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Abstract  
 
This thesis focuses on some of the most urgent and consequential issues in fiscal policy 
and development in Africa, with special reference to Zambia. In Chapter 2, the main research 
problem is how to get developing income countries out of the debilitating problem of low tax – 
low public expenditure low – development. We find possible merits in the ‘fiscal contract’ 
approach – suggesting that higher tax revenues can be achieved by improving accountability and 
offering better value for money in public expenditure. However, apparently the adoption of the 
value-added tax has not had a significant impact in spite of being regarded as the most significant 
innovation in tax policy design of the past millennium, whereas the establishment of ARAs has 
only had a contemporaneous positive effect, which on our analysis, dissipates over the medium 
term.  
 
In Chapter 3, we seek to understand whether investment in human capital, including public 
spending on education, is effective in promoting economic growth as suggested by ‘endogenous 
growth theory’. We also consider new issues in human capital accumulation, in particular ‘quality’ 
versus ‘quantity. We find strong evidence that the ‘quality’ (measured by repeater rates), rather 
than the ‘quantity’ (school enrolments) plays a major role and that policies of the past decades 
which have stressed ‘quantity’ may have undermined quality, and therefore, growth – a scepticism 
shared by the 2018 World Development Report. Our study also finds some evidence that 
institutions of governance matter for growth, but we find no evidence that different levels of public 
spending on education are differentially productive, contrary to assertions by World Bank (1986) 
and others.  
 
Chapter 4 brings together the revenue and expenditure dimensions of fiscal policy, to 
consider why fiscal deficits are becoming difficult to manage and control, especially in Africa. 
The evidence indicates that Africa’s democratisation has expressed itself in increasingly weak 
government ability to control fiscal deficits because in most African ‘political business cycles’ the 
pre-election fiscal boost is not counterbalanced by the post-election cutback. The ability to control 
fiscal deficits, especially in natural resource-dependent countries, has been compounded by 
government’s inability to effectively tax powerful resource corporations and poor management of 
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resources through wasteful spending, particularly on  uneconomic and unsustainable programmes. 
On the international scene, fiscal discipline is being further compromised by the erosion of the 
restraining influence of the IMF and aid donors, because low-income countries can now finance 
deficits using loans obtained from China and other sources and manage to postpone critical fiscal 
adjustments. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Summary of argument 
 
The economics literature has long asserted that fiscal policy – how the government designs 
and utilises policies relating to taxation, public spending and borrowing – plays a major role in 
shaping a country’s development (Diamond, 1965; Sato, 1967; Feldstein, 1974; Chamley, 1986). 
Several arguments for the developmental role of fiscal policy have been advanced, inter alia, 
fostering economic growth, better income distribution and stabilisation. Some commentators have 
argued that “fiscal policy can contribute to both development miracles and enduring stagnation” 
depending on how it is designed and implemented (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993: p.418). Until the 
1990s fiscal policy especially in developing countries, mainly promoted by Washington 
institutions, was largely confined to a narrow range of objectives focussing on short-term 
macroeconomic stabilisation and income distribution, but more recently its objectives in these 
countries have broadened to include other aspects such as building effective states, promoting 
employment and growth, accelerating the rate of capital formation and investment and achieving 
inclusive growth that is able to reduce poverty and inequality. In resource-rich countries where 
natural resource wealth has been linked to poor development outcomes, fiscal policy has been 
identified as a potential instrument in the effort to escape the ‘natural resource curse’ (Mosley, 
2017). Following the macroeconomic problems of the 1970s through the 1990s, there has been 
increased attention towards some of the most tenacious and consequential aspects of fiscal policy 
in developing countries, in particular how to improve domestic tax revenue performance which 
has stubbornly remain lower than other countries for decades, accelerating and sustaining the rate 
of growth and addressing rising and persistent public debt and unsustainable fiscal deficits. 
 
The use of fiscal policy, in addition to other policies, to achieve various developmental 
objectives has accomplished uneven success across the global, but it is developing countries which 
have continued to lag behind other countries in many areas, whether it is fiscal capacities, rates of 
economic growth and macroeconomic stability, income inequality, poverty or fiscal sustainability 
positions – most of which require urgent and appropriate policy solutions. For some while, the 
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international development community and independent analysts have been aware of these 
challenges and have sought to analyse and tackle them.  
 
In this thesis, we seek to understand fiscal policy in African development, and how its 
beneficial impacts can be improved. Although there is a large number of studies identifying various 
linkages and causes between different indicators of fiscal policy and development (from different 
perspectives), we focus on some the most urgent, tenacious and consequential aspects where very 
sparse research exists or empirical findings are inconclusive or  have scarcely been tackled by the 
empirical literature. Identifying and filling some of the gaps in our current knowledge on the 
developmental role of fiscal policy will not only contribute towards our better understanding of 
the fiscal policy-development connection but will also certainly contribute towards designing 
policies which can contribute towards addressing some of these development challenges. The 
broad objective of this thesis is to contribute towards this goal, and to accomplish this it has 
substantively been designed as three essays on different but interrelated aspects of fiscal policy, 
focusing on: tax revenue performance and how it can be improved; effectiveness of investment in 
human capital, including education public expenditure, since it has been given a pride of place in 
growth literature by Romer (1989) and other ‘new growth theory’ advocates; and why budget 
deficits are getting out of control, especially in Africa.  
 
Although the focus is on the economically backward continent of Africa in general, we have 
also made special reference to Zambia1, where recent trends show a declining tax-to-GDP ratio, 
slowing annual economic growth rates, rapidly rising public debt and fiscal deficits getting out of 
control, the country being reclassified by the IMF in 2015 as among the countries at the highest 
risk of debt distress2 and most recently, all the reputable international rating agencies (Moody’s, 
Standards and Poor’s and Fitch) having downgraded its credit rating. Our approach has, therefore, 
been partly informed by the need for the sponsors of my studies to benefit from the findings of this 
research. 
 
1 My PhD studies were sponsored by the Ministry of Finance in Zambia, as part of the effort to build government 
research capacity in a broad array of economic areas but more fundamentally in the fiscal policy and development 
fields. 
2 The IMF and World Bank classify a country as being at the highest risk of debt distress when it is experiencing 
difficulties in servicing its debt; accumulating arrears; when there are strong indications of a high probability debt 
restructuring; and when the risk of material losses to investors in the event of a default looms high (IMF, 2019) 
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1.2 Motivation of the thesis 
 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis focuses on three different but interrelated aspects of fiscal 
policy, which are relevant to our better understanding of the relationships between fiscal policy 
and development in a developing country context. Our intention here is to analyse these 
relationships and their implications and propose appropriate policy recommendations for 
addressing current obstacles to the prosperity of millions of people living under pernicious 
conditions in the developing world. 
 
The first research problem we focus on one of the most intractable problems in development, 
how to improve tax revenue performance in developing countries, because it is impossible to 
achieve development and prosperity without an effective state and a crucial element in building an 
effective state is building an effective tax system (di John 2006, Bräutigam  et al., 2008, Besley 
and Persson 2013). However, many of the poorest countries of the world have been unable to 
construct effective systems of taxation and thence continue to face the risks of being left further 
behind in development, as the gap between the poorest and other countries widens. 
 
This thesis also focuses on the role of public expenditure on education and human capital in 
promoting growth, because ‘new growth theory’ advocates assert that these are some of the 
essential ingredients in the generation of technological change and thence the growth of the 
economy (Romer, 1989; Barro, 1991), and also because rapid and sustained economic growth has 
been identified as the single most important instrument in the fight against poverty and inequality 
(UN, 2015). However, as we will see later on, the evidence on this relationship remains 
inconclusive. What is even more disturbing is that policies which have been promoted in 
developing countries and have been a central part of development strategies, such as expansion of 
school enrolments, have become controversial because they have not been able to guarantee higher 
growth rates. The 2018 World Development Report is now sceptical that education policies of the 
past five decades or so have not been successful towards achieving proper learning. However, it 
remains unclear whether such policies also affected the quality of education and therefore growth. 
The analysis here is motivated by the need to better understand factors that may have hampered 
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student learning and possibly growth, but also contribute in shaping educational policies that can 
lead to more learning and growth. 
 
In the final core chapter, the research problem we seek to explore is why fiscal deficits are 
getting out of control, especially in Africa, as can be observed from Table 4.1, in spite of the 
considerable macroeconomic implications. Large and persistent fiscal deficits profoundly concern 
policymakers and development agencies because of their economic costs including driving public 
debt into unsustainable levels, loss of policy flexibility to conduct prudent fiscal policy, loss of 
confidence in the economy and the damage to a country’s competitiveness. Low-income countries 
experienced large and persistent fiscal deficits, relative to other countries, leading to 
macroeconomic instability especially during the 1970s and 1980s. Although fiscal imbalances and 
public debt ebbed later the 1990s and early 2000s, they have recently returned in many low-income 
countries causing considerable macroeconomic problems. This thesis is motivated by the need to 
better understand what might be contributing towards the increasing weakness in government 
ability to control fiscal deficits. 
 
1.3 Common features of approach  
 
As part of our contribution to the literature, and because of the paucity of the data in Africa, 
we have adopted a two-track approach in all our substantive chapters called ‘qual-quant’– which 
is rarely employed in similar studies – combining panel data regression analysis, as the main 
analytical framework (quantitative approach), with a more detailed analysis of a country case study 
of Zambia (qualitative approach) in the final section of each chapter. This approach enables us to 
go beyond the general findings commonly generated from regressions and consider the 
applicability of such findings to a country situation (Zambia in this case), but more fundamentally, 
through this qualitative approach, try to identify particularities and causal factors which may 
underlie such findings but do not typically emerge in econometric analysis. Thus, the qualitative 
analysis helps to validate, or in some cases throw into question, some of the general findings from 
the cross-country regressions.  
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Across all the three core chapters, we have used the same sample of countries from Africa, 
with data on key variables primarily derived from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook datasets and covering the period between 1980 
and 2017. Sources of data for other variables are clearly indicated in each chapter. Data for our 
country case study sections are from public sources such as government published documents and 
responses from interviews conducted in Zambia.  
 
Because of the pernicious impact on estimates of the problem of ‘omitted variable bias’ 
caused by non-inclusion of all the relevant explanatory variables (which may not be readily 
available or observable), we have incorporated (where appropriate) country-specific fixed effects 
to account for heterogeneity arising from characteristics such as geographical, traditional and 
cultural factors and time-specific fixed effects in almost all our estimations to account for time-
linked factors such as unobservable shocks, domestic and global crises. We have also estimated 
our empirical models using the statistical package Stata/IC 14.2, based on the Huber-White’s 
standard errors approach, clustering standard errors at the country level to obtain unbiased standard 
errors and to ensure the estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. In each 
chapter, we conduct robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our key results to alternative 
estimation techniques and variable interactions.  
 
There are many cross-cutting themes between the chapters, including the importance of 
politics as a driver of economic development in all the chapters; natural resource wealth and its 
negative consequences in Chapters 2 and 4; and the developmental role of human capital, 
especially education as a driver of tax revenue performance and the growth rate of the economy in 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
Finally, as stated above the final section across all the substantive chapters is a case study 
with special reference to Zambia. Zambia has made strenuous attempts in many areas including 
democratisation, fiscal reforms, invested in human capital, and several attempts to rid its economy 
of fiscal deficits, but the country remains one of the poorly performing countries on the continent, 
and we wish to try and understand this paradox.  
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1.4 Presentation of thesis chapters 
 
As indicated above, this thesis consists of three core chapters, which are preceded by an 
introductory chapter at the beginning (the first present one) and followed by a concluding chapter 
at the end. In this section, we present summaries of the three substantive chapters which outline 
the research problem being tackled in each one of them, possible gaps in the current knowledge, 
methodologies employed and our main contributions at the end of each summary.  
 
In  Chapter 2 – Tax revenue performance in developing countries and how it can be 
improved – our research problem focusses on one of the most urgent and intractable problems in 
development, how to get low-income out of the pernicious problem of low tax – low public 
expenditure – low development spiral, which they have endured for decades. It is widely 
acknowledged that the capacity to generate sufficient revenues is at the core of building effective 
states and, therefore, development. However, experience over the past decades, as can be observed 
in Figure 2.1, shows that despite making some progress since the 2000s, low-income countries still 
lag behind other countries. Without building effective systems of taxation there is a risk that the 
development gap between the poorest and other countries may, therefore, widen. A large number 
of studies, summarised in Table 2.2, has identified several causes of poor revenue performance in 
low-income countries. We pick up on three issues in relation to this literature. First, we focus on 
the quality of tax structures –  recognised to play a major role in the growth of tax revenues in low-
income countries (Tanzi and Vito, 1987; Greenaway, 1991; Greenaway and Milner, 1992) – and 
the adoption of the VAT as a key tax policy reform initiative to improve tax structures and thence 
revenue collection. Although its objectives are well understood, the revenue impact of the VAT 
remains a controversial matter as evidence from the surprisingly limited number of studies is 
inconclusive. In this chapter, we re-examine the effectiveness of the value- added tax towards its 
revenue objective in a manner that attempts to do justice, by not only re-assessing its effectiveness, 
but also whether this depends on certain country-specific heterogeneity like the institutional 
environment in which it is designed and implemented and finally identifying factors which may 
underlie its lack of impact.  
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Second, we draw attention to the idea that has been credited by international development 
agencies that the roots of poor revenue performance are political – governments especially of weak 
states are unable to raise taxes if they fear that the consequences of doing so will be immediate 
loss of office or worse, powerful taxpayers in such societies will seek to use any leverage they can 
muster to avoid paying tax, and all taxpayers will resent paying tax more particularly if they can 
see that others much richer than them are not doing so. Therefore, efforts have been made to 
mitigate the anger and political turmoil caused by tax increases by ring-fencing the process of 
revenue collection from political interference by transferring it from the direct control of the 
ministry of finance and other political authorities to ARAs (Bergman 2003; Chand and Moene 
1999; Fjeldstad and Heggstad, 2012; Baskaran, 2013;). Whereas the objectives for establishing 
ARAs are well documented, and include improving revenue collections (Fjeldstad and Moore 
2009; Ahlerup et al., 2015; Mo, 2019), the empirical evidence on whether their formation has 
resulted in improved tax revenue performance is not just limited but also less clear. Similar to the 
VAT, we seek to re-assess the effectiveness of the ARAs towards the revenue objective by 
exploring whether it depends on certain country-specific heterogeneity like the institutional 
environment but also whether it takes some time to materialise (with some time-lag).  
 
The third issue, which is related to political factors, is the suggestion in the literature that 
political barriers to higher tax revenue performance can be overcome by framing the process of 
revenue collection as part of a ‘fiscal contract’ in which government commits to improve 
accountability and offer better value for money in public expenditure (our indicator of better value 
for money is health and education spending) in exchange for the revenue provided by taxpayers, 
rather than as a coercive process (Moore 1998; Bräutigam et al., 2008). However, the issue of how 
such ‘fiscal contracts’ can be formed, and what impact they have had, has scarcely been tackled 
by the empirical literature on revenue generation. Our main purpose here is to begin to fill this 
gap, by constructing and testing a picture of the process by which ‘fiscal contracts’ emerge and 
impact on the capacity of fiscal systems in developing countries. 
 
Our estimating models are specified and run in form of fixed effects and random effects 
models (common in the tax literature), on a sample of 42 African countries between 1980-2013. 
In addition, we account for the potential problem of endogeneity (selection bias) which may be 
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associated with the two policy reform initiatives (VAT and ARAs). Taken together, our main 
results suggest possible merits in the ‘fiscal contract’ approach as a possible solution to low 
revenues in Africa – our two variables which are proposed to play a major role in the emergence 
of a stable ‘fiscal contract’, democratic accountability and the value for money in public 
expenditure, emerge as significant correlates with tax ratios. However, in spite of being regarded 
as the most significant innovation in tax policy design of the past hundred years, apparently the 
VAT has not provided any revenue advantages, short- or long-term, to countries which have 
adopted them relative to those which have not, and that this does not depend on the institutional 
environment. We find some evidence that the establishment of ARAs may have led to 
contemporaneous improvements in tax ratios, but the effect dissipates over the medium to long 
term. However,  
 
More insights into the evolution of tax ratios and causal factors which may underlie the 
process were gained from the case studies of two similar countries with different patterns in tax 
revenue performance: Zambia (deteriorating) and Ghana (improving). Ghana has increased 
revenues after adopting the value-added by increasing the tax rate three times and linking it to the 
national insurance scheme or education, whereas Zambia’s has endured a steady decline since its 
adoption because of weak resistance towards demands from the urban populations for lower taxes 
on of basic commodities. The lack of VAT impact has also been linked to the complexity and 
difficulty in administering the tax in low-income countries due to the rigorous information and 
systems requirements. In Zambia, because of poor information management systems, there is a 
steady increase in input tax refunds relative to the growth in tax collections. We also find evidence 
that ARAs are not completely independent of political interference and are frequently too beholden 
to the executive. In terms of the processes by which stable ‘fiscal contracts’, this is possible when 
there is evidence of effective public expenditure, or a formal or informal link between a particular 
tax base and a particular form of favoured public expenditure (as in the windfall taxes levied in 
the1990s and 2000s in both countries), tax revenues can improve. Also, when it is known that a 
level playing field for tax liability which publicly brings the large and powerful (in particular multi-
national corporations) into the tax net and are paying what they owe has been established,  
taxpayers are more willing to pay. For instance, in Ghana all natural resource companies pay 
whereas in Zambia only two out of eleven mining companies pay corporation tax, which has 
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damaged both tax effort and the perception of equitable treatment between taxpayers in Zambia. 
A revised version of this section of Chapter 2, which is joint work with my supervisors, Professor 
Paul Mosley and Dr. Pamela Lenton, has been issued by the Sheffield Economic Research Paper 
Series (Lenton, Masiye and Mosley, 2017). 
 
In Chapter 3 – government expenditure on education, human capital and economic growth 
in developing countries – the research issue we wish to tackle is whether investment in human 
capital, including expenditure on education, is effective since it has been credited in the theoretical 
literature and given a pride of place in ‘endogenous growth theory’ as essential in generating 
technological change and thence growth (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1991). Recalling one 
of the key arguments of Chapter 2, we focus on the education aspect of human capital in this 
chapter, and draw attention to the composition of government expenditure on education as helping 
to determine the quality of education spending, and thus growth. A very large number of studies 
has explored this relationship using aggregate measures of human capital such as total education 
spending, school enrolments, years of schooling and literacy rates as predictors of growth, but 
none of these measures reliably predicts growth rates on a cross-country basis as there are as many 
studies reporting the lack of correlation or ambiguous findings as those finding a positive 
association (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Pritchett, 1997). The only studies that have conducted 
proper robustness checks are sceptical in tone, suggesting clearly that the original ‘endogenous 
growth hypothesis’ has severe difficulties defending its claims (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-
Martin, 1997; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004; Hoover and Perez, 2004).  
 
In this chapter, we wish to examine the possibility that although aggregate measures such as 
government expenditure on education may not emerge as significant correlates with growth, some 
of its categories may differentially affect growth – as suggested by the World Bank (1986) and 
others – and that such clues may be found in disaggregating the variable of interest between the 
different levels of education, something that has scarcely been attempted (with very few exceptions 
such as Devarajan et al., 1996). We also draw attention to the importance of the ‘quality’ aspect 
of human capital which has been observed by van der Berg (2007) for South Africa and 
underscored in the 2018 World Development Report but underexplored in the empirical literature. 
We seek to assess whether the ‘quality’ of education matters for growth as much as the ‘quantity’, 
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and whether previous policies which focussed on the expansion of enrolments might have 
undermined ‘quality’, and thence, economic growth. As in Chapter 2, we also consider the possible 
influence of institutions of governance (political factors), in particular the quality of democratic 
governance, in directly promoting growth or indirectly contributing to the effectiveness of public 
spending, since it has been suggested that well-functioning institutions can enhance the 
effectiveness of policies (Pritchett, 1996; Gupta et al., 1999; Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008) and 
that political factors tend to be crucial in poorer developing countries. 
 
Based on OLS, feasible generalised least squares and instrumental variable two-stage least 
squares estimations, we find no evidence that government spending on education and expansion 
of school enrolments have been able to create a strong footing for growth in Africa. Our analysis 
of disaggregated data on government spending on different levels of education could not validate 
the World Bank conventional wisdom and suggestions from micro level empirical studies that 
allocating more resources towards a particular level of education, such as primary can be more 
effective in promoting higher growth. However, we found very strong evidence of a statistically 
significant positive correlation between our measure of education ‘quality’, repetition rates, and 
growth, and that improving schooling conditions and the quality of institutions can propel 
educational ‘quality’ and therefore growth. Our preliminary findings also point to the possibility 
that policies that have strongly focussed on expansion of school enrolments over the past five or 
so decades may have compromised ‘quality’, confirming the scepticism expressed by the World 
Bank’s 2018 World Development Report.  
 
We have gained more insights into these issues by considering the case of Zambia, where 
the government has closely followed development strategies promoted by the World Bank since 
independence in 1964: government expenditure on education has increased significantly (currently 
receives the biggest allocation of the budget), school enrolments especially at primary level have 
expanded massively, however, economic growth has not increased proportionally – which appears 
to be a classic case of the apparent weak association between spending, school enrolments and 
growth. 
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The evidence from our qualitative analysis reveals that explanations for the low educational 
impact and poor ‘quality’ of education can be linked to several causal factors including 
inefficiencies in managing public resources, including the disproportionate allocation of scarce 
resources (of more than 80 percent) towards teacher wages/salaries versus other essential and 
complementary educational inputs leading to a widespread lack of the necessary teaching and 
learning materials as well as suitable school infrastructure. The existence of weak and poorly 
functioning institutions of governance has also contributed towards the failure to send a significant 
proportion of resources designated for specific educational programmes to the intended areas (due 
to fraud, embezzlement and misapplication). The ‘quality’ of education has further been 
compromised by a failure to recognise that growth in school enrolments cannot effectively deliver 
better learning unless complementary inputs such as teaching materials, additional teaching staff 
and maintenance of school buildings are delivered at the same time: a problem which in Zambia 
has been compounded by weak budgetary discipline and switching of such resources away from 
the areas to which they had been destined. Finally, the Zambia case study highlights the fact that 
its increased democratisation has not necessarily expressed itself in better economic conditions, 
perhaps implying that it is not enough to just create institutions of governance but ensuring that 
they are properly functioning is even more crucial.  
 
In Chapter 4 – The political economy of fiscal deficits in developing countries – we bring 
together the tax and expenditure dimensions of fiscal policy to try and identify some of the key 
factors that may be causing fiscal deficits to get out of control, especially in Africa. Large and 
persistent fiscal deficits profoundly concern policymakers and development agencies because of 
their macroeconomic implications as they may lead to unsustainable public debt, loss of policy 
flexibility to conduct prudent (countercyclical) fiscal policy, a general loss of confidence in the 
economy and more crucially loss of a country’s competitiveness.  
 
A large number of studies has explored causes and consequences of fiscal deficits and early 
work in this area such as the ‘tax smoothing hypothesis’ emphasised the major role played by 
macroeconomic factors in the tendency for the deficit to deteriorate. However, following the 
emergence of large and persistent deficits, underlying causal influences have broadened to include 
political, institutional and external factors. Few studies explore factors which can cause temporary 
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fiscal deficits to persist and therefore exacerbate the risks of macroeconomic instability and fiscal 
unsustainability. We seek to identify relevant factors pertinent to small open economies of Africa 
which play a major part in the tendency for temporary fiscal deficits to become persistent and 
difficult to control. We attempt to break new ground in relation to previous work by employing 
the ideas of ‘political business cycle’ to assess whether governments in Africa are able to 
implement the deflationary phase of the cycle to bring down fiscal deficits after the election as 
claimed by the political economy literature, and whether and how the natural resource wealth 
increases government weakness in ability to control fiscal deficits and therefore erodes fiscal 
discipline. We also consider whether the ability to control fiscal deficits depends on the 
relationship developing countries have with development agencies and aid donors, who finance a 
large portion of national budgets or on the quality of domestic institutions of governance which 
are expected to act as ‘agencies of restraint’ as suggested by Collier (1999) and others. The 
question of what the impact of foreign aid has been in recipient countries has been extensively 
explored but the evidence remains controversial. An important issue which has not been 
thoroughly explored in this literature is whether the availability of alternative sources of financing 
has possibly eroded the restraining influence of traditional aid donors and contributed to the return 
of large fiscal deficits in Africa in the recent past. We attempt to contribute to this area by analysing 
the case of Zambia. 
  
A standard dynamic model that captures the essence of the Nordhaus-type opportunistic 
approach, augmented by the ‘natural resource curse’ propositions and a measure which captures 
the role of aid donors, is specified and estimated on a more recent dataset than most previous 
studies on Africa (1980-2016). Our cross-section regressions, conducted using Huber-White’s 
robust OLS approach, fixed effects and the instrumental variable estimator three-stage least 
squares, confirm the incidence of fiscal policy manipulation during election years (pre-election 
spending increases), but that these are on average not followed up by adequate post-election 
cutback (as suggested by the insignificant coefficients on the two variables created to capture post-
election fiscal policy). This scenario presents African governments with an unpleasant choice of 
surrendering to the cycle and thus causing a temporary deficit to persist. The evidence, especially 
in natural resource intensive countries, shows that control of deficits is compounded by 
increasingly weak ability to effectively tax powerful natural resource companies which, as 
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mentioned in Chapter 2, damages the perception of equitable treatment between taxpayers, and 
thence tax effort, but also that the inability to resist political pressure (often due to the weak 
political base of most African governments) has led to resource revenues being frequently wasted 
on uneconomic and unsustainable public projects which require financing when the boom is over.  
 
 The evidence from the case study has confirmed the negative conclusion that Zambia’s 
increasing democratisation expressed itself in increasingly weak government resistance towards 
demands after, as well as before, elections, which increasingly compromised its ability to impose 
post-election deflation as election-linked cycles in deficits have been strengthening over the years 
(see Figure 4.3). The government’s ability to control fiscal deficits has been weakened by natural 
resource wealth, in particular the copper booms of the 1970s and the early 2000s were channelled 
towards the expansion of basic services and the role of the state, expansion of poorly designed and 
targeted agricultural subsidies, large scale but uneconomical infrastructure projects, and public 
sector wages, which were difficult to rollback when the booms were over. Finally, we find that 
because of the poor relationship Zambia has had historically with aid donors, and more recently 
the increased availability of diversified sources of financing such as Chinese loans and commercial 
borrowing, its ability to finance deficits has not depended on the relationship with traditional aid 
donors. Although the country has in this way managed to dodge the restraining influence of donors, 
it has not completely escaped the cost of delayed adjustment: fiscal deficits have deteriorated faster 
than anywhere else on the continent since 2010; public debt has increased rapidly, from 21 percent 
of GDP in 2011 to about 60 percent by 2016; and the country is now one of the 17 nations in Africa 
considered to be at highest risk of debt distress. 
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Chapter 2 
Tax revenue performance in developing countries 
and how it can be improved 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the first of the three core chapters of this thesis, and a section of which has 
developed into a joint paper with my supervisors issued by the Sheffield Economic Research Paper 
Series (Lenton, Masiye and Mosley, 2017), we consider one of the most intractable and urgent 
problems in development – how to get the poorest countries of the world out of the low tax-low 
public expenditure-low development spiral. The issue of low tax revenue performance has 
concerned preoccupied the international development community, independent analysts and 
policymakers for several decades (William, 1961; Lotz and Morss, 1967; IMF, 2011) because it is 
widely accepted that development is impossible without the construction of an effective state, and 
that a crucial element in building an effective state is building an effective tax system (Fjeldstad 
and Rakner, 2003; Bräutigam  et al., 2008; Di John, 2006; Besley and Persson 2013)3. However, 
as can be observed in Figure 2.1, experience shows that low-income countries lag behind other 
countries and there is a concern among the development community and other commentators that 
without building effective systems of taxation there is a risk of low-income countries remaining 
trapped in low or static revenues, and since state-building drives development, there is also a risk 
that the gap between the poorest and other countries may therefore widen (Di John, 2011; United 
Nations, 2013). 
 
 
3 Besley and Persson’s study of ‘pillars of prosperity’ argues that one of the pillars of an effective state is a well- 
functioning tax system, not least because the tax system underpins other institutions, public expenditure and legal 
institutions in particular. They argue that ‘Countries that have better fiscal capacity also tend to have better legal 
capacity, both of which are correlated with contemporaneous GDP per capita’ (Besley and Persson 2013: p.7, see also 
pages 31-33, 40-102, 131-138.) The case for the primacy of taxation as a development instrument has also been made 
by Deborah Bräutigam : ‘Taxation is an underrated tool in the effort to build more capable and responsive 
states…Democracies are built not only on periodic elections but also on a social contract based on bargaining over 
the collection and spending of public revenue. [Indeed, we can argue] that taxation may play the central role in building 
and sustaining the power of states.’ (Bräutigam  2008a; also, Bräutigam , Fjeldstad and Moore 2008:1-2). 
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What is particularly striking is that although there has been a marked improvement in low-
income countries generally since the early 2000s (Keen and Mansour, 2009; 2010), tax revenues 
have remained stubbornly low in relative to high-income countries where they have been high and 
middle-income countries where they have improved. The international development community 
and independent analysts have been aware of this problem and have sought to analyse and tackle 
it for some while, but today it still remains one of the development policy issues in international 
development discourse. As can be observed from Table 2.2 below, a large number of studies has 
identified several factors that are associated with variations in tax revenue performance across 
countries. Studies of the 1960s focused on macro-economic influences, identifying the level of 
development, openness of the economy to foreign trade and economic policies as important 
determinants. By the 1980s, these studies had broadened in scope to consider the sectoral 
composition of the tax base including the shares of agriculture and mining, and by the millennium 
governance indicators had also entered the picture.  
 
Within this huge literature, the structure of the tax system (main source of tax revenues) has 
been recognised to play a major role in the growth of tax revenues in developing countries. The 
literature has identified the poor quality of tax structures in low-income countries, which depend 
heavily on distortionary, narrow, unstable and low-yielding taxes such as sales and turnover taxes 
and in some cases trade taxes also, are a major cause of poor tax revenue performance (Greenaway, 
1984; Greenaway and Milner, 1991; Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997). International development 
agencies, with the IMF in the lead4, have sought to improve tax structures by weaning governments 
away from dependence on these traditional revenue sources, towards taxes on broader bases, and 
in particular towards the VAT. The VAT, which is credited for being broad-based, efficient and 
neutral on business, has now been widely adopted throughout the World. By some accounts its 
widespread in emergent and developing countries has been regarded as the most significant and 
visible innovation in tax policy design of the 21st century, while others have referred to it as a 
‘money machine’ (Ebrill et al., 2001; Keen and Lockwood, 2010). However, although its 
objectives and advantages are well understood, the success of the VAT towards the revenue 
objective remains a controversial matter, as the evidence from the surprisingly limited number of 
 
4 The International Monetary Fund has for a long time played a leading role in supporting efforts to improve tax 
revenue performance in developing countries (Cottarelli, 2011: p.4).  
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studies is inconclusive, and what is even disturbing for policymakers is that very little is understood 
about what might be causing its weak or low revenue impact. The efficacy of the VAT is now 
receiving renewed attention from policymakers in some countries. For instance, Zambia had 
recently announced its intentions to abolish the VAT by June 2019 arguing that it has not lived up 
to its revenue promises but has been a drain on the country’s resources. We attempt to expand the 
evidence base on the ‘true’ revenue impact of the VAT by assessing whether its impact takes some 
time to materialise or depends on certain country-specific heterogeneity. In addition, we attempt 
to identify possible causal factors which may underlie its lack of impact.  
 
Analysts and development agencies also assert that the roots of poor tax revenue 
performance are political – governments especially of weak states are unable to raise taxes if they 
fear that the consequences of doing so will be immediate loss of office or worse, powerful 
taxpayers in such societies will seek to use any leverage they can muster to avoid paying tax, and 
all taxpayers will resent paying tax more particularly if they can see that others much richer than 
them are not doing so. Such things have damaged the perception of equitable treatment between 
taxpayers such that any attempt to increase taxes has created anger and political turmoil in fragile 
countries. This is well illustrated by the case of Bolivia in February 2003, when at a time of severe 
economic crisis, following an IMF recommendation, the government proposed to widen the 
income-tax net so as to include sections of the middle class not then liable to pay tax. This proposed 
tax increase had to be abandoned after a violent revolt, in which over thirty people were killed, 
including several members of the La Paz police (who were in the group newly included in the tax 
net under the IMF’s proposals, and were themselves seeking to throw the proposals out). A key 
factor underlying the insurrection was that it became widely known that most upper-income 
people, especially oil and mining executives, who were due to pay income tax were not actually 
doing so, and this had been widely publicised in the press and on the internet5. In order to mitigate 
the anger and political turmoil caused by tax increases especially in fragile political environments, 
efforts have therefore been made by many governments to depoliticise the process of revenue 
collection by transferring tax collection from the direct control of the ministry of finance and other 
political authorities to ARAs (Bergman 2003, Chand and Moene 1999 , Fjeldstad and Moore 
2009); and also, more fundamentally, to frame the process of revenue collection as part of a fiscal 
 
5 For further detail of this episode, see Mosley (2012), chapter 10, Lora (2013) and Laserna (2011). 
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‘social contract’ (Moore 1998, 2013; Bräutigam et al. 2008) in which government commits itself 
to provide public services in exchange for the revenue provided by taxpayers, rather than as a 
coercive process in which the state extorts taxes where it can without needing to justify or be held 
to account for the way in which this is done. Over the past three decades, ARAs have spread across 
sub-Saharan Africa on the recommendation and support of the IMF and bilateral aid donors. 
Surprisingly, very little research exists on whether ARAs have provided any revenue advantages 
in countries where they have been established, and there is currently an unresolved controversy 
surrounding their ‘true’ impact. In this chapter we seek to assess whether their impact materialises 
with a time lag or depend on country-specific heterogeneity. On the ‘fiscal contract’ approach, as 
a possible solution to low tax revenue performance, we do not have any systematic evidence 
concerning the processes by which such ‘fiscal contracts’ can be formed, and what impact they 
have had, has scarcely been tackled by the empirical literature on revenue generation. Our main 
purpose here is to contribute in filling this gap. 
 
The empirical approach here, as mentioned earlier, is a ‘qual-quant’ analysis combining 
panel-data regression analysis on a sample of 42 African countries between 1980-2013, as our 
main analytical framework, and a comparative qualitative analysis of two countries, Ghana and 
Zambia in the final section. Standard estimating models commonly employed in the literature are 
specified as fixed effects and random effects specifications and estimated using Stata/IC 14.2 on a 
sample of 42 African countries between 1980-2013. We also account for a potential problem of 
endogeneity (selection bias) in our estimations, which may be associated with the decisions to 
adopt the VAT and ARAs.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides a picture of the global 
variations and varieties of experience in tax revenue performance, followed by a summary of the 
literature in section 2.3. Our three main innovations and issues of interest in this chapter are 
discussed in more detail in section 2.3, which is followed by the empirical approach and model 
specifications in sections 2.4, respectively. The empirical findings are presented and discussed in 
section 2.5. The second part of our methodology, the qualitative analysis of Ghana and Zambia is 
discussed in section 2.6 and the final section is the conclusion. 
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2.2. Variations in tax revenue performance  
  
It is well-documented that there are significant variations in tax revenue generation across 
countries and income groups, but it is the poorest countries of the world that are also the least 
performers. Besley and Persson (2011: p.102) show that poorer countries “tax very little” and raise 
much lower tax revenues, as a share of GDP, than middle- and higher-income countries. The most 
comprehensive datasets compiled by the International Centre for Tax and Development 
(Government Revenue Dataset) and the IMF (Government Financial Statistics) also show that on 
average tax revenues in developing countries have been the lowest (albeit improving since the 
2000s) generating less than 15 percent of GDP in tax revenues over the past three or so decades 
(WEO, 2017; ICTD/UNU-WIDER, 2017), which is below the level recommended by the IMF as 
a reasonable “minimum threshold for the provision of basic public goods and services” (IMF, 
2011: p.7). As can be observed from Figure 2.1, which shows average tax revenues (including 
resource revenues) as a share of GDP between 1980-2016, high-income countries collect the 
highest (averaging between 35 and 40 percent), followed by middle-income countries (between 20 
and 35 percent). The data also reveals that despite being low, average tax revenue performance 
has been improving in low- and middle-income countries, but the increase is faster in middle-
income countries than low-income as a group. These developments in tax capacities have also been 
confirmed elsewhere. For instance, Mosley (2015: Table 1) shows in a sample of 61 low- and 
middle-income countries that between 1990 and 2010, tax revenues improved in nine out of twenty 
low-income countries compared to 35 out of 41 middle-income countries.  
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Figure 2.1:  Tax revenues, percent of GDP, by income groups (1980-2016) 
 
Source: ICTD/UNU-WIDER (2018), IMF (2011). Notes: The categorisation of countries by income group follows 
the World Bank classification based on gross national income per capita 
 
The issue of low tax revenue performance has also drawn a lot of attention towards sub-
Saharan Africa, where for the past decades there has been marked improvement, but considerable 
variations still remain. In Table 2.1, we show variations in tax revenue performance in Africa, 
which reveal that although the average tax revenue performance increased from about 14.3 percent 
during the decade of the 1980s to more than 17 percent by the decade of the 2010s, there have 
been progress in some countries while many others have endured near-static or even declining 
revenues over prolonged periods. For instance, between 1980 and 2015, tax revenue collections 
improved in 15 out of the 37 African countries and declined in 7 countries. The evolution of tax 
revenue performance between the two countries of interest in this chapter, Ghana and Zambia, are 
also very different as shown in the shaded sections of Table 2.1, in spite of the political and 
economic similarities. Ghana’s tax ratio rose from 6 percent during the decade of the 1980s to 20 
percent in the decade of the 2010s, whereas Zambia’s fell during the same period from 20 percent 
to 14.7 percent.  
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Table 2.1: Tax revenues in Africa, percent of GDP (decade averages) 1980-2015 (see notes (a), (b), 
(c), (d), (e) 
Country 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
% change per decade 
(1980-2015) 
1. Angola 21.4 30.5 40.3 37.8 4.1 
2. Benin 10.7 10.7 14.5 14.9 1.1 
3. Botswana 22.8 25.0 25.3 24.5 0.4 
4. Burkina Faso 7.9 10.0 11.7 14.6 1.7 
5. Burundi 13.1 14.7 13.3 13.5 0.1 
6. Cameroon 10.4 9.1 14.8 12.9 0.6 
7. Cape Verde 11.7 14.1 18.7 18.5 1.7 
8. Central African Republic 11.7 8.0 7.9 7.2 -1.1 
9. Chad 3.9 5.4 8.1 13.8 2.5 
10. Comoros 10.3 11.5 11.0 11.5 0.3 
11. Congo, Dem. Rep. 8.5 2.3 5.3 10.3 0.4 
12. Congo, Rep. 28.7 11.6 7.6 10.9 -4.4 
13. Cote d'Ivoire 20.9 16.0 14.5 16.1 -1.2 
14. Ethiopia 9.0 7.8 10.6 12.0 0.7 
15. Gambia, The 12.3 12.5 12.4 14.9 0.7 
16. Ghana 6.2 8.5 12.2 14.2 2.0 
17. Guinea-Bissau 6.6 4.3 5.6 8.1 0.4 
18. Kenya 13.3 14.8 15.1 16.0 0.7 
19. Lesothod 28.8 34.7 40.5 40.7 3.0 
20. Madagascar 9.9 8.8 10.4 10.0 0.0 
21. Malawi 8.8 7.8 10.1 14.9 1.5 
22. Mali 8.1 9.2 12.5 12.9 1.2 
23. Mauritius 18.4 17.2 16.4 18.6 0.1 
24. Mozambique 8.1 9.0 10.8 19.9 2.9 
25. Namibia 25.2 28.0 27.3 31.1 1.5 
26. Niger 9.5 7.2 11.7 14.4 1.2 
27. Rwanda 10.0 8.7 11.3 13.9 1.0 
28. Senegal 14.1 14.6 17.6 19.0 1.2 
29. Seychelles 34.4 31.0 26.3 29.8 -1.1 
30. Sierra Leone 4.3 6.3 8.4 9.9 1.4 
31. South Africa 22.5 24.4 26.5 27.4 1.2 
32. Swazilande 14.2 20.1 22.3 24.6 2.6 
33. Tanzania 8.7 9.9 9.2 10.7 0.5 
34. Togo 22.6 12.1 14.2 17.5 -1.3 
35. Uganda 4.4 7.7 10.1 10.2 1.4 
36. Zambia 20.0 17.2 15.0 14.7 -1.3 
37. Zimbabwe 24.3 22.5 15.0 22.1 -0.5 
Regional average 14.2 13.9 15.3 17.1 0.7 
Source: ICTD/UNU-WIDER (2018). Notes: countries that have been shaded (Ghana and Zambia) will be used in this 
chapter as case studies to highlight why causal factors that underlie differences in the development and performance 
of tax revenues. 
Notes: (a) The data in all the columns represent decade averages except for the column headed  ‘2010s’ which have 
been averaged over a 7-year period (2010-2016) as there is no consistent data beyond 2016; (b) The average tax ratios 
for Africa cover the average tax performance in the 37 countries in the table and not the whole continent; (c) The 
percentage change is the increase or decrease in tax ratios from the decade 1980/89 or the earliest available decade to 
the decade 2010/16. (d) and (e) These revenues may be overstated because they include transfers from South Africa 
that appear as South African Customs Union (SACU) tariff revenues.  
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The stylised statistics in Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 clearly show that poor tax revenue 
performance remains an urgent and intractable issue in development, particularly in the poorest 
countries of the world. Because the capacity to generate sufficient tax revenues is at the core of 
building effective states and, thence, development, building effective tax systems has been an 
important policy objective in international development discourse for some while (Leuthold, 1991; 
Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; Ghura, 1998; IMF, 2011; Di John, 2011). 
 
2.3. Previous studies – survey of the literature 
 
The standard empirical approach has often been cross-country panel data analysis, regressing 
total tax revenues as a share of GDP on various combinations of explanatory variables representing 
the state of the macroeconomy, level of development, quality of tax structures and sectoral 
composition of the tax base and several other demographic, political and governance causes. The 
estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables included in these regressions represent the 
average impact of such variables on the country’s tax revenue performance. Our survey of the 
literature shows that efforts to analyse empirically determinants of tax revenue performance began 
in the 1960s with the identification of macro-economic influences such as the overall level of 
development and openness to international trade (Williamson, 1961; Hinrichs, 1965; 1970). In 
what some have described as one of the most influential studies in early tax literature, Lotz and 
Morss (1967) provide a theoretical basis and some early empirical findings linking revenue 
performance to GNP per capita and openness to foreign trade. They assert growth in “national 
income is often accompanied by higher rates of literacy, increased monetisation and stricter law 
enforcement – all of which can be expected to increase revenues‟ and that a country’s ability to 
collect more taxes increases with openness to international trade because “it is administratively 
easier to levy and collect taxes on trade inflows and outflows than domestic transactions‟ (Ibid: 
p.481- 482).  
 
From the 1970s onward, as shown in Table 2.2, several studies have explored the influence 
of sectoral composition of the tax base, focussing on the shares of agriculture and natural resources, 
especially mining, in the economy (Chelliah, Baas and Kelly, 1975; Tait and Eichengreen, 1978; 
Tait, Gratz and Eichengreen, 1979), and the structure of the tax system on tax revenue 
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performance. Most of these studies report a strong negative correlation between the share of the 
agricultural value addition and tax revenues, because the agricultural sector especially in poor 
countries is dominated by numerous small farmers who are notoriously difficult to tax (as most of 
them scarcely operate in the monetary economy, therefore do not keep accounts, and their activities 
take place in very remote places). A large share of mining (rents or exports) in the economy has 
also been found empirically to have a significant negative influence on tax revenue and has been 
seen as one manifestation of the ‘natural resource curse’ (Mosley, 2017). Consequently, during the 
1990s and 2000s indicators of institutions of governance entered into the picture, including 
corruption, voice, political regimes and rule of law (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Ghura, 1998; Gupta, 
2007; Thornton, 2008; Bird et al., 2004, 2012; Le et al., 2012; Ehrhart, 2012). In one very recent 
study (Langford and Ohlenburg, 2016) democratic accountability has also been explored (as 
reported in the bottom part of Table 2.2). Although theoretical work linking institutional factors to 
taxation started much earlier, with the influential work of Meltzer and Richard (1981) who 
proposed a model linking the increase in government taxes to “the demand for income 
redistribution by voters” (Meltzer and Richard, 1981: p.924), empirical studies did not become 
popular until  the 1990s and 2000s. The most consistent story emerging from studies of  
governance in relation to tax revenues is that high levels of corruption are generally associated 
with lower tax ratios.  
 
Studies have also identified political factors as causes of poor revenue collection especially 
in fragile states where, because of state weakness, governments are too weak to effectively tax ‘big 
players’ in particular multi-national corporations (including powerful natural resource companies) 
thereby creating the perception of inequitable treatment between low- and high-income earners, 
which then leads to taxpayers resenting paying taxes. This is well illustrated by the case of Bolivia 
mentioned earlier.  
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Table 2.2: Selected regression studies on determinants of tax revenue performance  
Author(s) Dependent variable, 
sample and time 
period 
Estimation 
method 
 Independent (right-hand side) variables in regression 
Macro-economic Tax structure Economic structure  Governance Other 
Williamson (1961) T/Y(33 LDCs 1950-
59) 
OLS Per capita GNP*     
Lotz and Morss (1967) T/Y (72 developing 
countries, 1962-66) 
 GNP/capita*, trade 
share* 
    
Lotz and Morss (1970) T/Y(50 developing 
countries, 1962-66) 
OLS Per capita 
GDP(private)*, 
trade*  
  ‘Government 
centralisation’ 
(i.e. autocracy) 
 
Chelliah (1971)   Non-mining exports*  Shares of mining 
exports*and 
agriculture* in GNP 
  
Chelliah et al. 
(1975) 
T/Y 
(all LDCs 
1972-76) 
OLS GDP, 
Openness 
(exports/GDP*) 
 Mining exports/GDP*   
Tait, Grätz, Eichengreen 
(1979) 
T/Y 
(all LDCs 
1972-76) 
OLS GDP(net of exports), 
Openness 
exports/GDP) 
 Shares of agriculture 
and mining* in GDP 
 
  
Greenaway (1980, 1984) T/Y (50 countries) 
1972-77 
OLS GNP International trade*    
Tanzi (1981) T/Y (34 sub-Saharan 
African countries, 
1977) 
 GNP/capita, Non-
mining exports* 
 Shares of mining*  Foreign debt* 
Tanzi (1992) T/Y (88 developing 
countries, 1978-88) 
 GNP/capita  Shares of agriculture*, 
import share*,  
  
Leuthold (1991) T/Y 
(eight African 
countries 1973-81) 
OLS, also 
Autoregressive 
Desired tax share, , 
openness* 
([X+M]/Y) 
 
 
 Shares of mining and 
agriculture* in income 
  
Stotsky and WoldeMariam 
(1997) 
T/Y (43 sub-Saharan 
countries, 1990-95) 
OLS GDP/capita*,  export*, imports Shares of agriculture*, 
mining*, manufacturing 
  
Ghura (1998) T/Y (39 sub-Saharan 
countries, 1985-96) 
IV-GLS GDP/capita*, 
inflation*, exchange 
rate,  
Trade*, natural 
resources*  
Share of agriculture* provision of 
public services*, 
corruption* 
Structural 
reforms* 
Piancastelli (2001) T/Y (75 countries, 
1985-95) 
 GDP/capita Trade share*,  Shares of agriculture*, 
manufacturing*, 
services* 
  
Baunsgaard and Keen 
(2005) 
T/Y (111 developed 
and developing 
Panel data (fixed 
and random 
effects); 
Per capita GDP, 
openness* 
 Agriculture/GDP; share 
of trade taxes and VAT 
in total revenue 
 Overseas aid* 
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countries, 1975-
2000) 
instrumental 
variables; GMM 
Gupta (2007) T/Y 
(1980-2004) 
Panel data with 
fixed- and 
random-effects 
specifications, 
also difference-
GMM and 
system-GMM 
GDP/capita* 
(significant in  low 
income countries 
only) 
 
 
Openness (goods and 
services/GDP) 
 Agriculture/ 
GDP* 
 
Corruption*, 
political 
stability, rule of 
law 
Aid/GDP* 
Bornhorst et al. (2008) Non-hydrocarbon 
T/Y (30 hydrocarbon 
producing countries, 
1992-05) 
OLS, Allerano 
Bond estimator 
GDP/capita Trade* Share of agriculture* Corruption*  
Bird et al. (2008) T/Y, Revenue/Y (25 
developing countries, 
1990-99) 
Cross-section 
OLS and 2SLS 
GDP/capita* Share of trade* Share of agriculture* Voice & 
accountability*, 
corruption* 
Population 
growth* 
Tanzi and Davoodi (2008) T/Y (68 countries, 
1980-95) 
OLS GDP/capita*   Corruption 
index* 
 
Drummond et al. 
(2012) 
Total revenue/GDP 
(including social 
contributions and 
non-tax revenue) 
(1980-2009) 
Panel data with 
fixed- and 
random-effects 
specifications 
GDP/capita* 
Agriculture/GDP 
Inflation rate* 
 Share of trade taxes Corruption, 
oil/natural 
resource rents*, 
size of shadow 
economy 
Aid/GDP 
Ehrhart (2012) T/Y (66 developing 
countries, 1990-
2005) 
Random effects, 
instrumental 
variable 2SLS 
GDP/capita, 
inflation,  
Imports  Share of agriculture,  Corruption*, 
bureaucratic 
quality*, 
political regime* 
Urbanisation, 
population*, 
aid/capita 
Le et al. (2012) T/Y (110 developed 
and developing 
countries, 1994-09) 
OLS with 
regional and 
time dummies 
GDP/capita* Share of trade*, 
agriculture* 
 Bureaucratic 
quality*, 
corruption 
index* 
Population 
growth* 
Fenocchietto and Pessino 
(2013) 
T/Y (113 countries, 
1991-12) 
Stochastic 
frontier method 
Inflation, 
agriculture/GDP*, 
 
Share of trade* Share of agriculture* Corruption* Gini 
coefficient of 
inequality*  
Keen and Lockwood (2010) T/Y (143 countries, 
1975-00) 
OLS, 
instrumental 
variable 
GDP/capita*,  Share of trade*, 
VAT* (but not for 
SSA) 
Share of agriculture*  Population  
von Haldenwang et al. 
(2014) 
T/Y (municipalities 
in Peru, 1998-2011) 
Fixed effects GDP/capita   Population 
growth*, 
election year* 
ARA* 
Ahlerup et al. (2015) T/Y (sub-Saharan 
Africa, 1980-2010) 
Fixed effects, 
2SLS 
GDP/capita, trade*,  VAT agriculture share*  ARA, 
population, 
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IMF 
programme 
Langford and 
Ohlenburg(2016) 
T/Y 
(excluding natural 
resource revenue and 
social security 
contributions) 
Stochastic 
frontier method 
GDP/capita, 
inflation* 
 
openness 
(imports/GDP) 
 Industrial structure 
(manufacturing/output) 
Corruption*, 
law and order*, 
democratic 
accountability 
Educational 
level 
(secondary 
enrolment 
rate?), 
educational 
level 
Dom (2019) T/Y (49 sub-Saharan 
African countries, 
1980-15) 
Fixed effects, 
2SLS, GMM, 
Common 
Correlated 
Effects Mean 
Group estimator 
    ARA, aid, IMF 
programme, 
lagged tax 
revenue 
Notes: *denotes significance of this variable at the 5% level or higher
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In this chapter, we pick up on three issues from the literature which are pertinent to 
developing countries: poor quality of tax structures recognised to play a major role in the growth 
of tax revenues and the adoption of the VAT as a possible solution; ring-fencing of the process of 
revenue collection from political interference (depoliticization) and establishment of ARAs; and 
the construction of ‘fiscal contracts’ to mitigating against the political anger and turmoil caused 
by increases in taxes, especially in politically fragile states. We seek to understand the ‘true’ the 
revenue effects of these policy initiatives, which have been adopted ostensibly under the stress of 
pressure from the IMF and aid donors. Although these policy initiatives included other objectives6 
improving revenue collection was certainly one of the crucial elements.  
 
2.3.1 Quality of tax structures and value-added tax  
 
Several studies have linked the quality of tax structures to a country’s ability to build an 
effective tax system and generate more revenues. Gordon and Li (2005) and Tanzi and Vito (2001) 
have documented some of the relevant aspects of tax structures found in developing countries, 
which they describe as ‘puzzling’ and associate them with low capacity to generate government 
revenues. They argue that historically, fiscal systems in developing countries have depended 
heavily on distortionary and unstable sources of tax revenues such as sales, export and turnover 
taxes, which is a cause of poor performance. This is contrary to the quality of tax structures found 
in other countries which rely more on income, consumption and capital, and abstain from 
distortionary taxes on exports and imports (Cagé and Gardenne, 2018; Greenaway, 1984, 1991; 
Greenaway and Sapsford, 1987; Greenaway and Milner 1991; Tanzi, 1992; Mosley, 2015. This 
issue has dominated development policy debate and to try and improve the quality of tax structure, 
and consequently revenue collections, the international development agencies have sought to wean 
governments in poor countries away from dependence on these poor sources of revenue, and 
towards taxes on other bases, and in particular the VAT. The adoption of VAT has been a key 
element of the IMF’s conditionality for financial aid to poor countries and has now been widely 
adopted in emerging and low-income countries making it an integral part of tax structures in these 
countries.  
 
6 For instance, the formation autonomous revenue authorities has been linked to other reforms objectives; to facilitate 
other reforms in tax administration and to support the fight against corruption (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2009) 
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The VAT was first implemented in France in 1954, and shortly after in Côte d’Ivoire, 
Senegal and Brazil in the 1960s. As can be observed from Table 2.3, which shows the spread of 
value-added globally, its adoption was initially limited to a few countries: less than 10 countries 
in the 1970s. By the late 1980s, it had spread to almost 50 countries, predominantly in Europe, as 
a pre-requisite for European Union membership, and in a handful of countries in Latin American 
and Africa. Over the past few decades, it has spread very widely with nearly three-quarters of the 
adoptions having taken place between 1990s and the late 2000s (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005: p.3). 
It has now been adopted in more 140 countries. By some accounts, the widespread adoption of the 
VAT has been regarded as “the most significant development in the evolution of tax structures and 
economic reforms of the twentieth century” (Cnossen, 1998; Keen and Simone, 2004: p.37)  and  
the most significant innovation in tax policy design of the past hundred years (Ebrill et al., 2001; 
Keen and Lockwood, 2010). In sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and the Pacific most countries VAT 
was not widespread until the mid-1990s, and accelerated rapidly into the 2000s, but the rate of 
adoption has tapered since. Its adoption in the middle east and north Africa has only been modest.  
 
Table 2.3: The Adoption of value-added tax globally (1960 – 2013) 
Year Europe and 
Central Asia 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
East Asia 
and Pacific 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
1960 0 0 0 0 1 
1965 0 1 0 0 1 
1970 8 3 0 0 1 
1975 14 10 0 0 1 
1980 14 13 2 1 2 
1985 15 16 2 2 2 
1990 20 17 4 6 5 
1995 44 21 6 11 15 
2000 48 24 7 18 26 
2005 51 24 9 19 35 
2010 52 30 11 20 38 
Total  (53) (33) (21) (32) (48) 
Source: IMF, Ebrill et al (2001), Ahlerup et al. (2015) and compilation by author from various sources. Note: The 
figures in the parenthesis indicate the total number of countries per region as per the World Bank classification. 
As stated above, the adoption of the VAT has been a critical component of the IMF-
supported structural adjustment programmes in developing countries (World Bank, 1991; IMF, 
1998). Zambia’s and Ethiopia’s Letters of Intent of 1994 and 2003, respectively provide some of 
the evidence where governments had to agree to the IMF recommendation to introduce a VAT” 
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by April 1995 in the case of Zambia7 and January 2003 in the case of Ethiopian8. Table 2.4 shows 
the standard VAT rates and dates of adoption between 1980 and 2013 in African countries in our 
sample. The average standard tax rate is 16 percent, and ranges between 5 percent in Nigeria and 
20 percent in a number of countries including Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar and Tanzania.  
 
Table 2.4 Standard value-added tax regimes in SSA (1980-2013) 
 Country  Value added tax Year of operation* 
1 Angola no VAT  
2 Burundi 18% 2009 
3 Benin 18% 1991 
4 Burkina Faso 18% 1992 
5 Botswana 10% 2000 
6 Central African Republic 18% 2001 
7 Cote d'Ivoire 20% 1960 
8 Cameroon 19.25% 1999 
9 Congo, Dem. Rep. 16% 2012 
10 Congo, Rep. 18.9% 1997 
11 Comoros no VAT  
12 Cabo Verde 15% 2004 
13 Ethiopia 15% 2003 
14 Gabon 18% 1995 
15 Ghana 12.5% 1999 
16 Guinea 18% 1996 
17 Gambia 15% 2013 
18 Guinea-Bissau 15% 2001 
19 Kenya 16% 1990 
20 Lesotho 14% 2003 
21 Madagascar 20% 1994 
22 Mali 18% 1991 
23 Mozambique 17% 1999 
24 Mauritania 14% 1995 
25 Mauritius 15% 1995 
26 Malawi 16.5% 2005 
27 Namibia 15% 2000 
28 Niger 17% 1986 
29 Nigeria 5% 1994 
30 Rwanda 18% 2013 
31 Sudan 10% 2000 
32 Senegal 18% 1961 
33 Sierra Leone no VAT  
34 Eswatini 14% 2001 
35 Seychelles 15% 2013 
 
7 International Monetary Fund, Zambia, Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and 
Technical Memorandum of Understanding, April 1994. 
8 International Monetary Fund, Ethiopia, Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and 
Technical Memorandum of Understanding, January 2001. 
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36 Chad 18% 2000 
37 Togo 18% 1995 
38 Tanzania 20% 1998 
39 Uganda 17% 1996 
40 South Africa 14% 1991 
41 Zambia 17.5% 1995 
42 Zimbabwe 15% 2003 
Source: Ebrill et al. (2002), Crowe (2016). 
Notes: * refers to the year when the VAT was actually implemented 
 
The question of whether these tax policy reform initiatives, which have led to changes in tax 
structures and the widespread implementation of the VAT in emerging and developing countries, 
have successful towards providing revenue advantages as suggested by its advocates, has recently 
become a subject of intense debate. International development agencies and local politicians 
expect these reforms to result in more tax revenues, but as can be noted from Figure 2.2, which 
shows tax revenue performance in both sets of countries that adopted and those that did not adopt 
the VAT, tax revenues in both groups of countries have been rising since the 1990s. Revenues in 
countries with VAT initially rose faster but have remained close to those countries without the 
value-added. Another important observation is that tax revenues in countries that adopted the VAT 
have fluctuated more, although this is not the focus of the study. It is certainly difficult to make 
any generalisations about the revenue advantages of having a VAT from these stylised facts.   
 
Figure 2.2 Tax revenues in countries with or without a value-added tax in Africa (1990-15) 
 
Source: Ahlerup et al. (2015), Ebrill et al. (2001). Notes: The evolution of the averaged total revenue-to-GDP ratio for countries 
which adopted a VAT (full line) and those which did not (dotted line) in selected countries in Africa.  
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
T
ax
 r
ev
en
u
es
 (
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
)
Countries with a VAT Countries without a VAT
40 
 
What is quite certain from the literature is that many poor countries, especially in Africa, 
turned towards the VAT in the mid to the late 1990s because of the stubborn and persistent low 
levels of revenue collections (Mann, 2004). Although a majority of countries in Africa have had 
considerable experience of implementing a VAT, averaging about 16 years by 2013, it remains 
unclear whether this reform has been successful towards the revenue objective it was set out to 
meet. Surprisingly, there are very few studies that have analysed the possible effects on tax revenue 
performance of the adoption of a VAT, and amongst these few the evidence is limited or 
inconclusive. This limited literature has produced mixed results and disagreements about the 
impact of this tax. Among the influential studies that have conducted cross-country analysis to 
assess the effect of the VAT, Ebrill et al. (2001)’s study of ‘The Modern VAT, Chapters 3 and 4” 
provides cross-section data on eight sub-Saharan African countries that had implemented VAT in 
the 1990s to show evidence that the implementation of the VAT has been beneficial, and that the 
effect is even larger in more developed countries and less in more open ones. These findings have 
been criticised for potentially being biased due to the possibility of the adoption of VAT being 
endogenous. A study which assessed whether revenue losses from reduction in tariffs on 
international trade have been compensated by the revenues brought in as a result of the VAT argues 
that “[F]or high-income countries the answer is clearly in the affirmative, for middle-income 
countries, there is support for significant recovery but for low-income countries, however, 
recovery has been far from complete” Baunsgaard and Keen (2005: p.22). This result was 
confirmed in a later study which finds no evidence that low-income countries with a VAT have 
recovered more than those without (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010: p.571- 575). Keen and Lockwood 
(2010: p.148) using a sample of 143 countries between 1975-2000 find some evidence that the 
“VAT may have increased long-run tax revenues by about 4.5 percent of GDP in most countries, 
but the evidence is less apparent in sub-Saharan Africa”. The most recent and comprehensive 
study, to our knowledge, conducted on a sample of 47 sub-Saharan African countries over the 
period 1980-2010 shows that on average VAT has a “negligible effect or its impact is non-existent” 
(Ahlerup et al., 2015: p.702).  
 
One possibility for the mixed findings on the ‘true’ revenue impact of VAT can be country 
heterogeneity. That is, the impact of the VAT may vary across different countries due to certain 
country-specific characteristics. Previous studies have shown that the effect of VAT depends on 
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the income level (Ebrill et al., 2001; Keen and Lockwood, 2010): higher income countries are 
better prepared to handle the complex informational, administrative and system requirements of 
the VAT. Although several studies have highlighted the important role played by institutions of 
governance in determining policy outcomes, this issue has rarely ben tackled in the context of the 
VAT. For example, Gupta et al. (1999), World Bank (2007), Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) and 
others have argued that policy reform implemented for various purposes may not lead to desirable 
outcomes in less favourable institutional environments. A survey of the large empirical literature 
on how institutional quality can affect development outcomes is provided in Kaufmann et al. 
(1999). Acknowledging the major part that institutions of governance can play in determining 
policy outcomes, and the lack of consensus on the effectiveness of the VAT towards its revenue 
objectives, this chapter tries to explore whether the revenue impact of the VAT depends on the 
institutional environment within the tax is designed and implemented. We follow ab approach 
similar to the one employed in Burnside and Dollar (2000) who examine whether the effects of aid 
on growth depend on the quality of domestic policies, and Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) who 
analyse whether the effectiveness of public spending depends on governance quality. 
 
The main institutions of interest here are those that are central in the ability to formulate and 
implement sound policies and, in the case of tax policy, those which can affect tax compliance 
behaviour. It is recognised in the literature that where institutions are strong there is a low risk of 
political interference or policy reversals, which can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
tax system. (Bird and Gendron, 2007; James, 2015). The quality of institutions can affect the 
revenue impact of the VAT through efficiency in tax collection and the ability to enforce tax laws. 
The quality of institutions is also likely to influence voluntary tax compliance. Previous studies 
have also indicated that taxpayers are less willing to cooperate in tax matters if there are 
perceptions of widespread corruption which can harm compliance rates and increase evasion; tax 
exemptions perceived to be linked to bribery can undermine public trust in the government and 
compliance with tax obligations; widespread corruption can also drive businesses into the informal 
sector, and thus, eroding the potential tax base. From our previous discussions, it is likely that 
bureaucratic quality (effectiveness) and the ability to control corruption and enforce the rule of 
law will be possible factors which can affect the effectiveness of the VAT in meeting its revenue 
objective. We, therefore, argue that the VAT will be more effective in countries with better quality 
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of institutions. We, therefore, attempt to contribute to the literature by bringing into the analysis 
the potential impacts of time lags and experience and heterogeneity in institutional environments. 
Finally, we also explore some of these issues in more detail using case study analysis.   
 
2.3.2 Autonomous revenue authorities  
 
As mentioned earlier, the development community and independent analysts have identified 
political factors as the roots of poor tax performance in developing countries, and global efforts to 
overcome them have focussed on, inter alia, ring-fencing the process of revenue collection from 
political interference by moving the process of revenue collection from the direct control of the 
ministry of finance to a more professional and autonomous revenue authority. Aid donors expect 
that such a reform can contribute towards curbing the discretionary use of taxation powers, 
improving public trust in institutions and entrench tax compliance (Chand and Moene, 1999; 
Bergman 2003; Fjeldstad and Moore, 2009). Revenue collection responsibilities are traditionally 
“integrated in the ministry of finance” in many countries (Ahlerup et al., 2015: p.692), but 
especially in poor countries such public sector institutions seldom get trust from citizens because 
they are perceived to be politicised, less professional and as conduits for political corruption and 
patronage. Chand and Moene (1997) claim that corruption in revenue collection has been a key 
factor behind the low rates of tax compliance in poor countries. Some commentators also argue 
that although lack of confidence in public sector institutions is a global issue, it is exceptionally 
widespread in the poorest countries of the world, and exacerbated by weak and poorly functionally 
institutions of governance, political corruption and patronage (Fjeldstad and Ranker, 2003; Moore, 
2004; 2013). Studies have documented that taxpayers are less likely to cooperate on tax matters 
(including on payment of taxes) where they perceive public institutions to engage in discretionary 
use of taxation powers, abuse of public authority and selective enforcement of laws and procedures 
(Scholz, 1998: p.138-400; Levi, 1998; Slemond, 2003; Manasan, 2004: p.174).  
 
The formation of ARAs is considered an institutional innovation that is part of international 
effort to strengthen tax administration, promote fairness in tax administration, curb corruption and 
patronage (including between government and powerful rent-seekers). It is envisaged that under 
an independent and professional organisation (with professional, well-trained and remunerated 
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staff, well-equipped offices, managerial space, financial autonomy and administrative efficiency) 
tax affairs will be ring-fenced from political interference (Devas, Delay and Hubbard, 2001; 
Taliercio, 2004; Kidd and Crandall, 2006; Mo, 2019). The operationalisation of ARAs is typically 
done by enactment of laws which act as a signal of a “credible commitment to a fairer and less 
discretionary” revenue collection process to win taxpayers’ trust in public institutions (Dom, 2019: 
p.1418). The creation of ARAs has been a key element of fiscal reforms, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa, during the last three decades (Bergman 2003; Chand and Moene 2009; Fjeldstad and Moore 
2009). Outside of sub-Saharan Africa, there have been few ARAs created elsewhere, in particular 
Latin America and Asia. Figure 2.3 shows the spread of ARAs in Africa between 1980 and 2013, 
and indicates that prior to the 1990s governments of poor countries were less willing to undertake 
radical reforms that involved the creation of ARAs, but as fiscal crises worsened (including public 
indebtedness and massive fiscal deficits) during the 1990s, more and more countries introduced 
ARAs. Between 1990 and 2013, the number of countries with ARAs increased from just one to 
more than 17. 
 
Figure 2.3: The spread of autonomous revenue authorities in Africa (1980 -2013)  
 
Source: Bräutigam  et al. (2008), Fjeldstad and Moore, (2009), Fjeldstad (2013), Ahlerup et al. (2015), Dom (2019). 
An autonomous revenue authority is considered to have been established for purposes of assessing its impact on tax 
ratios when it became operational, and not the legal establishment which is commonly followed in the literature.  
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If ARAs in developing countries were created mostly for fiscal and economic purposes, as 
suggested by some commentators (Barbone et al., 1999; Mann, 2004; Fjeldstad and Heggstad, 
2012; Baskaran, 2013), it is reasonable to suppose that countries which have established them 
should experience growth in tax revenue performance relative to those that have not. Taliercio 
(2003) finds evidence in Latin America suggesting that politicians are more willing to make a 
“credible commitment” to depoliticising the process of revenue collection to make it more 
competent, efficient and fair, when the payoff is increased tax compliance and higher revenues. 
Both international development agencies and local politicians expect this tax innovation to result 
in more tax revenues (IMF, 2011; Di John, 2009; OECD, 2011; von Haldenwang et al., 2010), but 
this is less clear in the literature. The number of empirical studies on the impact of ARAs is 
surprisingly limited, with many of the studies taking the case study and qualitative approaches, 
focussing on managerial effectiveness, operational autonomy, corruption and human resource 
effectiveness, among others. For instance, Kidd and Crandall (2006) analyse efficiency of ARAs 
in 14 developing countries using data collected using questionnaires to assess the ARAs but not 
fiscal effects are investigated. Some studies try to show a link between the growth of tax revenues 
and levels of independence of ARAs (Taliercio, 2004a). Hlope and Friedman (2002) and Smith 
(2003) report anecdotal evidence of a success story in revenue collections after the establishment 
of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) in South Africa, which surpassed revenue targets 
and significantly increased the tax take during the first decade of the fall of apartheid. Chand and 
Moene (1999) assert that the improvements in revenue levels observed in Ghana from 4.5 percent 
in the 1980s to over 8.5 percent of GDP in 1990s were largely credited to the improvements 
brought about by reforming tax administration. Fjeldstad and Moore (2009) provide an extensive 
qualitative view on the spread and different models of ARAs in developing countries, but go on to 
paint a pessimistic picture that “although they were created for purposes of increasing central 
government revenues, to date there is little sign that ARAs have actually contributed to that goal” 
(p.14). The most recent study of ARAs  by Dom (2019: p.1423) also comes to the pessimistic 
conclusion that ‘the findings from the different models fail to provide support for the hypothesis 
that ARAs have increased total tax revenues in SSA on average.’ He notes that ARAs  may be 
limited by their lack of a meaningful role in tax policy and the proliferation of tax exemptions. 
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Von Haldenwang et al. (2014) is one of the first studies to use a quantitative approach in 
analysing the revenue effect of ARAs  in municipalities in Peru. Their findings indicate that 
municipalities with ARAs  performed better than those without. A very recent case (Ahlerup et 
al., 2015) which is close to our study examines the revenue effect of ARAs  in Africa during the 
period 1980-2010, and find some evidence suggesting that this tax innovation only has revenue 
impact in its first years, but this effect dissipates over time (p.703). The most recent quantitative 
study which has appeared since the start of this work, Dom (2019), in spite of taking account of 
revenue trends prior to creation of autonomous revenue authorised, which was largely ignored in 
previous studies, finds no robust evidence that this particular tax innovation has provided revenue 
advantages in countries where it has been implemented.  
 
What is quite clear from these studies is that the proposition that the creation of ARAs  can 
lead to better tax revenue performance compared to the case where the responsibilities of revenue 
collection remain under the direct control of a traditional government department has neither been 
established nor refuted because the existing evidence is inconclusive. Existing studies have faced 
some difficulty in establishing the true revenue impact of creating ARAs  due to the possibility 
that certain country-specific factors, which play an essential role in realising the objectives of tax 
administration reforms, are not adequately accounted for. Although there is much homogeneity in 
the objectives for the creation of ARAs  (as a possible solution to political obstacles to higher 
revenue performance and high levels of corruption in tax administration (Taliercio, 2004)), and 
their organisational and corporate structures (management boards style), there are also important 
issues of heterogeneity in many other respects. For instance, the IMF observes that widespread 
political corruption and patronage “remain a fundamental barrier to effective and fair taxation, and 
to building wider trust between government and taxpayers” (IMF, 2011: p.19), and therefore 
substantially dampens voluntary tax compliance (Tanzi and Pellechio, 1995; Silvani and Baer, 
1997). Corruption also tends to foster the development of the informal economy by causing 
businesses to hide from the burden of corruption (Friedman et al, 1999: Schneider and Enste, 
2000), and tax exemptions perceived to be the result of corruption undermine public trust in 
government and erode the culture of voluntary compliance. Also, poorly designed and complicated 
tax policies tend to overload tax systems with numerous low-yielding taxes or too high marginal 
tax rates, which are administratively burdensome as they often divert efforts and resources from 
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major tax sources and overstretch tax administration (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2005; 
Di John and Putzel, 2005; Kidd and Crandall, 2006). Finally, policy consistency and stability in 
the tax system can enhance the credibility of the system and reduce the cost of compliance and 
enforcement, as opposed to frequent and fundamental tax system changes can be a reason for 
difficulties in tax administration (Jenkins, 1994; Delay, Devas, and Hubbard, 1999; Mann, 2004; 
Taliercio, 2004).  
 
Although these important governance issues, which are characteristic of developing country 
settings, have been recognised to be essential in the performance of revenue authorities, existing 
studies have not adequately incorporated them into the analysis of the revenue impact of revenue 
authorities. In this chapter, we revisit this issue and attempt to contribute to our understanding of 
the relationship between ARAs  and revenue performance by bringing into the analysis institutions 
of governance within which ARAs  operate. We explore whether the quality of institutions of 
governance can limit or enhance the efficiency of revenue authorities.  In particular, we test the 
proposition that the creation of the autonomous revenue authority is likely to be more successful 
in meeting the revenue objective in countries where the government is effective in formulating and 
implementing sound policies, and committing to such policies (policy stability); has the ability to 
control corruption; and where taxpayers have confidence in and abide by the rule of law.  
 
Another issue we wish to factor into the analysis is that institutional reforms tend to be 
complex and thus take some time before the real benefits of the transformation can materialise 
(Acemoglu et al. 2005). Our experience working in Zambia and also observed in neighbouring 
countries is that it takes a few years to have a fully functional organisational structure, recruit and 
train the relevant staff, procure and set up computer and administrative systems. There are also 
several refinements to the organisational structure during the transition period. It is, reasonable to 
anticipate the creation of ARAs  to bring about revenue benefits with a time lag. Although this 
approach may be considered as only suggestive, it provides a richer characterisation which we 
hope can help in shading some light on the less optimistic and surprising finding on the lack of 
autonomous revenue authority impact. We gain more insights into how cross-country 
heterogeneity and revenue authorities have affected tax revenue performance by complementing 
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the econometric analysis with two case studies of Ghana and Zambia, whose contrasted fiscal 
performance is highlighted in Table 2.1 above.  
 
2.3.3 ‘Fiscal contracts’ approach   
 
Finally, we consider the ideas of the ‘fiscal contract’ approach as a possible solution to poor 
revenue collection. It is frequently documented that the roots of poor revenue performance are 
political (Ricciuti et al., 2016: p. 29; Besley and Persson, 2014: p. 100). Governments especially 
of weak states are frightened to raise taxes if they fear that the consequences of doing so will be 
immediate loss of office or worse, influential (corporate and individual) taxpayers in such societies 
will seek to use any leverage they can muster to avoid paying tax, and all taxpayers will resent 
paying tax more particularly if they can see that others much richer than them are not doing so. An 
example of how governments of weak states fail to raise taxes, even at a time of fiscal crisis, due 
to fear of loss of power and other political factors is well illustrated in Mosley (2012) and also 
restated in Lenton et al. (2017). Efforts to mitigate the anger and political turmoil caused by tax 
increases have therefore been made by many governments. One such aspect proposed in the 
theoretical literature is framing the process of revenue collection as part of a ‘fiscal contract’ in 
which government commits itself to provide improved public services in exchange for the revenue 
provided by taxpayers, rather than as a coercive process in which the state extorts taxes where it 
can without needing to justify or be held to account for the way in which this is done (Moore 1998, 
2013; Bräutigam  et al. 2008). Our primary objective is to analyse the process by which such ‘fiscal 
contracts’ between taxpayers and governments can emerge and impact on the growth of tax 
revenue.  
 
The concept of a social contract begins in the seventeenth century with Thomas Hobbes, but 
the idea that effective social contracts must be democratic originated with the Enlightenment 
philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762, 1986), who argued that only the people, and not 
autocratic authorities, should be allowed to legislate: “mighty does not make right, and…we are 
obliged to obey none but legitimate powers‟ (Rousseau 1986: p.7). Dictatorship, therefore, was in 
his view no way of achieving a social contract; however, the delegation of decision-making powers 
to citizens, in Rousseau’s view, would only take make possible the expression of private interests, 
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and not of the social optimum, or “general will‟ as Rousseau called it, which “looks only to the 
common interest, whereas (the will of all) looks to private interest, and is simply a sum of particular 
wills” (Rousseau 1986: p.29). For Rousseau, what was required to achieve the social optimum 
was, in the first instance, a very strict form of democracy, not typical of any modern state, in which 
all legislative decisions were decided by the majority view of all adult citizens, as in Rousseau’s 
native city-state of Geneva (Rousseau 1986: p.71-73, Rosenblatt 1997), modified by the actions of 
an enlightened executive, or president, who would act in the interests of the general will, but, was 
supposed to refrain entirely from the use of coercive power‟ (Rousseau 1986, editor’s introduction 
by Frederick Watkins, page xxxvii)49 . Rousseau’s view was put forward as a riposte to the view 
put forward by Thomas Hobbes, who had argued a century earlier that the preservation of social 
order required the imposition of a social contract enforced through the autocratic power of a 
sovereign (Hobbes 1651, Cervellati et al 2008), but it will be clear from the above that his approach 
finesses the problem of how to create representative political institutions, not to mention 
accountable bureaucracies and effective judicial institutions, and cannot be exactly represented by 
democratic accountability in the sense of one adult, one vote. 
 
One element in the achievement of social order and development, as discussed earlier, in 
which the conflict between general will/social optimum and private optimum emerges particularly 
sharply, is of course the provision of public goods financed by taxation. Taxation, of course, can 
only be imposed by legislative authority, and it therefore seems to follow axiomatically that ability 
to impose taxes varies with the degree of democratic accountability, but subject to the caveat made 
above concerning the distinction between the will of all individuals and the social optimum; 
because private individuals, considered purely as taxpayers, dislike paying tax, and can only be 
expected to be willing to do so if either they see themselves getting something in return (such as 
benefits from public expenditure) or an ”enlightened executive, or president‟ persuades them that 
it is worth entering into a social contract which provides such benefits in return for tax payments.  
 
 
9 This distinction between the general will and the will of all can be interpreted as awareness of public-goods problems 
– in other words, the existence of particular services, including political stability and environmental protection, which 
are in the public interest even though they are not perceived by citizens to be in their private  
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Figure 2.4: Sample of less developed countries: scatterplot, tax/GDP ratio in relation to democratic accountability (case-study 
countries circled; not all data points shown) 
 
Source: democratic accountability data from University of Gothenburg Quality of Government database (www. qog. pol. su.se); tax/GDP ratio from World Bank, 
World Development Indicators database. This diagram is reproduced from Lenton, Masiye and Mosley (2017).
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An initial piece of evidence in supporting the idea that democratic governance may be good 
for the formation of social contracts is provided by two-variable regressions such as that depicted 
in Figure 2.4, for a sample of developing countries between 1990-2010, which suggest a 
significantly positive relationship between increases in democratic accountability and the tax-to-
GDP ratio. 
 
In addition, the recent literature on the emergence and effectiveness of ‘fiscal contracts’ 
suggests that , although there is clearly two-way causation at work, the sequence of causation may 
be evolving: according to Fjeldstad and Therkildsen, historically ‘taxation contributed to political 
development and democratisation by catalysing “revenue bargaining”, i.e. a process in which the 
state exchanged influence over public policy with tax revenues from citizens’ but more recently in 
LDCs, and specifically in Tanzania and Uganda, ‘democratisation drives tax reform – not the other 
way round’ (Fjeldstad and Therkildsen, in Bräutigam  et al (eds) 2008: pp.128-129). 
 
Our second proposition is that the likelihood of forming a satisfactory and stable ‘fiscal 
contract’ between taxpayers and government depends on the establishment of mutual trust, or 
social capital, between those parties – an expectation by the government that taxes will be paid, in 
return for an expectation by taxpayers that the government will be trustworthy, i.e. that they in 
return will receive public services that will benefit them. In other words, to understand the amount 
of tax which is paid (the tax ratio), we have to consider factors influencing not just the size and 
incidence of the tax bill, but the amount and quality of public services which are provided in return, 
as essential elements in the ‘fiscal contract’. Jeffrey Timmons goes further than this, insisting that 
“The contemporary practice of studying spending and taxation in isolation from one another is 
fundamentally flawed because half of the equation (either taxes or spending) is left out of the 
analysis” (Timmons, 2005: p.531). Developing this idea, Timmons explains the growth of trust 
between governments and taxpayers in terms of a game between these two groups, and we build 
on his approach here. His model, which we present in adapted form as Table 2.5, is a 2x2 matrix, 
with both parties having two options: the truster, or taxpayer, may either comply or not with 
demands to pay tax presented by the government, and the trustee, or government, may either offer 
public services in exchange for the tax revenue provided, or simply extort this revenue from the 
taxpayer, using threats or sanctions if necessary, without offering anything in return. 
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Table 2.5. The generic ‘fiscal dilemma’                                                                                  
 
 
Options for government 
(‘trustee’) 
Implement delivery of services 
and ‘trade’ this for payments of 
taxes  
Coerce the taxpayer without 
offering any benefits in return 
 
Options for taxpayer 
(‘truster’) 
Pay tax 
(‘Comply’) 
Quadrant I 
 
(αG*-βT, T-Gc) 
Quadrant II 
 
(-βT, T) 
Not pay tax  
(‘Not comply’) 
Quadrant III 
 
(G*,-Gc) 
Quadrant IV 
 
(p(-T-S), p(T+S)-Sc) 
Note: Entries in cells are presented in the order (taxpayer, government) 
[G*= government expenditure, α = ‘quality of government expenditure’, T= tax revenue, β = disutility attached to 
tax payments, S = penalty paid by non-taxpayers who are ‘caught’, p = probability of being caught] This figure is 
inspired by the model of Timmons (2005) and is reproduced from Lenton, Masiye and Mosley (2017). 
 
In Table 2.5, we imagine that the state is bargaining with the taxpaying population for 
revenue. T is the total amount of public revenue (including revenue from nontax sources such as 
user charges), and β is the utility(characteristically negative) attached by taxpayers to paying them; 
G* is the amount of government expenditure (and α is taxpayers‟ estimated valuation of those 
benefits); Gc is the cost of producing the goods and services financed by public expenditure; p is 
the probability that the state is able to identify and bill those who are liable to pay tax; S is the 
amount of the penalty imposed on defaulting taxpayers; and Sc is the cost of imposing that penalty. 
As Timmons (2005:537) notes, if the payoffs satisfy the conditions αG*-T>p (-T-S)> -T for 
taxpayers and T-Gc>p (T+S) –Sc > Gc for the state, the game is a prisoner’s dilemma. Of course, 
in the conventional (one-shot) prisoner’s dilemma, the equilibrium solution is in the bottom right-
hand corner (quadrant IV) – in other words, no agreement or contract is reached and as a 
consequence, both parties are worse off than they would have been in the situation where they 
would have been able to communicate and bargain. In Table 2.6a, where we set the values of the 
parameters at the level G*=4, T=2,Gc= α= 1, β= -1, S = -2,Sc = 0,p=0.5, the outcome of the 
taxpayer’s dilemma is of this sort: the taxpayer’s dominant strategy is always to play Not Comply 
rather than comply (since 4>2 and 0>-2) ; the government’s dominant strategy is always to play 
Coerce rather than trade services for compliance (since 2>1 and 0>-1); hence no fiscal contract 
materialises. 
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Table 2.6a. The pre-fiscal contract situation                                                                                           
 
 
Options for government 
(‘trustee’) 
Implement  delivery of services 
and ‘trade’ this for payments of 
taxes  
Coerce the taxpayer without 
offering any benefits in return 
Options for taxpayer 
(‘truster’) 
Pay tax  
(‘Comply’) 
Quadrant I 
(2,1) 
Quadrant II 
(-2,2) 
Not pay tax  
(‘Not comply’) 
Quadrant III 
(4,-1) 
Quadrant IV 
(0,0) 
Entries in cells of the four quadrants are presented in the order (taxpayer, government).      
Note: the shaded area denotes the dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome. This diagram is reproduced from Lenton, 
Masiye and Mosley (2017) 
 
However, if we imagine a reform in the tax base, for example that it evolves from being 
principally based on trade taxes to being increasingly based on income and consumption taxes, 
such as occurred in many developing countries in the 1990s and 2000s under the impetus of 
economic crisis and IMF adjustment loan packages, then that can be expected, especially if 
accompanied by evidence of increasing social expenditure and less misuse of tax revenue, to lead 
to sustainably higher tax ratios and higher and better-quality public expenditure, and these can 
bring about a shift to the top left-hand (fiscal contract) equilibrium. If for example we imagine 
that, following reforms of the type described, G* increases from 4 to 6, the sanction attached to 
non-payment of tax (S) increases from 0 to 2, and the utilities attached by taxpayers to government 
expenditure (α) and payment of tax (β) move to 2 and -0.5 respectively, then the payoffs are as 
indicated in Table 2.6b, and the dominant strategy equilibrium moves towards a ‘fiscal contract’ 
in the top left-hand corner. 
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Table 2.6b. A possible post-fiscal contract equilibrium 
  Options for government 
(‘trustee’) 
  Implement  delivery of 
services and ‘trade’ this for 
payments of taxes  
Coerce the taxpayer 
without offering any 
benefits in return 
Truster (taxpayer) 
Options 
Pay tax  
(‘comply’) 
Quadrant I 
(10,3) 
Quadrant II 
(-1, 2) 
Not pay tax  
(‘not comply’) 
Quadrant III 
(6, -1) 
Quadrant IV 
(-4, -2) 
Entries in cells are presented in the order (taxpayer, government) 
Note: the shaded area denotes the dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome (which may be interpreted as a form of 
fiscal contract). This diagram is reproduced from Lenton, Masiye and Mosley (2017). 
 
For the taxpayer, compliance is now better than non-compliance whatever choice the state 
makes (since 10>6 and -1 > -4) and for the state, it is now better to improve service delivery and 
’trade’ that for higher tax payments than to coerce (since 1>-1 and 2 <-2). Thus better service 
delivery, in association with changes in tax structures and democratisation, has played a key part, 
in this model, in incentivising trust between taxpayers and governments (Lenton and Mosley, 
2011): that is, in bringing about patterns of behaviour (which we can style as fiscal contracts, even 
though they are most often unspoken and implicit, rather than explicit) which then make possible 
sustained improvements in tax ratios, in defiance of the short-term political risks associated with 
raising taxes especially in fragile states. Empirical evidence has gradually built up, initially for the 
United States (Scholz and Pinney 1995, Scholz and Lubell 1998) and more recently at micro-level 
for parts of Africa (Bodea and Le Bas 2013, Ali et al 2014) which suggests that taxpayers are more 
willing to pay taxes if they evaluate related public services as being satisfactory. Of course, 
‘satisfactory’ is a subjective and often ambiguous term. Two of the meanings which have been 
attached to it relate to improved quality of outcomes (as in the case of reforms in public health 
services which reduce mortality rates, or educational reforms which increase pass rates in 
examinations) and improved breadth of coverage (as in the case of services which used to be made 
available to privileged social groups only and are now much more widely available), and we shall 
make use of the second of these meanings in our modelling below. In recent years, a number of 
developing-country governments, initially in Latin America but now spreading to Africa, have 
sought to capitalise on the second of these meanings by proposing ’fiscal contracts’ which are 
explicit rather than implicit: e.g. tax increases which are earmarked to specific increases in 
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expenditure which are expected to yield political benefits, often targeted on lower income groups10. 
Explicit fiscal contracts of this sort we refer to as ‘linked taxation’, and we discuss them further 
below. 
 
In achieving this transition from deadlock without trust to a fiscal contract with mutual trust, 
the sequence of moves is once again important. In particular, in the game portrayed above, it is the 
government, which is relatively powerful and unlike taxpayers directly controls the instruments of 
fiscal management, which needs to make the opening move, by portraying itself through its actions 
as trustworthy: thus, the taxpayer’s dilemma is a dilemma for government also. In the example 
portrayed above, this opening move is executed through actions on the expenditure side, i.e. the 
delivery of  better public services and better publicity which between them give the taxpaying 
public the feeling that they are getting something useful in return for the taxes they pay, rather than 
simply being coerced. However, it can also be done by reforms on the tax side, which show that 
the burden of taxation is being borne more by richer than by poor people. An example of this is 
provided by Ghana and Uganda, both of which in the early 1990s reduced (in the case of Uganda 
completely removed) implicit taxes on exports of, respectively, cocoa and coffee, which fell 
heavily on low-income producers of crops and their employees. These low-income taxpayers thus 
received evidence of government’s commitment to a fairer distribution of the tax burden which 
proved an important bargaining tool in building their trust and laying the basis for future extensions 
of the tax base and increases in the tax ratio. Other first moves are possible, including amending 
the structure of taxation away from consumption taxes and towards income taxes, which may be 
expected to make the distribution of income more progressive (di John, 2006) and closing tax 
loopholes, notably exemptions from corporate income tax enjoyed by multinational corporations. 
 
 
 
10 In a number of Latin American countries legislators have shown an increasing tendency to promise that new taxes 
will be committed to particular forms of social expenditure, often as a way of softening the blow. Often these 
commitments are purely informal, as in the case of Brazil and Chile (Barrientos 2013:192-193), but in three cases, 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, the commitment is contractual (Mosley and Abdul-Gafaru 2016). In the case of 
Bolivia, there is evidence that two of the main social welfare payments which are earmarked to be paid out of specific 
tax revenues – the Renta Dignidad, or universal old-age pension, , and the Bono Juancito Pinto, an educational subsidy 
for lower income children, both of which are mainly financed out of taxes on oil and gas production, there is evidence 
that these specific tax-linked social benefits have impacted heavily and favourably on both headcount poverty and the 
popularity of the government (Arauco 2014). More recently, this kind of earmarking of tax revenues has spread to 
Africa, and in section 4 below we examine attempts to construct fiscal contracts of this kind in Ghana and Zambia. 
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2.4. Empirical approach 
 
The empirical approach in this chapter, as in the next substantive chapters, is ‘qual-quant’, 
combining panel-data regression analysis across a sample of African countries as the main 
analytical framework, with two country case studies involving Ghana and Zambia, as special 
references11 (in section 2.6). This two-track approach, which is not often employed in the 
conventional tax effort literature, allows us to first model the revenue function based on the 
influences identified and discussed in the previous section, and those recognised in the literature. 
Within the first stage we also account for the potential econometric issues of endogeneity that 
could possibly bias the results. In the second step, which appears at the end of the chapter, we 
relate the findings from panel regressions to the evolution and development of revenue 
performance in Zambia, by highlighting particularities of causation which do not emerge properly 
from the panel regressions.  
 
Our arguments so far, as discussed in section 2.3, are that some tax innovations have been 
suggested and implemented in developing countries as part of the global effort to remedy poor tax 
revenue performance: tax reforms implemented to improve the quality of tax structures by the 
adoption of the VAT; ring-fencing of the process of revenue collection from political corruption 
and patronage by creating ARAs ; and improvements in democratic accountability and the delivery 
of better services to taxpayers (G*, in the prisoner’s dilemma model above), among other policies, 
are likely to facilitate the establishment of a stable ‘fiscal contract’ in which the tax base is 
broadened and, thereby the tax ratio is raised in a way that makes the provision of developmental 
services possible.  
 
However, to convert these basic arguments in our core model into a formulation which will 
give us a picture of how tax ratios are impacted by the reforms we describe, we need to bring into 
the story, as controls, those influences which have long been recognised in the conventional tax 
literature as important determinants of tax yields Previous studies have included a number of 
 
11 Zambia was selected as a special reference to fulfill the requirements of the sponsors of my PhD studies, the Zambia 
Ministry of Finance, of understanding the causes and consequences the fiscal challenges the country was experiencing 
at the time and how to deal with them: declining tax performance, rising public debt, the persistent fiscal deficits and 
a decline in economic performance  
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variables presumed to affect a country’s ability to build up tax revenues, such as the overall level 
of development, sectoral composition of the tax base and the economy’s openness to international 
trade. Tax revenues are likely to be positively influenced by a country’s overall level of 
development as higher incomes increase the ability to pay and collect taxes, while overall 
development is associated with higher literacy rates, increased monetisation and better law 
enforcement  (Lotz and Morss, 1967; Chelliah, 1971). The sectoral composition of the tax base is 
another important determinant of tax collection because certain sectors are less amenable to 
taxation than others. In this study involving developing countries the share of agriculture in the 
economy may be an important determinant (being one of the largest sectors) as it is not easily 
amenable to taxation because the subsistence nature of most of the activities in the sector makes it 
difficult to produce taxable surpluses (Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; Ghura, 1998). Finally, a 
country’s openness to foreign trade is included to try and capture the combined effects on current 
tax revenues of the ease of collection due to the few locations where trade takes place but also the 
reduction in trade taxes since the late 1980s due to trade liberalisation and integration. Thus, the 
effect of foreign trade on tax revenue remains an empirical issue. Feeding these controls into the 
ideas of our main story above, leads to our baseline model which we graphically depict as Figure 
2.5.  
 
Figure 2.5: The baseline model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The baseline model shows the direction of impact of each of our key explanatory variables (in shaded boxes) and other 
conventional controls in the plain box.  
Tax structures  
• adoption of VAT 
Improvements 
in service 
delivery 
Ring-fencing of tax admin 
• creation of revenue 
authorities 
Improvements 
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accountability 
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performance) 
Emergence (or not) of 
a fiscal contract  
(Tables 2.6a and 2.6b) 
Macro-economy  
• level of development, 
agriculture, trade 
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2.4.1 Model specification 
 
The standard approach typically used in the tax literature is to specify a model that links the 
dependent variable, in this case tax revenue performance, to a combination of explanatory 
variables that are conjectured  here to affect the dependent variable. The specified model is then 
regressed on a sample of countries, and the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables can 
be interpreted as the potential “average” impacts on the dependent variable. We closely follow this 
approach, also used in Lotz and Morss (1967), Chelliah et al. (1975), Keen and Lockwood (2010), 
Ahlerup et al., 2015, and Dom(2019) and other papers, but augment it with the ideas of a stable 
‘fiscal contract’ as discussed above and outlined in our baseline model in Figure 2.6, to specify a 
testable equation. Thus, the reduced form equation which will enable us to properly assess the 
statistical impact of the implementation of the VAT, creation of an autonomous revenue authority 
and the emergence of ‘fiscal contracts’ is specified as shown in equation (2.1): 
 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝜁𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜃𝑗
3
𝑗=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + λ𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2.1) 
  
where:  
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡, the main dependent variable for this chapter, is total tax revenues expressed as a 
percentage of GDP in country 𝑖 at time (year) 𝑡, and is a proxy measure for a country’s 
revenue performance. An increase in the size of the variable 𝑇𝑅 represents better tax 
revenue performance and vice versa;  
 
𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 is a dichotomous dummy variable created to capture the adoption of the VAT and is 
equal to one if country 𝑖 has a value added tax in year 𝑡, and zero otherwise. The estimated 
coefficient of the 𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 variable, ?̂?, is to be positive (?̂? > 0); 
 
𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a dichotomous dummy variable created to capture the operational presence of an 
autonomous revenue authority and is equal to one if it is operation in country 𝑖 at time 
(year) 𝑡, and zero otherwise, as per the practice of Dom (2019); this one-zero specification, 
of course, limits the amount of information which we can gather concerning the qualitative 
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impact of this policy measure. The revenue impact of an autonomous revenue authority is 
expected to be positive, i.e., its estimated coefficient, 𝛾, is projected to be positive which 
captures the (𝛾 > 0); 
 
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 is our democratic accountability measure, which captures one of the key factors that 
are crucial in the emergence of a ‘fiscal contract’ and is measured on a scale that ranges 
between -10 (full autocracy) and +10 (full democracy). The coefficient 𝛿, which captures 
the impact of improvements in democratic accountability on tax revenues (through fiscal 
contracts) is expected to be positive (𝛿 > 0);  
 
𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 is indicator of effectiveness or improvements in service delivery. As an indicator of 
the effectiveness of public expenditure, we use the share of public expenditure spent on 
human capital (health and education) in GDP, which we interpret as a measure of the 
productivity of the social wage, following the approach taken in Hudson, Lenton and 
Mosley (2015). This indicator is derived from the approach of new growth theory, in which 
expenditures which create new applied knowledge, notably health and education, make an 
additional contribution to growth (Romer 1986; Lewis, 1988; Barro, 1991) because they 
impact both on GDP and on the growth of productivity, and thus exhibit increasing returns. 
It would be desirable to use a measure of expenditure effectiveness which better captures 
‘service delivery’, as discussed in our theoretical section above. For the moment, too few 
survey datasets on attitudes to public expenditure exist for us to be able to explore this 
approach in our econometric analysis, but we take the service delivery issue further in the 
qualitative analysis of Section 2.6 below. For this reason, as noted above, many social 
protection schemes throughout the developing world have been made conditional on 
‘increased effectiveness of spending’ in precisely this sense (Barrientos 2013, etc). The 
estimated coefficient of the variable 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡, ?̂? which measures the statistical influence of 
improvements in service delivery on the construction of a fiscal contract and ultimately tax ratios, 
is expected to be positive12 ( ?̂? > 0); 
 
12 This service delivery measure suffers from the limitation of being correlated with total revenue, and therefore 
endogenous. We attempt to correct for this endogeneity in Lenton et al. (2017), which uses 3SLS estimation 
methods. 
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𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 is a vector of three explanatory variables, shown in the unshaded box of Figure 
2.6, representing the level of overall development represented by the country’s GDP per 
capita (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡), sectoral composition of the tax base proxied by the share of agriculture in 
the economy (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡) and openness to international trade, measured by sum of imports 
and exports, as a proportion of GDP (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡). The estimated coefficients of the variables 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 (𝜃1) and 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡  (𝜃2) are expected to be positive, whereas the estimated coefficient 
for 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 (𝜃3) is expected to be negative for reasons discussed above. 
 
𝜇𝑖 represents country-specific fixed effects to capture the unobservable heterogeneity 
across countries, 𝜆𝑡 represents time-specific fixed effects to control for unobservable time-
specific characteristics within countries, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an independent and identically 
distributed (iid) error term.  
 
2.4.2 Estimation technique 
 
Before discussing the estimation techniques employed in this chapter, we investigate 
whether our data is affected by some of the problems that are common in panel data. Our tests for 
the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, reported in the notes to 2.10 indicate that 
autocorrelation is not likely to be a problem, but heteroscedasticity is potentially a more important 
problem in our data. Thus, using the standard pooled OLS estimator may bias our estimates. 
Another potential problem associated with the use of the pooled OLS is that it does not recognise 
the panel structure of panel data and therefore fails to use the information that is available across 
countries (heterogeneity), which can potentially be an important issue in long datasets. Finally, 
pooled OLS does not deal with one of the common problems in regression analysis, omitted 
variable bias, primarily caused by the possibility that the outcome of the dependent variable may 
be influenced by unobservable independent variables. These problems can (but not always) render 
results from the pooled OLS biased and inconsistent. 
 
The two widely used panel data models to try and address some of these problems are fixed 
effects and random effects, which tend to control for unobserved or unmeasurable sources of inter-
country heterogeneity and the effects of omitted variables (which violates the Gauss-Markov 
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assumptions lead to spurious correlations) and, thus, have become very popular. Fixed effects 
models try to address these problems by using within-country information and assume that within-
country unobserved characteristics are not correlated with the error term, whereas random effects 
models use information within- and between-country information and presume that these 
unobserved variables are random. These models have the advantage of minimising the potential 
problem the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Either of these models has some 
weakness: fixed effects do not produce estimates for variables that do not change overtime and 
sometimes produce larger standard errors leading to overstated p-values and wider confidence 
intervals (Allison, 2009); when the strong assumption of no correlation between the unobservable 
and explanatory variables which the random effects models depend on is violated, this can lead to 
inconsistent and biased parameter estimates. A common approach frequently employed to guide 
the choice between these estimators is the Hausman test, which shows researchers the significance 
of the differences between parameters estimated from the two approaches.  
 
We, therefore, take advantage of the strengths of each of the approaches and employ two-
way fixed effects and random effects estimators in this study with the year dummies serving as 
time-specific fixed effects and country dummies as country-specific. Hausman tests are performed 
to appreciate the significance of the differences in the estimates and to be guided on the more 
efficient approach. These models are estimated by the econometric software package, Stata/IC 
14.2. To try and minimise the effects of heteroscedasticity identified earlier, and the possible 
presence of autocorrelation, our results and test statistics are estimated with cluster-robust 
Huber/White standard errors, with the estimation option of vce(robust). 
 
2.4.3 Data description and summary 
 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the period 1980 to 2013 and utilises annual data from an 
unbalanced panel dataset (due to missing data for some countries and in certain periods) involving 
a sample of 42 countries from sub-Saharan Africa. Several other African countries were excluded 
from our sample because of data limitations. Appendix 2.1 shows the panel of countries in our 
sample with standard rates and dates of the adoption of the VAT and operationalisation of ARAs  
in each country. Almost all the countries in our sample have adopted the VAT and 17 out of 42 of 
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them (the largest number globally) had established ARAs  by 201313. We focus on sub-Saharan 
African countries because, certainly in the sense examined here, these countries lag behind other 
continents in the developing world in terms of several dimensions of governance and especially 
tax revenue performance, in spite of implementing important fiscal reforms over the past decades. 
Also, several countries on the continent are making strenuous efforts to put in place more 
democratic systems of government. Understanding the effectiveness of some of these measures 
and what other policies can be considered to address the roots of poor tax revenue performance is, 
therefore, of utmost importance not only for Africa but also for other developing countries facing 
similar challenges in Latin America and Asia. 
 
Data for our analysis were derived from various sources, as indicted in Table 2.7. Our main 
dependent variable is total government tax revenues expressed as a percentage of GDP, 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡, 
which was downloaded from the Government Revenue Dataset (GRD) of the International Centre 
for Tax and Development/ United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics 
Research (ICTD/UNU-WIDER, 2018). This data was supplemented, for data prior to 1990, with 
data from Mario Mansour’s ‘A tax revenue dataset for sub-Saharan Africa: 1980-2010’ published 
on www.ferdi.fr. The two sources provide a more consistent and verifiable dataset than most of 
the available alternative and have become very popular in tax effort studies.  
 
The VAT variable, 𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡, was created by coding a year as one if a VAT was adopted and 
implemented in that year for a particular country and zero otherwise. This classification helps to 
overcome possible gaps which may exist between the enactment of the relevant laws and the 
beginning of implementation of the tax, which is crucial in assessing true impact. The data on the 
VAT was first obtained from Ebrill et al. (2001), Keen and Lockwood (2010) and Ahlerup et al. 
(2015), and verified for consistency on actual implementation with Crowe (2016) and various 
country reports and government documents (for example, VAT laws, Tax Bulletins, Economic 
Reports). The years we use for purposes of creating the VAT dummy variable are the years when 
the VAT was actually implemented.  
 
 
13 Dom (2019) reports that the number of countries with autonomous revenue authorities had increased to 21 African 
countries by 2015, and that Africa remains the continent with the largest number of autonomous revenue authorities.  
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The process that guided the coding of the VAT was also employed here to create a dummy 
variable for ARAs ,(𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡) except in this case the basis was the operational presence as opposed 
to the legal creation of the revenue authority. A dummy variable equal to one was created if an 
autonomous revenue authority was operational and zero otherwise. The data on the operational 
presence of the autonomous revenue authority was derived from Crandall (2010), Fjeldstad and 
Moore (2009), Ahlerup et al. (2015) and Dom (2019) and cross-checked with country reports 
similar to those mentioned above. 
 
Data on expenditure spent on human capital (health and education in GDP), and the controls, 
namely GDP per capita, shares of agriculture and trade in GDP were drawn from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators and IMF’s World Economic Outlook. Finally, the data for our case 
study section (qualitative) were from the sources published by respective governments such as 
ministries of finance, central statistical office, central banks and revenue authorities. The only part 
of the research where ethical issues may potentially arise is that the case-study part of the thesis 
involved few interviews. However, interviewees were assured in advance of the interview that they 
were not obligated to answer any questions and could terminate the interview at any time.  
 
Table 2.7 provides the notation and interpretations of the variables included in the empirical 
estimations as well as the sources from which they have been obtained. A summary of the data 
relating to these variables is provided in Table 2.8. 
 
Table 2.7: Notation and sources 
Variable 
Symbol 
Meaning Source 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 
An indicator of government total tax revenues 
from taxes, social contributions, and other 
revenues such as fines, fees, rent, and income from 
property or sales 
Government revenue dataset (GRD) 
ICTD/UNU-WIDER (2018);  
A tax revenue dataset for sub-Saharan 
Africa: 1980-2010’; www.ferdi.fr 
 
𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡  
A dummy variable coded as one when a VAT has 
been operational in that year, and zero otherwise.  
Ebrill et al. (2001), Keen and Lockwood 
(2010) Ahlerup et al.(2015), Crowe (2016),   
𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 
A dichotomous dummy variable equal to one is 
operational in that year, and zero otherwise.  
Crandall (2010), Fjeldstad and Moore (2009), 
Ahlerup et al. (2015), Dom (2019). 
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡  
A measure of institutionalised accountability and 
measures political competitiveness, participation, 
openness and constraints on the president or chief 
governmental executive.  
Teorell et al. (2009), University of 
Gothenburg Quality of Government database 
(www. qog. pol. su.se); Database of Political 
Institutions (2016), Centre for Systemic 
Peace, polity IV Project 
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𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡  
An indicator of service delivery measured by the 
combined shares of public spending on education 
and health (% of GDP). 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Education 
spending 
One of the two components that make up the 
service delivery indicator (above)  
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Health spending 
One of the two components that make up the 
service delivery indicator (above)  
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  
An indicator of a country’s level of development 
proxied by real GDP per capita, based on the 
purchasing power parity in constant 2011 
international dollars. 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 
The share of agricultural sector, value added, in 
GDP. 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡  
Trade openness is a measured as a share of the sum 
of all imports and exports of goods and services in 
GDP.  
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 
Measures a country’s stock of external debt as a 
share of national income, and includes use of IMF 
credit, and short-term debt. 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑖𝑡 
A dummy variable equal to one if country has an 
IMF programme (SBF, ESAF, PRGF or SAF) 
with tax measures as one of the conditionalities 
between 1990 and 2003. This period coincides 
with the time when tax reforms were pushed on 
many African countries.  
Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA) 
Database (1993-2010) 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡 𝑖𝑡  
Bureaucratic effectiveness, an indicator of 
government ability to formulate and implement 
sound policies and commitment to such policies 
World Bank, World Governance Indicators 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑡  
Ability of the government to control political 
corruption  
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡  
Measures the extent to which citizens have 
confidence in and abide by rules  
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
 
Table 2.8: Data and summary statistics 
Variable         Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Central government total tax revenues, percent of GDP (TR) 22.2 10.5 1.3 59.8 
Adoption of the value added tax (VAT) 0.4 0.5 0 1 
Operational presence of an autonomous revenue authority (ARA) 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Democratic accountability (DA) 3.3 5.2 -10 10 
Service delivery, spending on education + health, percent of GDP (SD) 10.2 3.2 3.7 19.2 
Government spending on education, percent of GDP (Education) 4.3 2.0 1.0 13.2 
GDP per capita, PPP constant 2011 dollars (GDP) 3339.0 3879.1 592.0 18,171.9 
Share of agriculture value added, percent of GDP (Agric)  26.5 15.0 2.0 58.4 
Openness to foreign trade, percent of GDP (Trade)  73.7 35.9 0.0 209.9 
Stock of external debt, percent of GNI (Debt) 64.7 53.8 0.0 487.5 
Existence of an IMF crisis programme (1993-2003) (IMF) 0.13 0.3 0 1 
Bureaucratic effectiveness (Govt) -0.7 0.6 -1.9 1.0 
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Corruption (Corr) 2.4 1.0 0 6 
Rule of law (Law) 2.8 1.1 0 6 
Sources: Primarily from ICTD/UNU-WIDER, World Bank World Development Indicators, IMF World Economic Outlook for the 
period 1980-2013. For further details see Table 2.7 above. 
 
 
2.5. Empirical findings – quantitative results 
 
Before presenting and discussing our empirical findings, it’s useful to conduct some basic 
diagnostics to determine whether any of our explanatory variables could be correlated. The adverse 
consequences of multicollinearity between explanatory variables on the findings and interpretation 
of results is well-documented. Its presence can lead to higher variances and standard errors and 
lower t-statistics (a possible violation of the Gauss-Markov assumptions), and consequently lead 
to misleading interpretation of the findings. We employ the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation 
method to gain some insights into the nature of any association between the explanatory variables 
and the direction of such relationships. The Pearson pairwise correlation matrix is presented in 
Table 2.9.  
 
 
Table 2.9: Pairwise correlations, explanatory variables 
 VAT ARA SD DA Agric Trade  GDP IMF 
VAT 1.0000         
ARA 0.3577* 1.0000        
 (0.0000)        
SD -0.0023 0.4060* 1.0000       
 (0.9660) (0.0000)       
DA 0.3978* 0.2282* 0.2993* 1.0000      
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)      
Agric -0.1076* -0.0200 -0.1116* -0.2316* 1.0000     
 (0.0001) (0.4685) (0.0395) (0.0000)     
Trade 0.0179 -0.0437 0.1701* 0.1651* -0.5713* 1.0000    
 (0.5032) (0.1029) (0.0014) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
GDP -0.0229 -0.0363 0.0169 0.1502* -0.6597* 0.4781* 1.0000   
 (0.4864) (0.2696) (0.7573) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
IMF 0.1475* 0.0097 -0.1861* 0.1027* 0.1026* -0.1045* -0.1619* 1.000 
 (0.0000) (0.7177) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000)  
Note: The pairwise correlations, which depict partial correlations between two explanatory variables, were calculated 
using the data in our sample (see Tables 2.7 and 2.8). The Pearson correlation coefficient between two variables ranges 
between -1 (perfect negative correlation) and +1 (perfect positive correlation). A coefficient close to 0 (zero) indicates 
the lack of association between two variables.  
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The pairwise correlation matrix is one of the tools used to check for the presence (or not) 
of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables and the rule of thumb is that if the pairwise 
correlation estimate is greater than 0.8, then severe multicollinearity may be present. As can be 
observed in Table 2.9, the estimated partial correlations are less than 0.50, suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not likely to be a problem here.  
 
2.5.1 Baseline results - value added tax, autonomous revenue authority and ‘fiscal contracts’  
 
In this section, we present our main findings about the impacts on government revenues of 
the implementation of the VAT, creation of ARAs  and the construction of ‘fiscal contracts’. Table 
2.10 presents the results from the robust OLS, two-way fixed effects14 and random effects 
specifications based on equation (2.1). Our strategy, which is quite common in this literature, is to 
introduce each of our variables of interest gradually. First, we run the baseline equation with policy 
reform variables, VAT and ARAs , together with the controls (GDP per capita, share of agriculture 
and openness to international trade). The results are reported in columns (1), (2) and (3).  Second, 
we run the baseline equation with the elements that are crucial in the emergence of ‘fiscal 
contracts’, democratic accountability and effectiveness of service delivery and the same controls, 
and report the findings in columns (4), (5) and (6). Finally, we run the full baseline equation with 
all the variables as shown in columns (7), (8) and (9). As mentioned earlier, all specifications are 
estimated with cluster-robust white standard errors to minimise the potential effects of arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. We also calculate the Hausman test-statistic for purposes 
of comparing the fit of the fixed effects and random effects specifications. The p-values of the 
Hausman test statistics are all above 0.9, suggesting that the random effects specification is more 
consistent and, therefore, favoured over the fixed effects.  
 
Both the fixed effects and random effects regressions indicate that the coefficient on the 
variable VAT is positive but not significant, signalling that the adoption of the VAT may have had 
a positive contemporaneous impact on tax revenues in Africa, but this effect is not significant 
enough to have a significant impact on tax revenues (except that in the OLS specification (7) in 
 
14 For fixed-effect estimation we use the specification recommended by Angrist and Mansoor (2009) and also 
implemented in Ahlerup et al. (2015) 
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Table 2.10, VAT exhibits negative significance). The null hypothesis that efforts to improve the 
quality of tax structures, and thus, revenue performance by adopting the VAT have not delivered 
on the revenue objective in Africa is not rejected. These findings suggest that on average countries 
in Africa which have adopted a VAT do not necessarily perform better in tax revenue collection 
than those without. One possible explanation for the lack of significant effect of the VAT is that 
its adoption may have not been able to adequately compensate for the revenue lost from the taxes 
it replaced. The policy implication of this finding is that, merely adopting the VAT does not 
guarantee better revenue performance over countries without the VAT. The finding also signals 
that the much-widely adopted tax has not been successful in realising its revenue objectives for 
which it was introduced. 
  
Our results on the variable ARA also do not emerge as a significant correlate of tax yields 
across all our specifications. The estimated coefficient on the variable ARA is positive in the fixed 
effects specification and negative in the random effects specification, but insignificant in both 
cases. We, therefore, fail to reject the null hypothesis that ARAs  have not provided an advantage 
for countries that have created them for revenue purposes in Africa. The policy implication of this 
finding, which is similar to Dom (2019), is that efforts to improve tax revenue performance by 
ring-fencing the process of revenue collection from political interference by simply transferring 
such processes to an autonomous revenue authority in order to improve public trust and improving 
tax compliance, may not necessarily deliver on this promise. It appears from these econometric 
results that the success of policy reforms such as the adoption of the VAT and the creation of 
ARAs  in meeting revenue objectives remains controversial. One possibility for what is going 
wrong is that their revenue effects are influenced by several other factors, including the governance 
environment of the country, tax policy design, bureaucratic effectiveness and other political factors 
which may certainly impact their effectiveness. As can be observed from Table 2.2, these 
interesting and important conditioning influences have been less thoroughly studied in the analysis, 
leaving the true impact quite unclear. Even for the surprising results, existing studies do not offer 
explanations for particular causal factors which may underlie the lack of impact of these 
innovations. These are some of the issues we will come back to in the next and the case study 
sections of this chapter. 
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Turning to our governance variables that have been hypothesised to be crucial in the 
emergence of stable ‘fiscal contracts’, the results from both the fixed effects and random effects 
specifications, as well as the OLS specifications reveal that improvements in democratic 
accountability and the effectiveness (or quality) of service delivery (human capital spending) 
emerge as significant correlates of tax revenue performance. For both variables, we reject the null 
hypotheses of no impact and conclude that the ‘fiscal contract’ approach can improve tax revenue 
performance. The estimated coefficients indicate that improvements in democratic accountability 
can increase tax yields by an average between 0.01 and 0.02 percentage points of GDP, and 
improvements in service delivery (measured by spending on human capital) by one percent can 
improve tax yields by between 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points of GDP. Our results also clearly show 
that improving the effectiveness of service delivery has more influence in the emergence of the 
‘fiscal contract’ than improvements in democratic accountability. The policy implication for 
developing countries is that making improvements in democratic accountability and creating a 
connection between the taxes which taxpayers pay to government and the services which they 
receive (and publicising that connection properly) – may be a possible solution to the problem of 
poor revenue performance in developing countries.  
 
Again, like the issue of policy reforms, we gain more insights into how ‘fiscal contracts’ can 
help build up taxes in the developing countries is explored in more detail in the case study section, 
as part of our contribution to the literature. 
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Table 2.10: Value-added tax, autonomous revenue authority and ‘fiscal contracts’ - baseline regressions [equation 2.1] 
Estimation method 
Explanatory variables 
OLS 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
RE 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
RE 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
FE 
(8) 
RE 
(9) 
Adoption of the value-added tax (𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡) -0.011 0.046 0.039    -0.095** 0.038 0.007 
 (0.300) (1.100) (0.970)    (2.420) (0.720) (0.150) 
Creation of an autonomous revenue authority (𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡) 0.006 0.076 0.038    -0.027 0.016 -0.002 
 (0.200) (1.450) (0.840)    (0.990) (0.320) (0.040) 
Democratic accountability (𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡)    0.004 0.022*** 0.011** 0.007** 0.022*** 0.011** 
    (1.490) (3.860) (2.650) (2.480) (3.740) (2.660) 
Effectiveness of service delivery (𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡)    0.406*** 0.347*** 0.308*** 0.401*** 0.342*** (0.309)*** 
    (7.790) (4.550) (5.210) (7.310) (4.450) (4.980) 
Agriculture share in GDP (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡) -0.181*** -0.287*** 0.231*** -0.208*** -0.121 -0.160*** -0.221*** -0.116 -0.157*** 
 (5.720) (4.350) (4.860) (6.120) (1.550) (3.530) (6.680) (1.470) (3.350) 
Foreign trade share in GDP (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡) 0.317*** 0.315*** 0.308*** 0.209*** 0.304*** 0.289*** 0.206*** 0.301*** 0.290*** 
 (7.190) (5.830) (6.240) (5.450) (4.650) (5.740) (5.130) (4.530) (5.610) 
GDP per capita (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) 0.017 -0.149* -0.045 -0.128*** 0.021 -0.079 -0.138*** 0.013 -0.076 
 (0.520 (1.870) (0.950) (3.740) (0.160) (1.640) (4.110) (0.100) (1.530) 
Constant  2.091*** 3.748*** 2.815*** 2.818*** 1.063 2.138*** 3.032*** 1.104 2.096*** 
 (5.180) (5.550) (5.670) (7.900) (0.970) (4.090) (8.750) (1.101) (3.890) 
R2 0.337 0.196 0.349 0.472 0.425 0.480 0.483 0.427 0.476 
Observations  732 732 732 313 313 313 313 313 313 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hausman’s test (Prob>chi2)  0.9999  0.9755  0.9322 
Time-specific fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country-specific fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is total tax revenues as a share of GDP. As described in Table 2.7, explanatory variables of interest: VAT and ARA are dummy variables 
and service delivery is the share of education and health spending (human capital) in GDP. Control variables: agriculture and trade as shares of GDP and GDP per capita. 
All fixed effects and random effects specifications include country and year fixed effects. All estimations including the pooled OLS are done with heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation (White) robust standard errors with t-values reported in the parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
The reason why the number of observations changes from 732 in columns (1)-(3) to 313 in columns (4)-(9) is the fewer observations available for the  education and health 
expenditure variables, derived  by ourselves based on the World Development Indicators. 
Test for the presence of autocorrelation (Wooldridge test): F(  1,      30) =      3.495; Prob > F      =      0.0714 
Test for heteroscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test): Chi2(1)         =   34.26; Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
These tests indicate that autocorrelation is not likely to be a problem, but heteroscedasticity is potentially a more important problem in our data.
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Finally, we consider the findings on the controls recognised as important influences in the 
literature and included in our model. The results from the random effects specification (which 
according to the Hausman test statistics in Table 2.10 are more consistent than the fixed effects 
estimates) indicate that the sectoral composition of the tax base measured by the share of agriculture 
in the economy and a country’s openness to foreign trade emerge as significant correlates of tax 
revenue performance in Africa. Both the fixed effects and random effects estimations fail to establish 
the role of overall level of development as a significant determinant of revenue performance in Africa, 
which is not consistent with the theoretical suggestion that GDP per capita is linked to the capacity to 
pay and collect taxes. The results also indicate that increasing the compositional size of agriculture in 
the tax base by 1 percent lowers the tax yield by between 0.2 and 0.4 percent of GDP, confirming 
earlier findings that because it is one of the hard-to tax sectors, the large share of agriculture has 
contributed to poor revenue generation in developing countries. The degree of a country’s openness 
to international trade improves revenue collections by about 0.30 percent of GDP. These findings, 
which are significant at the conventional 5 percent significance level, are consistent with previous 
findings (for example, Leuthold, 1991; Ghura, 1998; Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; Gupta, 2007).  
 
The central message from our baseline regressions is that the true revenue impact of the VAT 
and ARAs  remains unclear, however, we find strong evidence that improvements in democratic 
accountability and the quality of government service delivery can lead to the emergence of a ‘fiscal 
contract’, which is a possible solution to the problem of poor revenue generation in poorer developing 
countries.  
 
2.5.2 Lags and possible causal effects – VAT, ARA and ‘fiscal contracts’ 
 
As mentioned earlier, a possible concern with policy reforms is that they are complex and their 
beneficial gains may take a while to materialise (Acemoglu, 2005; Ahlerup et al., 2015; Dom, 2019). 
These studies suggest that the explanatory power of policy and institutional variables may be weaker 
over short horizons but may improve over time. Assessing the potential benefits of policy reforms 
such as the adoption of the VAT and creation of ARAs  based on our baseline model ignores these 
important aspects and could possibly be the reason for the failure to capture the true impacts of such 
reforms. Policy reforms tend to be complex and in this particular case may involve things like 
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changing organisational structures, recruiting and training (and retraining) relevant staff and 
conducting educational campaign for taxpayers and the public to build wider trust and acceptance 
among taxpayers and the public. Even when these policy reforms are implemented, some countries 
often have to make several refinements as they gain more experience over some years to fine-tune the 
policy or administrative structures to improve performance. Also, it will be useful to explore whether 
the results from our baseline model reported in Table 2.10, in particular lagging the policy variable 
effectiveness of service delivery, can be seen as a form of causation running from government offer 
of better public services to better tax revenue performance - the process which unlocked the door to 
a fiscal contract, or ‘top left-hand corner equilibrium’ in the prisoner’s dilemma model of Tables 2.6a 
and Table 2.6b above. 
 
To address the issue of whether VATs and ARAs  only have impacts over the long-run and test 
the proposition that the beneficial gains of policy and institutional reforms may take some while to 
happen, we lag the three main variables of interest in equation 2.1 by between three and five years 
and assess the response of the tax ratio – the VAT, ARAs  and the offer of improved services by 
government (modelled here as the combined share of health and education in total government 
spending, SD). Our econometric findings are reported in Table 2.11. The lags are introduced 
gradually, beginning with the lags of the variables VAT and ARA by three years with the results 
reported in columns (1) to (3), and then the lag of the offer of better public services by two years as 
reported in columns (4) to (6).  
 
With the lag structures, the results indicate that the effect of the VAT is mostly insignificant in 
the short and medium term. The estimated coefficients across all the three specifications as reported 
in columns (1) to (3) are statistically insignificant both for the contemporaneous effect as well as for 
the three-year lagged effect. The results for an autonomous revenue authority now show that there is 
a contemporaneous increase in tax revenues following its creation of about 0.1 to 0.3 percentage 
points. However, the estimated coefficients on the lagged indicator of the autonomous revenue 
authority (𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡−3) emerge with a negative and statistically significant coefficient after three years 
and remain mainly insignificant over the long run. This finding, which is similar to the findings of 
Ahlerup el at. (2015), indicates that the creation of autonomous revenue authority may have led to 
contemporaneous improvements in tax revenue collections, but that this effect dissipates in the 
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medium to long term15. Possible explanations for this finding is that in spite of institutional reforms, 
the autonomy of revenue authorities has remained limited as they remain too beholden to the ministry 
of finance and the political leadership (the president), their budget autonomy and certainty tend to 
dissipated overtime as revenue authorities are increasingly subject to the broader deteriorating fiscal 
positions of African countries (as will be noted in Chapter 4) and African countries have failed to 
sustain revenue increases due to increasing levels fiscal corruption in tax administration observed in 
these countries. The implication of this finding is that poor countries may benefit more from the 
creation of ARAs  by improving the institutional environment. This proposition is explored later on 
in this section as part of the process of checking the robustness of our findings.  
 
To assess whether the offer of improved services by government which makes possible the 
emergence of a ‘fiscal contract’ which then leads to improvements in tax revenue collections in 
defiance of the political risks associated with higher taxes, can be seen as a possible causal link, we 
lag by two years the expenditure variable, which is modelled here as the share of health and education 
spending in government expenditure. The results which are reported in columns (4) to (6) suggest that 
improving the quality of services offered by the government, which makes it possible for a ‘fiscal 
contract’ to emerge, is causally connected with improvements in tax revenue performance. The 
estimated effect remains strong and significant across all specifications. The main conclusion from 
these findings is that increasing levels of democratic accountability and the value of public services 
that are provided in return for payment of taxes  are significantly correlated and causally connected 
with increasing tax revenue performance, and can thus be a possible solution to the problem of poor 
revenue performance in developing countries.
 
15 We consider medium term as three-year period and long term as any time beyond three years, a standard commonly 
followed by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and various continental Development Banks (World Bank, 
1999; IMF, 1999; Houerou and Taliercio, 2002) 
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Table 2.11: Regression results embodying lags and causal effects 
Estimation method 
Explanatory variables 
OLS 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
RE 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
RE 
(6) 
Adoption of the value-added tax (𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡) -0.038 0.024 0.002 -0.166*** 0.135 0.025  
(0.560) (0.440) (0.030) (3.450) (1.190) (0.390) 
Adoption of the value-added tax lagged 3 years (𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−3) -0.058 0.020 -0.048     
(0.980) (0.400) (0.910)    
Creation of autonomous revenue authority (𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡) 0.302*** 0.057 0.121** -0.025 -0.069 -0.044  
(4.880) (0.970) (2.030) (0.860) (1.100) (0.860) 
Creation of autonomous revenue authority lagged 3 years (𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡−3) -0.349*** -0.056 -0.160**     
(5.280) (0.930) (2.300)    
Democratic accountability (𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡) 0.006** 0.022** 0.008* 0.007** 0.028*** 0.011**  
(2.150) (2.590) (1.700) (2.240) (4.000) (2.010) 
Effectiveness of service delivery (𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡) 0.366*** 0.345*** 0.310***     
(6.600) (3.770) (3.520)    
Effectiveness of service delivery lagged 2 years (𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡−2)    0.345*** 0.289** 0.294*** 
    (5.670) (2.690) (3.460) 
Agriculture share in GDP (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡) -0.200*** -0.116 -0.176*** -0.244*** -0.110 -0.153***  
(5.900) (1.370) (3.090) (6.430) (1.380) (2.710) 
Foreign trade share in GDP (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡) 0.187*** 0.300*** 0.252*** 0.258*** 0.348*** 0.330***  
(4.600) (4.100) (3.970) (5.820) (5.520) (6.050) 
GDP per capita (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) -0.106*** 0.023 -0.084 -0.162*** 0.175 -0.059  
(3.020) (0.130) (1.400) (4.370) (0.680) (0.830) 
Constant  2.885*** 1.023 2.405*** 3.276*** -0.313 1.816*** 
 
(8.270) (0.620) (3.930) (8.120) (0.150) 2.730 
Observations  313 313 313 265 265 265 
R-squared 0.5160 0.4286 0.5386 0.4974 0.4053 0.4578 
Time-specific fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific fixed effects  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is total tax revenues as a share of GDP. As described in Table 2.7, explanatory variables of interest: VAT and ARA are dummy variables and service 
delivery is the share of education and health spending (human capital) in GDP. Control variables: agriculture and trade as shares of GDP and GDP per capita. All fixed effects and 
random effects specifications include country and year fixed effects. All estimations including the pooled OLS are done with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (White) robust 
standard errors with t-values reported in the parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*)
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2.5.3 Dealing with the endogeneity of key explanatory variables 
 
Previous studies have recognised that fiscal reforms such as the adoption of the VAT and 
establishment of ARAs, tend to be endogenous with respect to revenue performance due to the problem 
of selection bias (Keen and Lockwood, 2010; Ahlerup el al., 2015; Dom, 2019). An important issue in 
relation to this is that governments are more likely to make decisions to undertake these reforms when in 
fiscal crisis. Studies show that there are several reasons why governments take decisions to adopt the 
VAT or establish ARAs , but in Africa the primary reason is that these reforms are considered as panaceas 
to overcome low tax revenue performance. A possible critique of our baseline findings based on equation 
is that these variables have so far been treated as exogenous relative to tax revenue performance. The 
baseline results include country- and time-specific fixed effects and a number of explanatory variables 
but given the limited number of control variables in equation 2.1, however there is a possibility that there 
are certain important unobservable factors which may influence the likelihood of a country adopting the 
VAT or establishing ARAs . This is one potential source of the selection bias problem, and without 
addressing it our findings may be misleading. Therefore, being an important issue in determining the 
‘true’ impact, it needs to be factored into any analysis of this sort. Also, we explore this issue in this 
section as part of testing how robust our baseline findings are to this endogeneity problem.   
 
Studies have identified different ways of correcting the selection bias associated with the decisions 
to adopt a VAT or establish an autonomous revenue authority The two most common methods employed 
to purge this endogeneity are the instrumental variable approach (Dom, 2019) and a two-stage selection 
correction procedure (Keen and Lockwood, 2010; Ahlerup et al., 2015). The challenge of finding suitable 
and valid instruments which are correlated with the two explanatory variables (VAT and ARAs ) but are 
uncorrelated with the dependent variable (tax revenue performance),  has limited the use of the 
instrumental variable approach in this chapter. Therefore, the strategy we employ here to tackle this 
problem is the two-step approach developed by Heckman (1979) and Maddala (1983) and employed by 
Keen and Lockwood (2010) and Ahlerup et al. (2015) in tax effort studies. This process is further 
elaborated below.  
 
The two-stage selection correction method is a simple and consistent procedure, which enables 
researchers to estimate behavioural functions from non-randomly selected samples or in the presence of 
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‘omitted variable ‘ bias by OLS (Heckman, 1979). In the first stage, a pooled probit or logit model on 
the determinants of the VAT or autonomous revenue authority (as dependent variables) is specified and 
estimated. Typical determinants of the VAT may include levels of overall development, a country’s 
indebtedness, the extent to which government is held accountable, tax administration, stress of pressure 
of the IMF and a country’s openness to foreign trade. Standard determinants of ARAs  may include some 
of the drivers that also influence the VAT such as the overall level of development, public indebtedness, 
democratisation and openness to foreign trade, but also include the structure of the tax system, the 
influential role of bilateral aid donors and the ability to control corruption in tax administration. It is 
recognised in the literature that more developed, democratic and open countries are more likely to adopt 
the VAT and an autonomous revenue authority. The IMF and bilateral aid donors, which have muscled 
developing countries into implementing these reforms are more likely to be significant correlates with 
the decision to adopt the VAT and ARAs , respectively. Improved systems of tax administration are more 
likely to be associated with the decision to adopt better taxes such as the VAT, while better quality tax 
structures and the ability to control corruption are expected to strongly influence the establishment ARAs 
. The impact of public debt may be an empirical issue – as highly indebted developing countries may see 
it necessary to implement such reforms to raise taxes or may be too indebted and financially weak to 
implement such expensive reforms. According to Heckman (1979), Keen and Lockwood (2010) and 
other studies, the decisions to adopt the VAT and ARAs  can, therefore, be specified as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑡] = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (2.2) 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑖𝑡] = 𝑐 + 𝑑𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (2.3) 
 
 
where: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑡] is the probability that country 𝑖 is likely to adopt and implement a VAT in 
year 𝑡 given a group of control variables represented by the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡; 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑌𝑖𝑡] is the probability that country 𝑖 will establish and operate an autonomous 
revenue authority in year 𝑡 given a set of control variables represented by the vector 𝑌𝑖𝑡; 
 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of typical determinants of the decision to adopt a VAT and, as mentioned, includes 
an indicator of the level of overall development, GDP per capita; country’s indebtedness (external 
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debt % of GDP); an indicator of the extent to which government is held accountable, operational 
presence of an autonomous revenue authority, influential role of the IMF (dummy variable equal 
to one if a country has an IMF programme with revenue reform measures in that year) and an 
indicator of a country’s openness to foreign trade (trade % of GDP). These variables are also 
defined in Table 2.7; 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a vector of standard group of controls identified as possible influences of the decisions to 
establish an autonomous revenue authority and, as mentioned earlier includes an indicator of the 
level of overall development, GDP per capita; country’s indebtedness (external debt % of GDP); 
an indicator of the extent to which government is held accountable, an indicator of the quality of 
tax structures (dummy variable for the operational presence of a VAT); influential role of bilateral 
aid donors (official development assistance % of GNI) and an indicator of a country’s openness to 
foreign trade (trade % of GDP).;  
 
𝑏 and 𝑑 are the coefficients of interest in VAT and autonomous revenue authority behavioural 
equations; and  
𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an independent, identically distributed error term. 
 
Equations (2.2) and (2.3) are estimated by the pooled probit and logit estimators on the same 
sample of 42 African countries over the period 1980 to 2013. The results of this first stage are reported 
in Table 2.12. The first two columns show results of the probit and logit specifications relating the 
likelihood of a country adopting the VAT to a set of variables contained in 𝑌𝑖𝑡, and the last two columns 
show results linking the likelihood of creating an autonomous revenue authority to the same set of 
variables.  
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Table 2.12: Correlates of the likelihood of adopting VAT and ARA [equations 2.2 and 2.3] 
Estimation method 
 
Dependent variable 
Explanatory variable 
Probit 
 
VAT 
Logit 
 
VAT  
Probit 
 
ARA 
Logit 
 
ARA 
GDP per capita (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.160) (1.150) (0.020) (0.220) 
External debt stock (𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡) -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.010*** 
 (5.420) (5.290) (5.160) (4.980) 
Democratic accountability (𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡) 0.048*** 0.079*** 0.036*** 0.060*** 
 (5.780) (5.720) (3.090) (3.040) 
Creation of autonomous revenue authorities (𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡) 0.734*** 1.206***   
 (6.420) (6.090)   
Adoption of value added tax (𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡)   0.379*** 0.658*** 
   (2.830) (2.850) 
IMF programme with tax measures (𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑖𝑡) 0.342*** 0.585***   
 (2.860) (2.920)   
Bilateral aid (𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡)   0.024*** 0.041*** 
   (3.080) (3.050) 
Control of corruption (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡)   -0.131** -0.216** 
   (2.210) (2.150) 
Openness to foreign trade (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡) -0.001 -0.001 -0.007*** -0.012*** 
 -0.510 -0.610 (2.870) (2.980) 
Constant  0.359*** 0.616*** 0.050 0.084 
 (2.780) (2.850) (0.210) (0.210) 
Observations  897 897 687 687 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1314 0.1308 0.1126 0.1115 
Note: The dependent variables are the probability of adopting the VAT and autonomous revenue authority. Estimation 
techniques are probit and logit, with robust standard errors in the parenthesis. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 
5% (**) and 10% (*). 
 
Although the estimation results in Table 2.12 are for purposes of calculating the selection 
correction factors, they point to some key elements – they confirm the suggestion that the widespread 
adoption of the VAT and the creation of ARAs  in poor countries are linked to the major role played by 
the IMF and bilateral aid donors, respectively. The results also indicate that the continent’s increasing 
democratisation (especially after the 1990s) expressed itself in even more likelihood of reforming tax 
systems with high expectations of building up taxes. Surprisingly, our results show no evidence of a 
strong link between the adoption of the VAT and/or ARAs  and a country’s level of development, 
signalling the possibility that the question of affordability may not have deterred poor countries from 
reforming their tax systems.  
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In the second step towards addressing the selection bias, we use the estimated results from the 
pooled probit, or logit models based on equations (2.2) and (2.3) to compute the inverse Mills ratio 
(IMR), which are designated in the literature as bias-correction factor. Following Heckman (1979), 
Maddala (1983), Vella and Verbeek (1999) and Keen and Lockwood (2010) the inverse Mills ratios are 
estimated as follows:  
 
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑇 = 
{
 
 
 
 ∅(?̂?,   𝑋𝑖𝑡)
ɸ(?̂?,   𝑋𝑖𝑡)
,                𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 1
− 
∅(?̂?,  𝑋𝑖𝑡)
1 −  ɸ(?̂?,   𝑋𝑖𝑡)
,     𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 0  
           (2.4) 
   
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐴 = 
{
 
 
 
 ∅(?̂?,   𝑌𝑖𝑡)
ɸ(?̂?, 𝑌𝑖𝑡)
,                𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1
− 
∅(?̂?,   𝑌𝑖𝑡)
1 −  ɸ(?̂?,   𝑌𝑖𝑡)
, 𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 0
               (2.5) 
  
 
where:  
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑇 = inverse Mills ratio for the adoption of the VAT,  
𝐼𝑀𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐴 = inverse Mills ration for the creation of autonomous revenue authority,  
φ = standard normal density function, and  
Φ = standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
The variables 𝑏, 𝑑 and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 are defined above.  
 
The estimates of the respective inverse Mills ratios are then embedded into our baseline model 
(equation 2.1) as independent variables and re-specified as equations (2.6) and (2.7) as shown below. 
The estimated inverse mills ratios are presumed to capture the influence of most of the unobservable 
factors that influence the tax revenue and the likelihood of the reforms. They are also assumed to be 
exogenous and their inclusion addresses the endogeneity problem of selection, and therefore estimates 
of the policy reform variables in question are expected to be unbiased. Feeding the selection correlation 
factors, the inverse Mills ratios, into our baseline gives us the following extended equations: 
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𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝜁𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜃𝑗
3
𝑗=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑇 + 𝜇𝑖
+ λ𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                     (2.6) 
    
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝜁𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜃𝑗
3
𝑗=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝐼𝑀𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐴 + 𝜇𝑖
+ λ𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                       (2.7) 
    
The inclusion of the inverse Mills ratios in our estimating models limits our estimation techniques 
to OLS as the fixed effects and random effects techniques do not perform better than the OLS. The 
inclusion of the selection correction factors, 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑇 and 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐴 allows for the coefficients on the 
variables 𝑉𝐴𝑇 and 𝐴𝑅𝐴, 𝜗 and 𝜏 respectively, to be estimated and interpreted with minimum risks of 
bias. A statistically significant coefficient on the selection correction factor suggests that it is crucial to 
control for the endogeneity problem in the estimates because certain unobservable factors significantly 
influence both the tax ratio and the decisions to adopt the VAT or the creation of an autonomous revenue 
authority. The estimation results which take into account the potential endogeneity problem as discussed 
are reported in Table 2.13. Estimates based on equations (2.6) and (2.7) are collected in columns (1) and 
(2), whereas in column (3) we report findings when both inverse Mills ratios are included in the same 
equation.  
 
The estimated results for the selection correction factors, the inverse mills ratios for both variables 
do not emerge as strong correlates of the tax ratio. The estimated coefficient on the selection factor for 
the VAT is about -0.02, whereas the one for the ARA is between 0.07 and 0.14, but both are statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that the unobservable factors may have an impact on the policy decisions 
relating to the adoption of the VAT and the creation of the autonomous revenue authority, but this had 
no influence on tax revenues. We, therefore, conclude that the endogeneity problem of selection may not 
be a major concern to affect the reliability of our previous findings.  
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Table 2.13: Tax revenue performance – embodying selection factors [equations 2.6 and 2.7] 
Estimation technique 
Equation 
OLS (1) 
(2.6) 
OLS (2) 
(2.7) 
OLS (3) 
Adoption of value added tax (𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡) 0.037 0.011 -0.014 
 (0.750) (0.190) (0.220) 
Creation of autonomous revenue authority (𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡) 0.064 0.015 0.093 
 (0.960) (0.340) (1.190) 
Democratic accountability (𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡) 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 
 (4.060) (3.190) (3.990) 
Effectiveness of service delivery (𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡) 0.328*** 0.343*** 0.322*** 
 (4.140) (4.250) (3.980) 
Agriculture share in GDP (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡) -0.119 -0.125 -0.145* 
 (1.470) (1.500) (1.680) 
Foreign trade share in GDP (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡) 0.298*** 0.294*** 0.284*** 
 (4.110) (3.960) (3.770) 
GDP per capita (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) 0.017 0.044 0.056 
 (0.130) (0.340) (0.430) 
Inverse Mills ratio for VAT (𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑇) -0.015 
 -0.024 
 (0.990)  (1.250) 
Inverse Mills ratio for ARA (𝐼𝑀𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐴) 
 0.068 0.135 
  (0.620) (1.060) 
Constant  1.110 0.856 0.903 
 (1.000) (0.760) (0.800) 
Observations  313 306 306 
R-squared  0.8216 0.8178 0.8190 
Country-specific fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time-specific fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is total tax revenues as a share of GDP. As described in Table 2.7, explanatory variables of 
interest: VAT and ARA are dummy variables and service delivery is the share of education and health spending (human 
capital) in GDP. Control variables: agriculture and trade as shares of GDP and GDP per capita. All fixed effects and random 
effects specifications include country and year fixed effects. All estimations including the pooled OLS are done with 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (White) robust standard errors with t-values reported in the parentheses. Significance 
levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
 
 
2.5.4 Robustness checks – conditional impact of VAT and ARA  
 
Although the literature has emphasised the major part played by the quality of policies and institutions 
in determining certain policy outcomes (World Bank, 2003; Burnside and Dollar, 2000), comparative 
studies have not thoroughly analysed how such factors can affect the success (or not) of policy reforms 
such as the adoption of the VAT and ARAs. This is particularly important here because institutional 
weakness is a common characteristic in countries in our sample (Block, 2002; Mosley and Chiripanhura, 
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2016). In this section we consider the role of the institutional environment within which reforms are 
implemented. Specifically, we examine whether the success of the VAT and ARA towards revenue 
objectives, for which they were primarily adopted in most poor countries, is influenced by a country’s 
institutional environment. The basic idea which we explore here is whether the success of the VAT and 
ARA towards their revenue objectives is limited (or bolstered) by a country’s institutional qualities 
within which these policy reforms are implemented. As mentioned in our previous discussion, we focus 
on institutional qualities that can reinforce tax collection efficiency: government effectiveness in 
formulating sound tax policies and the stability of such policies, and citizens’ respect for and adherence 
to the rule of law. It is well acknowledged in the literature that a properly designed and stable tax system and 
adherence to the rule of law can reduce the cost of enforcement on tax administration and reduce burden of 
compliance on taxpayers, and thus increasing the overall collection efficiency and the taxpayer base. Therefore, it 
is expected that the VAT and ARAs  will be more successful in countries with better bureaucratic quality and 
stronger adherence to the rule of law.   
 
To capture the influence of these institutional variables on policy outcomes, we specify and 
estimate a model where our policy reform variables are interacted with measures of institutional quality 
mentioned earlier, using the approach employed in Keen and Lockwood (2010) and Ahlerup et al. (2015). 
The extended model, which is an extension of our baseline equation, is specified as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝜁𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 +∑𝜃𝑗
3
𝑗=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡 + ℶ𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + λ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (2.8) 
   
where our indicators of the institutional environment are government effectiveness, 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡, which reflects 
perceptions on the quality and ability of a country’s bureaucracy to formulate and implement sound policies, as 
well as its commitment to such policies, and rule of law, 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡, which reflects perceptions on the confidence in 
and adherence to the country’s rules and laws.  
 
The extended model (equation 2.8) is estimated by OLS, fixed effects and random effects estimators, 
as in previous estimations. The four coefficients of interest, which capture the potential impact of a 
country’s institutional quality on the success of VAT and ARA towards their revenue objectives, 𝜑, 𝜓, ℶ 
and 𝜔 are all assumed to be positive. The results are reported in Table 2.14. Institutional variables are 
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introduced and analysed progressively, first beginning with government effectiveness in columns (1) to 
(3), respect for and enforcement of the rule of law in columns (4) to (5). In columns (6) to (9) we 
incorporate both institutional variables in the same equation and analyse their impact.  
Several interesting findings emerge from this analysis. Key results which are important for 
purposes of the robustness checks are the estimated coefficients and significance of the interaction terms 
in equation 2.8. Consistent with our previous findings in sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.3, the OLS, fixed effects 
or random effects estimators, we find in this section that on average the two policy reform variables of 
interest, 𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 and 𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡, have had little or no direct impact on tax revenue performance in Africa. The 
estimated coefficients on both variables remain highly insignificant across all specifications (as in 
previous estimates), perhaps indicating that although there are strong a priori reasons for expecting policy 
reforms which have involved the adoption of the VAT or creation of an autonomous revenue authority 
as panaceas for improving tax systems and revenue performance, these policies have been less successful 
in Africa. However, the finding in the case of the autonomous revenue authority should be interpreted 
with caution, as it appears to be sensitive to a country’s institutional environment. The estimates from 
the OLS and the random effects specifications (which in this study is more consistent than the fixed 
effects) show that the interaction effects between our indicator bureaucracy and the dichotomous 𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 
variable is positive and statistically significant. The estimated coefficient on the interaction term, 
𝐴𝑅𝐴 ∗ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡, suggests, in our view, that the creation or operational presence of the autonomous revenue 
authority leads to a revenue advantage of 0.1 to 0.3 percent of GDP in countries with higher levels of 
bureaucratic effectiveness16. However, we find no evidence that the level of government effectiveness 
matters for how the VAT impacts tax revenues.  
 
16 It was pointed out in the oral examination that the claim made here is not secure, and that there is also evidence for the 
proposition that causation may run in the reverse direction, from the establishment of VAT and ARA authorities to 
governance,  instead of, or as well as, in the opposite direction from VAT and ARAs to additional revenue generation as we 
contend. 
82 
 
Table 2.14: Results for the conditional impact of the VAT and ARA [equation 2.8] 
Estimation technique 
Explanatory variables 
OLS 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
RE 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
RE 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
FE 
(8) 
RE 
(9) 
Adoption of value added tax (𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡) -0.060 -0.002 -0.024 -0.310 0.029 -0.225 0.054 0.036 -0.100  
(0.950) (0.030) (0.670) (1.560) (0.050) (1.000) (0.330) (0.050) (0.490) 
Creation of autonomous revenue authority (𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡) 0.069 0.038 0.045 -0.058 0.597 0.005 -0.012 0.675 0.036  
(1.440) (0.590) (0.750) (0.340) (1.230) (0.020) (0.060) (1.310) (0.130) 
Democratic accountability (𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡) 0.005* 0.025*** 0.011** 0.008** 0.019* 0.011 0.012*** 0.024** 0.012** 
 (1.790) (3.200) (2.420) (2.220) (1.710) (1.620) (2.620) (2.310) (2.000) 
Effectiveness of service delivery (𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡) 0.429*** 0.352*** 0.322*** 0.182** 0.449*** 0.272** 0.246*** 0.439*** 0.274**  
(7.350) (3.750) (3.770) (2.230) (3.950) (2.240) 2.960 (3.720) (2.320) 
Agriculture share in GDP (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡) -0.217*** -0.101 -0.151*** -0.190*** -0.094 -0.170*** -0.212*** -0.092 -0.192*** 
 (6.030) (1.050) (2.630) (5.840) (0.930) (3.060) (6.680) (0.880) (4.130) 
Foreign trade share in GDP (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡) 0.210*** 0.297*** 0.288*** 0.263*** 0.335*** 0.317*** 0.275*** 0.347*** 0.325*** 
 (4.250) (3.530) (4.450) (4.250) (3.290) (4.050) (3.950) (3.100) (3.400) 
GDP per capita (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) -0.139*** 0.049 -0.073 -0.032 -0.081 -0.012 -0.050 -0.086 -0.032  
(3.980) (0.240) (1.120) (0.880) (0.330) (0.180) (1.400) (0.310) (0.580) 
Effectiveness of government bureaucracy (𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑖𝑡) 0.117 0.011 0.038    0.316*** 0.065 0.262***  
(1.610) (0.110) (0.510)    (3.840) (0.300) (3.380) 
VAT*Effectiveness of government bureaucracy 0.042 -0.061 -0.035    0.022 0.169 -0.017  
(0.520) (0.770) (0.440)    (0.510) (1.080) (0.260) 
ARA*Effectiveness of government bureaucracy 0.163*** 0.069 0.131**    0.315*** 0.034 0.230**  
(3.530) (0.920) (2.220)    (3.260) (0.170) (2.450) 
Law and order (𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡)    -0.022 0.160 -0.006 0.131*** 0.024 0.148** 
    (0.390) (1.010) (0.090) (2.840) (0.240) (2.300) 
VAT*Law and order    0.060 -0.031 0.037 0.003 -0.030 0.034 
    (1.000) (0.170) (0.570) (0.060) (0.160) (0.530) 
ARA*Law and order    0.011 -0.151 -0.002 0.027 -0.163 0.015 
    (0.220) (1.030) (0.030) (0.480) (1.070) (0.180) 
Constant  2.879*** 0.785 2.028*** 2.455*** 0.908 1.698** 2.134*** 0.854 1.786***  
(7.440) (0.410) (2.950) (5.490) (0.470) (2.400) (4.950) (0.400) (2.840) 
Observations  294 294 294 223 223 223 210 210 210 
R-squared  0.4999 0.4059 0.4905 0.4390 0.4262 0.4864 0.4827 0.4233 0.5354 
The dependent variable is total tax revenues as a share of GDP, as described in Table 2.7. All fixed effects and random effects specifications include country and year fixed effects. 
All estimations including the pooled OLS are done with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (White) robust standard errors with t-values reported in the parentheses. Significance 
levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
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We have similarly explored the interaction between our policy reform variables and other 
dimensions of the institutional environment pertinent to the ability to generate tax revenues in poor 
countries. The results for the interaction effects between a country’s level of respect for and enforcement 
of the rule of law are surprisingly insignificant in both cases. In other words, how the VAT and ARAs  
affect tax revenue performance does not depend on citizens’ respect and adhere to rule of law. This 
uninformative finding could be explained by the fact that the rule of law does not change much over 
time.  
 
We have also explored the robustness of our findings by allowing for the interaction between 
lagged policy reform variables, instead of contemporaneous values like in Table 2.14, and the 
institutional environment. The re-estimated results are given in Table 2.15. The results in columns (1) to 
(3) do not include the selection correction factors and are based on OLS, fixed effects and random effects 
specifications, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) include the selection factors and are estimated by OLS 
only following the standard literature (for example, Keen and Lockwood (2010); Ahlerup et al. (2015)). 
It appears that our findings remain generally similar to our earlier results. The adoption of the VAT 
remains statistically insignificant whether its contemporaneous effects, lagged by three years or 
interacted with institutional quality. The creation of autonomous revenue authority improves tax 
collections but, similar to our previous finding in Table 2.14, but the effect dissipates over the medium 
to long term. Our sensitivity analysis also shows that the effectiveness of public expenditure continues 
to be strongly correlated with improvements in tax collections, but democratic accountability does not 
emerge as robust to this specification. We also observe that the quality of government bureaucracy 
matters for the effectiveness of the autonomous revenue authority but not the value added tax, as 
suggested by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term. This result might 
suggest that better quality of bureaucracy increases the efficiency of revenue authorities in the short run.   
 
The policy implication of this finding is that ARAs  are more likely to successfully live up to 
revenue expectations in countries where government bureaucracy is more effective as such institutional 
qualities support the proficiency and effectiveness of the tax system. Thus, countries will benefit more 
from creating ARAs  if they also improve government effectiveness.  
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Table 2.15: Robustness checks (lagged policy variables and interactions) 
Estimation method 
Explanatory variables 
OLS 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
RE 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS  
(5) 
Adoption of value added tax (𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡) -0.013 0.019 0.006 -0.001 -0.106 
 (0.170) (0.330) (0.120) (0.010) (1.250) 
Creation of autonomous revenue authority (𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡) 0.299*** 0.061 0.126** 0.260*** 0.265*** 
 (4.380) (1.020) (1.990) (3.030) (3.450) 
Value-added tax lagged 3 years (𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−3) -0.098 0.007 -0.084 -0.118 -0.112 
 (1.420) (0.140) (1.460) (1.430) (1.520) 
Autonomous revenue authority lagged 3 years(𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡−3) -0.292*** -0.055 -0.114 -0.264*** -0.267*** 
 (3.780) (0.900) (1.430) (2.920) (3.290) 
VAT lagged 3 years*government effectiveness -0.053 -0.029 -0.056 -0.063* -0.054 
 (1.550) (0.610) (1.210) (1.710) (1.610) 
ARA lagged 3 years*government effectiveness  0.100** 0.003 0.112* 0.109** 0.088* 
 (2.180) (0.040) (1.900) (2.250) (1.880) 
Effectiveness of service delivery (𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡) 0.378*** 0.340*** 0.327*** 0.375*** 0.348*** 
 (6.470) (3.580) (3.640) (5.690) (5.420) 
Democratic accountability (𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡) 0.004 0.025*** 0.007 0.003 0.003 
 (1.510) (3.200) (1.540) (1.020) (0.850) 
Agriculture share in GDP (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡) -0.192*** -0.116 -0.173*** -0.183*** -0.216*** 
 
(5.300) (1.230) (2.960) (4.630) (5.630) 
Foreign trade share in GDP (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡) 0.192*** 0.296*** 0.252*** 0.208*** 0.180*** 
 
(3.870) (3.590) (3.480) (3.760) (3.500) 
GDP per capita (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) -0.100*** 0.034 -0.083 -0.105*** -0.127*** 
 (2.720) (0.150) (1.370) (2.720) (3.160) 
Inverse Mills ratio for VAT (𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑇)    0.006  
 
   (1.080)  
Inverse Mills ratio for ARA (𝐼𝑀𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐴)     0.135 
     
(1.060) 
Constant  2.759*** 0.960 2.349*** 2.703*** 2.977*** 
 (7.320) (0.490) (3.720) (6.590) (7.250) 
Observations  294 294 294 288 288 
R-squared  0.5172 0.4056 0.5408 0.5070 0.5156 
The dependent variable is total tax revenues as a share of GDP, as described in Table 2.7. All fixed effects and random effects specifications 
include country and year fixed effects. All estimations including the pooled OLS are done with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
(White) robust standard errors with t-values reported in the parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% 
(*). 
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2.6. Qualitative results – Ghana and Zambia case studies 
 
As mentioned earlier, our methodology is a ‘qual-quant’ approach. In the preceding 
section we have applied a quantitative approach as our main analytical approach. In this section 
we adopt a different approach, a qualitative analysis, as an attempt to trace some of the factors 
or processes that may underlie the development (or lack) of tax systems our findings through 
a comparative study of two countries: Ghana and Zambia. Ghana and Zambia both fall in the 
lower-middle income range (by World Bank classification), with average per capita incomes 
of about US$1,751 and US$1,523 during the 2010s; both are mineral-exporting economies; 
and in terms of democratisation, one of the key drivers of tax ratios according to our analysis, 
both have experienced a similar progression, with Ghana’s military-authoritarian regime of the 
1970s and Zambia’s one-party state in the 1970s-1980s and dominant-party government of the 
1990s having given way to multi-party democracy17, and as can be observed in Figure 2.4, both 
have had almost the same democratic accountability score between the 1990s and 2014. Both 
countries, moreover, adopted the value added tax (became operational in 1995 in both 
countries) and established ARAs early in the reform process which followed the global crisis 
of the 1980s (operational in 1983 in Ghana and 1994 in Zambia). However, the evolution of 
the two countries’ tax revenue performance has been very different, as shown by the trends in 
Figures 2.6a, 2.6b and 2.6c. Ghana’s tax revenue performance between 1980 and 2014 
improved from just under 5 percent to 20 percent, a process which Prichard described as ‘the 
most dramatic, and prolonged, improvement of any country in Africa’ (Prichard 2009: p.8). 
Ghana was worse off and lagged behind the average country in sub-Saharan Africa for much 
of the period between the 1980s and early 2000s, but its performance has been improving 
steadily during the same period and is now able to collect above the IMF’s recommended tax 
revenue performance. Zambia’s performance on the other hand, in spite of the favourable 
political environment, having implemented policy and institutional reforms promoted by 
multilateral development agencies, fell during the same period from 22 percent to 14.4 percent 
and appears, it will be recalled, as a ‘negative outlier’ on Figure 2.4 which plots the relationship 
between democratic accountability and fiscal performance. Zambia was one of the strong 
performers in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s, as will be recalled from Table 2.1, and stood 
more favourably in comparison to its peers like Ghana, and also above the IMF’s recommended 
 
17 The Ghana part of this section updates but otherwise closely follows the narrative in Mosley (2017), but the 
Zambia data and analysis are our own.  
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threshold for minimum tax revenue performance. Zambia’s performance has rapidly declined, 
particularly after the 1990s, and now lags behind Ghana’s and the sub-continent’s average. Our 
aim is to understand the reasons for the apparent difference in the evolution of tax revenue 
performance between these two countries.  
 
Figure 2.6a: Trends in average tax performance in Ghana and Zambia (1980-2015) 
 
Source: UNU-WIDER (2018), IMF (2011).  
Notes: The IMF recommended minimum threshold of 15 percent of GDP is based on the calculation for the 
required tax revenues for the provision of basic public goods and services.  
 
We explore these issues in more detail to try and identify factors which may underlie 
Zambia’s apparent inferior tax revenue performance relative to Ghana’s. Our qualitative 
analysis focuses on the following possible causal factors: whereas both countries have adopted 
the VAT, Ghana seems to have done better in improving its contribution (as can be seen in 
Table 2.6b) while the contribution of the VAT to tax revenue has remained static in Zambia;  
Ghana, unlike Zambia, had a politically potent smallholder export sector. In Zambia, the 
political landscape is dominated by powerful mining companies and other multinational 
corporations, which in various ways contribute to government weak ability to effectively raise 
taxes. We shall argue these factors have contributed towards the evolution of ‘fiscal contracts’ 
which emerged. Finally, unlike Zambia, Ghana achieved a close working relationship with the 
IMF and other key bilateral aid donors. These differences, we shall argue, fed directly into the 
evolution of the tax systems of  the two countries. 
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Figure 2.6b Ghana: chronology of tax changes (1985-2015) 
 
Source: UCTD/UNU (2018). 
Notes:  1 – First structural adjustment credit agreed with the World Bank/IMF 
 ARA – Establishment of the National Revenue Secretariat 
 2 – Liberalisation of cocoa export prices; removal of implicit cocoa export tax 
1st VAT – First (unsuccessful) introduction of the valued-added tax to replace sales tax; proposed VAT policy 
abandoned 
 2nd VAT – second (successful) introduction of the VAT at a lower rate than previous sales tax 
1st VAT increase – Increase in VAT earmarked for National Health Insurance Scheme; mineral windfall tax also 
introduced 
2nd VAT increase – Increase in VAT earmarked for National Health Insurance Scheme; mineral windfall tax also 
introduced 
3 – Increase in mineral royalty rates  
4 – Start of petroleum exports from Ghana; petroleum taxes begin to be paid; mineral windfall tax withdrawn 
 
As can be noted from Figure 2.6 (b), Ghana first introduced the VAT (at a higher rate of 
17.5 percent) to replace sales and service taxes (levied at 15 percent) in 1995 to diversify the 
tax base and improve tax revenues, simplify domestic tax policy and tax administration 
(Terpker, 1996; Addison and Osei, 2001). This policy reform was implemented under the stress 
of pressure by the IMF who were concerned about “high levels of indebtedness in the aftermath 
of huge expenditure increases during the 1992 election” (Prichard, 2009: p.12). However, this 
effort was largely unsuccessful because within three months the policy was abandoned 
following a public apprehension – characterised by widespread protests and large-scale non-
compliance. Terpker points out that the lack of public education on the new tax was the main 
reason cited more than any other for the public apprehension over the VAT. The government 
of Ghana realised early on that it was necessary to achieve broad public consensus on the VAT 
and avert resentment towards tax increases. The VAT was later successfully reintroduced and 
publicly accepted (at a lower rate of 10 percent) in 1998 and following this reintroduction 
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Ghana has experienced a significant increase in both the VAT and total tax revenue collections, 
as can be observed from Figure 2.7 (b). VAT revenue collections increased from 2.9 percent 
of GDP in 1999 to 5.3 percent of GDP by 2015. An important factor in the improvement of the 
VAT performance in subsequent years is government ability to successfully increase the 
standard rate by linking such increases, backed by much publicity and sensitisation to secure 
political support, to the creation of the Education Trust Fund in 2000 and establishment and 
improvement of the universal National Health Insurance Scheme in 2004 and 2007, 
respectively.   
 
Figure 2.6c.  Zambia: Chronology of tax changes (1985-2015)   
 
Source: UCTD/UNU (2018), Ministry of Finance (various budget speeches and economic reports), Zambia 
Revenue Authority (various annual reports) 
Notes:  1 – Government breaks relations with IMF and implements New Economic Recovery Programme 
 2 – Return to multiparty system and first multiparty elections (two-parties) 
 3 – Resumption of relations with IMF and major tax reforms pushed by the Fund  
ARA – establishment and commencement of operation of Zambia Revenue Authority 
VAT – implementation of the value added tax   
4 – Privatisation of state-owned enterprises, including the country’s mining conglomerate. Provision of generous tax 
concessions and exemptions to new mining companies 
5 – First major changes to the VAT law (expansion of exempt items to reduce refund of input tax), an attempt to 
raise taxes 
6 – Proposal to expand items to be subject to VAT Act (including newspapers, basic foodstuffs, books) rejected by 
the opposition and general public  
7 – Copper windfall tax introduced, due to public discontent, and also on advice by Norad and the IMF 
8 – Abolition of the copper windfall tax due to pressure from powerful mining companies and the fall in copper 
prices. Government caved into the demands of mining companies to assess windfall tax liabilities at 25%, instead of 
the tiers of 25%, 50% and 75%. Mining companies also only agreed to pay the assessed 25% over three years (2009-
11). 
9 – Increase in mineral royalty tax from 0.6% to 3%. Attempts to raise mineral royalty rates in 2013 and 2018 were 
met with a strong rejection by powerful mineral companies. The 2013 proposal to increase the royalty rates from 3% 
to 9% for deep-cast and 20% for open cast were unsuccessful after mining companies threatened to shut down mining 
operation and lay off workers.  
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Contrary to Ghana, in Zambia the VAT was successfully introduced at the first attempt 
in 1995 at a higher rate of 20 percent, but this did not immediately lead to any significant 
increase in tax revenue collections. As Figure 2.6c shows, it was adopted at the time tax 
revenues were declining and this continued in spite of the adoption of the VAT. Figure 2.6c 
also reveals (in the graph in the bottom part) that the performance of the VAT has weakened 
since its adoption, from about 5.7 percent of GDP in 1996, reaching the lowest level of about 
3.2 percent in 2010, before slightly improving to 4.4 percent by 2015. According to our 
respondents in the Ministry of Finance and Zambia Revenue Authority, the weak (or low) 
performance of the VAT can be linked to several factors including weak government ability to 
galvanise and secure support of taxpayers and around tax issues but also government failure to 
resist political pressure for tax reductions from the urban populations and interest groups such 
as trade unions, non-governmental and faith-based organisations, due to a weak political base. 
Records in the Tax Policy Unit of the Ministry of Finance and our experience working there 
show that there had been a lot of pressure to reduce the standard rate or exempt most of the 
basic items such as food, health and education services from taxation. These records show that 
more than a third of the tax policy proposals submitted to the Tax Policy Review Committee 
of the Ministry by individuals, corporations and organisations for possible inclusion in the 
national budget were related to VAT-reduction. Government buckled under the weight of such 
demands and surrendered to this pressure by reducing the VAT standard rate was in 1997 from 
20 to 17.5 percent. Another important episode which exemplifies this weakness is a botched 
attempt in 2006 to widen the VAT net by bringing more goods into the net (including 
newspapers, basic foodstuffs, books) which was rejected by the opposition and the general 
public through petitions to the President and the National Assembly. A key factor underlying 
the insurrection was that the tax was going to increase the cost of living and hurt many segments 
of the population. The proposal was withdrawn after the President directed the Minister of 
Finance to do so.  
 
Political pressure to further reduce the VAT standard rate continued during the 2000s. In 
his budget address to the National Assembly in January, 2008 the Minister of Finance stated, 
after reducing the VAT standard rate from 17.5 percent to 16.0 percent that “the issue of the 
17.5 percent standard rate of the VAT is a matter on which I have received numerous 
representations for many years. I have always promised that I will respond when economic 
conditions were appropriate” (GRZ, 2008: Budget Speech). However, the reason for the 
reduction was that “the burden of the VAT on low-income earners had been rising … hence 
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the reduction was intended to cushion this segment of the population”. In our view, government 
inability to secure political support for the VAT and its weak political base which led to the 
reduction of the VAT rate from 20 percent to 17.5 percent in 1997, and to 16 percent in 2008, 
partly explains the fall in revenues.   
 
Figure 2.7: Zambia - Total value-added tax collections and refunds, percent of GDP 
(2013-2017)  
 
Source: Zambia Revenue Authority (2018). (GRD) ICTD/UNU-WIDER (2019), 
Note: The 2017 figure is only preliminary, and has been reported by the IMF, the government has been delaying 
refunding input tax and using the funds as a source of short-term financing, thereby accumulating arrears which 
now stand at about US$800 million (IMF, 2017).  
 
According the Zambia Revenue Authority, the other cause of the poor performance of 
the VAT in Zambia is a case of the VAT being more difficult to administer than initially 
thought and that these enforcement problems have been undermining its effectiveness, similar 
to what Jantscher (1987: p.3) observed in the case of “presumptive taxes”. The Zambia 
Revenue Authority has stated publicly that: “[The] VAT has turned out to be a drain on national 
coffers since its introduction because of the complexities of the system as well as leakages in 
the refund system”. Our analysis of the VAT tax returns shows that although gross VAT 
revenues increased in the last few years, net collections have declined due to the rapid increase 
in refunds. As example of this being the VAT performance during the years 2014-2016 as 
shown in Figure 2.7, when gross VAT collections increased from 6.9 to almost 8.0 percent of 
GDP, but its net contribution declined over the same period from 4.9 to 4.5 percent. Although 
gross VAT collections have been increasing over the years, they have not matched the increase 
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in refunds, thereby causing net VAT collection (revenue to government) to drop. The Zambia 
Revenue Authority argues that the cause of this problem is the complexity associated with the 
processes and documentation that is required. The government also seems to believe that this 
is the major cause of poor VAT performance, and now this issue has increasingly dominated 
tax policy debate in Zambia. Having buckled under the weight of paying huge VAT refunds 
for some time, the Minister of Finance has proposed to repeal the Value Added Tax Act and 
replace it with the new Sales Tax Act in 2019. 
 
We also suggest that the divergence in the evolution of tax performance between Ghana 
and Zambia is largely due to two factors of great importance to the two countries’ political 
economies: Ghana, unlike Zambia, had a politically potent smallholder export sector and 
Ghana, unlike Zambia, achieved a close working relationship with the IMF and other key aid 
donors. These differences, we shall argue, fed directly into the evolution of the fiscal contracts 
which emerged in the two countries. Ghana’s exports of cocoa, and to a lesser extent other 
tropical export crops such as pineapple, have since early colonial times been the mainstay of 
the economy alongside gold and other minerals, by contrast with Zambia which since the 1920s 
has been wholly mineral-dependent. From 1930 until 1992, however, lacking a political 
leverage corresponding to their economic contribution18, Ghanaian cocoa producers were 
subjected to an implicit tax, at a rate varying between 30 percent and 90 percent, consisting of 
the difference between the export price of cocoa and the price paid to cocoa farmers19. This 
‘cocoa industry development fund’, as it was formally known, thus became a key element in 
Ghana’s public revenue, which has no parallel in Zambia, where public revenue is and has 
always been composed less of commodity taxes and much more of taxes on sales and personal 
income20. 
 
Both economies were hit hard by the global depression of the 1980s, and by the 
consequent collapse of commodity prices and foreign investment. Ghana, however, was much 
the quicker of the two administrations to acknowledge its dependence on, and form contractual 
 
18 There is one exception to this tendency: between 1969 and 1972 Kofi Busia’s National Liberation Congress, 
whose elite was dominated by representatives from Ashanti, the main cocoa-growing area, did win power and 
attempt to roll back the implicit cocoa export tax: but they were forced out of power by a military coup before 
they were able to make any progress with repealing export taxes.   
19 Data illustrating the gap between the on-farm price and the export realisation from the 1950s through the 
1980s is provided by Bates (1981), appendix B. 
20 The ratio of commodity taxes to total tax revenue in Ghana is estimated at 30-35% in the 1980s, falling to 
between 15 and 20% by 2005-10; in Zambia, it is estimated at 25-30% in the 1980s, falling to just under 10% 
between 2005-10 (source: IMF, International Financial Statistics)   
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relationships (ESAFs) with, the aid donors: in particular, it had accepted by the mid- 1980s that 
priority that needed to be given to the restoration of foreign investment and liberalisation, 
whereas Zambia continued until almost the millennium to cling to the idea of state participation 
in strategic industries including mining21. Even more importantly, Ghana embraced with much 
more conviction than Zambia the pro-poor, redistributive rhetoric emanating from the 
international development agencies and embodied in the Multilateral, later Millennium, 
Development Goals and their associated apparatus of Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facilities (ESAFs), which eventually  were transformed into Poverty Reduction Strategies, 
because it was ahead of the game in being able to foresee the political and fiscal advantages 
which might flow from broader-based development. This had the important effect of giving 
Ghana (by contrast with Zambia) ideas concerning not only which new taxes might yield 
additional tax revenue, but also how to frame those new taxes in the form of a ‘fiscal contract’ 
which would make taxpayers feel as if they were getting something in return for those increased 
tax payments (an important example being the VAT increase of September 2004, which was 
linked, backed by much publicity, to the creation of the universal National Health Insurance 
Scheme). Zambia never managed any ‘contractual linkages’ of this sort, with the exception of 
the very popular mining windfall tax, brought in in 2006 by an already ailing President 
Mwanawasa and rescinded in 2007, shortly after Mwanawasa’s death, by his successor Rupiah 
Banda. Not only was the mining windfall tax rescinded, but from 2009 the multinational mining 
companies were able to negotiate, with the government’s blessing, a tax regime in which only 
the most profitable opencast mines (Lumwana and Kansanshi) paid any corporate income tax, 
and the others, all deep mines, were exempted. The contrast with Ghana, where all large 
(multinational) mines paid corporate income tax and the richest, Newmont, paid a surcharge 
above this, is stark, and this alone accounts for much of the difference between the trend of the 
tax yields achieved by the two countries. We return to this subject in Chapter 4 below. 
 
A crucial milestone in cementing the Ghana government’s alliance with both cocoa 
producers and aid donors was the liberalisation of cocoa marketing in 1992. This reform 
 
21 In Ghana the ratio of aid to GNP was around 13% in the first half of the 1990s, rising to around 21% in the 
first half of the 2000s; in Zambia the ratio was around 10% in the first half of the 1990s, rising to 16% in the 
first half of the 2000s; in both countries, the aid-to-GNP ratio has fallen back into single figures since the 
beginning of the present decade under the impetus of economic growth. However, the key difference between 
the aid relationships of the two countries resides not in these numbers, but rather in the quality of the 
relationship (and in particular the poverty reduction commitment of the Ghana government), which made 
possible the exchange of ideas on tax reform (for example concerning ‘linked taxation’, user charges, and the 
taxation of the informal sector), on a scale which did not occur in Zambia.   
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removed the implicit export tax on cocoa, gave approximately half of it back to cocoa 
producers22 and channelled the remaining half into programmes of subsidy and technical 
development programmes designed to increase the productivity and competitiveness of the 
cocoa industry. The impacts even of the half which was distributed to cocoa producers were 
very widely diffused, since cocoa is a labour-intensive crop grown by small as well as large 
farmers, and account for a substantial part of Ghana’s achievement in halving poverty between 
1990 and 2014, and substantially reducing inequality (by contrast, in Zambia, poverty scarcely 
changed over this twenty-five year period, and inequality has risen slightly)23. 
 
They were also important fiscally, because, by cutting taxes on a large and politically 
outspoken section of the population, in combination with the aid-led structural shift of public 
expenditure into health, education, agricultural extension and rural infrastructure (which raised 
the pro-poor expenditure ratio from around 5 percent to around 35 percent between 1990 and 
201424 ; see Table 2.16) they provided the government of Ghana, as already mentioned, with 
an eloquent down payment towards the formation of an equitable fiscal contract. Both the shift 
towards pro-poor human capital expenditure and even the formal part of the fiscal contract, the 
earmarking of particular taxes to particular expenditure headings, were, for a period, emulated 
by the Zambia government also, but with less conviction, less effective publicity and less 
impact25. 
 
 
22 The proportion of the export price received by Ghanaian cocoa growers rose to 58% in 1992, fell to around 
half in the mid-1990s and rose again to 60% during the early 2000s. See Mosley(2012) figure 5.2.   
23 In Ghana, headcount poverty across the country as a whole fell from 51% to 24% between 1990 and 2014, 
according to successive reports of the Ghana Living Standards Surveys, and the Gini coefficient of inequality has 
fallen from 45% to 33%. In Zambia, the national poverty headcount rate has been static at just over 60% from 
1990 to the early 2000s (Data published in April 2016 by the Central Statistical Office suggest that national 
headcount poverty in 2015 may have fallen to 54%, but these data are apparently contradicted by rural poverty 
data from the Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Unit (IAPRI), see Mosley (2017 ), notes to table 4.4, page 
118.) The Gini coefficient has risen slightly since 1990 from 61% to 64%, see Table 2.16 below.   
24 Although this figure is faithfully derived from issues of the IMF Expenditure Statistics Yearbook for the years 
named, we regard the figure as suspicious, almost certainly overstated, and probably derived from changes over 
time in classification of particular expenditure headings. 
25 Zambia increased the share of its public expenditure devoted to health and education from 24% to 34% between 
1990 and 2014, by comparison with Ghana’s increase of that percentage from 5% to 35% over the same period 
(see Table 2.16 below). Ghana, as described earlier, committed monies derived from increases in VAT in 2000 
and 2003 to the Ghana Education Trust and the national health insurance scheme respectively; it also applied the 
same principle to a ‘talk tax’ on mobile phone calls, earmarked to expenditures for the reduction of youth 
unemployment. All of these measures can be seen as attempts to make the fiscal contract between taxpayers and 
government explicit. Zambia also attempted this kind of earmarking with respect to mineral taxation in 2008, 
when a windfall tax on copper was earmarked to be spent one-half on health and education in the poorer districts 
of Zambia, and one-half on local councils. This tax was however dropped in 2009, and in spite of governments 
that it was being reintroduced in 2011, there has been no sign of this being implemented.   
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However, the importance of smallholder exports (in Ghana, by the cocoa industry) goes 
beyond their fiscal role. Once liberalised, the Ghana cocoa industry was able to assert itself as 
a key player in political debate, and began to use its muscle to countervail the policies of ‘urban 
bias’ (i.e. cheap food and cheap inputs, in the interests of importers, especially multinational 
companies) which had afflicted Ghana, Zambia and most other African countries since colonial 
times. In particular, the previous pattern of a state dominated by rent-seekers, able to insist on 
cheap-input policies in return for the provision of support to the government, was replaced by 
a ‘strategic alliance’ in which both cocoa exporters and government jointly agreed, as the 
outcome of a bargaining process, that they have more to gain than to lose by the preservation 
of free-market policies in specific markets, including most particularly the preservation of a 
competitive real exchange rate, in defiance of the wish of importers and rent-seekers for a 
higher exchange rate and lower input prices. As Table 2.16 shows, the Ghanaian real exchange 
rate has depreciated steadily since the reforms of the 1990s, thereby boosting exports and their 
diversification26, the growth rate and, eventually, tax revenue. By contrast, as may be seen in 
the same table, the Zambian real exchange rate has gone in the opposite direction, and hence 
growth and tax revenue have been correspondingly lower. Fundamentally, this is because the 
Zambian government is not confronted by any interlocutor as powerful as the Ghanaian cocoa 
producers’ lobby to restrain it from policies of urban bias, and in particular from policies of 
pegging the exchange rate and other key prices. In the absence of such restraints, exchange 
controls have been reintroduced in Zambia (in 2013), accompanied by other policies in restraint 
of free trade, such as controls on the export of maize. An additional lesson which we learn from 
these case-studies is that political pressure to maintain urban bias, when surrendered to, 
generates upward pressures on the real exchange rate which damage competitiveness27; and if 
 
26 Zambia increased the share of its public expenditure devoted to health and education from 24% to 34% between 
1990 and 2014, by comparison with Ghana’s increase of that percentage from 5% to 35% over the same period 
(see Table 2.16 below). Ghana, as described earlier, committed monies derived from increases in VAT in 2000 
and 2003 to the Ghana Education Trust and the national health insurance scheme respectively; it also applied the 
same principle to a ‘talk tax’ on mobile phone calls, earmarked to expenditures for the reduction of youth 
unemployment. All of these measures can be seen as attempts to make the fiscal contract between taxpayers and 
government explicit. Zambia also attempted this kind of earmarking with respect to mineral taxation in 2008, 
when a windfall tax on copper was earmarked to be spent one-half on health and education in the poorer districts 
of Zambia, and one-half on local councils. This tax was however dropped in 2009, and in spite of governments 
that it was being reintroduced in 2011, there has been no sign of this being implemented. 
27 Our argument concerning the determination of policy in Ghana is inspired by Kang (2002), who explains the 
economic success of South Korea in the last quarter of the twentieth century, by contrast with the Philippines, in 
terms of a politics in which business and government were equally matched, rather than government being 
overwhelmed by the pressure of rent-seekers, leading to the preservation of openness in key markets, especially 
the market for foreign exchange. In Zambia, by contrast with Ghana, there has never existed any interest group 
with the political muscle to force government to keep the real interest rate competitive in defiance of the 
pressures of rent-seekers, although signs are emerging that Chinese firms in the manufacturing and construction 
industries are beginning to exercise pressures of this sort: see Hinfelaar and Achberger (2015:12-13) 
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these pressures can be countervailed, as they have been in Ghana, that will impact on the growth 
and thus the tax-earning potential of the economy. 
 
Our story so far, then (see Table 2.16), is that the superior tax performance of Ghana in 
relation to Zambia is partly owing to causes already discussed, including the trend towards 
providing a better quality of public expenditure as a down-payment towards a durable fiscal 
contract, but also due to more fundamental factors not so far incorporated in the model, in 
particular the bargaining relationship between government and private interests (especially 
exporters) and its implications for the real exchange rate and competitiveness. However, there 
are two elements in this story which need closer attention. 
 
Table 2.16: Ghana and Zambia: trends in key indicators (1990-2014) 
 Ghana Zambia 
Tax ratio, 1990-2016 11                        19.2 21                          16.2 
Governance: 
Democratic accountability, 1990 
versus 2016: 
Polity score(p_democ) 
Narrative 
 
2                        5 
Multi-party democracy since 
1992 
 
2                            4.5 
Dominant party (Movement for 
multiparty democracy) 1991-2005; 
multiparty democracy since 2005) 
Tax structure: 
Revenue authorities 
 
 
 
Value added tax  
Ghana National Revenue 
Secretariat became operational 
1985, converted into Revenue 
Agencies Governing Board 
1998 
First introduced in 1995 at 
17.5% but was repealed after 3 
months due to public outcry 
over sudden increase in prices. 
Successfully re-introduced in 
1998 and managed to increase 
the rate in 2007 and 2011 
Zambia Revenue Authority became 
operational in 1994 
 
 
 
Introduced in 1995 at 20%, reduced 
to 17.5% and 16% percent due to 
public pressure. Attempts to increase 
the value-added tax rate failed in 
2007 and 2009   
Tax exemptions None, but two larger mining 
corporations (Newmont and 
Anglo Gold) pay lower rates of 
royalty 
Multiple: Previously only two 
mining corporations (Kansanshi and 
Lumwana) used to pay but since 
2014 a third company (Chibuluma) 
is paying 
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Public expenditure: 
Pro-poor expenditure/ 
effectiveness of public spending, 
1990 versus 2014: 
4.7                        35.0 
 
24.3          36.9 (2008)    34.0 (2014) 
Macro-economic environment: 
GDP per capita 
Foreign trade /GDP ratio  
Agriculture/GDP ratio 
Average Real exchange rate 
(1990=100)* 
 
1919.6                          3833.8 
42.7%                           81.0% 
45.1%                          23.2% 
186 
 
2318.3                              3628.2 
63.4%                               83.2% 
20.6%                              9.6% 
79 
 
Gini coefficient of income 
inequality 
45                                 33 
 
61                                     64 
 
The first of these is the implementation of tax policies and their visibility, in particular 
towards the corporate sector. We shall focus on mining tax policies. In both Ghana and Zambia, 
governments have followed broadly similar policies of increases in the standard rates of 
corporation tax and royalty during the boom years (2003-08), accompanied by flirtations with 
windfall taxes, ‘linked’ as earlier described to specific items of public expenditure. These tax 
increases are integrally linked with the consolidation of democratic governance: when the 
Ashanti-dominated National Patriotic Party, the successor to Busia’s National Democratic 
Council of the late 1960s, took over the government of Ghana in 2000 it immediately brought 
in a windfall profits tax on mining in order to shift the burden of taxation off the shoulders of 
rural businesses (and cocoa in particular) on to mining, and when the Zambian Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) which previously had enjoyed dominant party status, started to 
experience serious competition from the rival Patriotic Front (PF), it too used a windfall profits 
tax in order to counteract the PF’s increasingly powerful argument that the privileges of the 
multinational mining corporations needed to be restrained in favour of a fairer deal for the 
economically insecure (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2009). 
 
What is crucial, however, is that whereas in Ghana all companies paid corporate income 
tax (albeit with concessions for the largest producers, Newmont and Anglo Gold) in Zambia, 
only two mining companies, First Quantum (at Kansanshi) and Barrick Gold Mining (at 
Lumwana) ever paid income tax28 . This fact has become widely known and has begun to infect 
the political debate. Not only has it impaired the ability of the Zambian government to motivate 
 
28 Lundstöl et al. (2013), pp24-31 and especially graph 4.4 on page 24. 
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compliance with the current fiscal contract, as in the Bolivian case previously discussed; it has 
also caused NORAD (the Norwegian international development authority), the donor agency 
most concerned with the mining industry, having failed to persuade the Zambian ministry of 
finance after much pressure to enforce credible mineral taxation policies, to withdraw from 
Zambia in mid-201529. The consultants appointed to review Zambia’s mineral policies had 
previously reported that ‘the government revenue instruments for mining developed for 
Zambia…failed by a large margin to deliver what could be considered an effective ‘benefit 
sharing’ of revenues’ (Lundstöl 2014:1). In other words, observed tax compliance especially 
in relation to high-profile taxpayers, and not only advertised tax rates and bases, are crucial for 
determining trust, and thence trusters’ (i.e. taxpayers’), willingness to participate in fiscal 
contracts. 
 
The other issue requiring further discussion is the role of regulatory bodies, i.e. ARAs 
such as the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) and Revenue Authorities Governing Body 
(RAGB) in Ghana. Since the beginning of the structural adjustment process in the 1980s, it has 
been an axiom of reformers – and the IMF in particular – that the office responsible for revenue 
collection needs to be uncoupled from the national ministry of finance, and the apparatus of 
central government more generally, in order to prevent privileged taxpayers from making 
corrupt deals with central government staff which breach the tax code. ARAs have been the 
main focus for the reform efforts of aid agencies and IFIs, and independent revenue authorities 
have sprung up all over Africa and to a lesser degree Latin America, as discussed above. Ghana 
was very early in accepting this prompt from the international funding agencies: in 1983, in the 
early reform period before the advent of democracy, it established a semi-autonomous National 
Revenue Secretariat (NRS), including a new Minister of National Revenue, to oversee the 
newly formed IRS (Internal Revenue Service) and CEPS (Customs, Excise and Preventive 
Services), ‘each of which were granted greater autonomy from the main civil service, including 
salary flexibility’ (Prichard 2009: 19, drawing on Osei and Quartey 2005). In 1998, a Revenue 
Agencies Governing Board (RAGB) provided a mechanism for integrating the work of these 
authorities, which was eventually amalgamated into an over-arching Ghana Revenue 
Authority. Zambia eventually followed suit, establishing the Zambia Revenue Authority in 
1994. 
 
 
29 Zambia Weekly, 15 June 2015. 
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2.7. Conclusions  
 
The primary objective of this chapter was to explore one of the most urgent and 
intractable development problems facing the poorest countries of the world, factors that 
underlie poor tax revenue generation and what kind of policy and institutional reforms can be 
expected to encourage the construction of a suitable revenue base which can provide an impulse 
to development. We focussed on three issues: first, the revenue consequences of policy reform 
innovations encouraged by the international development community and widely implemented 
in many countries which have involved making improvements in the quality of tax structures 
by adopting broad-based taxes, in particular the VAT; second, the impact of ring-fencing the 
process of revenue collection by transferring tax administration from the direct control of the 
ministry of finance to an ARAs, again another important donor-supported institutional reform 
innovation aimed at mitigating against political risks associated with tax increases; and third, 
whether poor countries can improve their tax revenue generation ability by framing the process 
of revenue collection as part of a ‘fiscal contract’ in which the government commits to improve 
its accountability and the value for money which taxpayers get from public spending, rather 
than as a coercive process.  
 
This investigation is motivated by the lack of consensus on the true impact of the 
adoption of the VAT and creation of autonomous revenue authority, while there is no 
systematic evidence concerning the process by which ‘fiscal contracts’ can be formed and what 
impact they have had. Taking into account country- and time-specific fixed effects our results 
from OLS, fixed effects and random effects regressions based on a panel data for 42 African 
countries during the period 1980-2013, could not confirm our prior expectation that African 
countries’ tax revenues would be significantly increased by the adoption of the VAT and the 
creation of ARAs. The principal findings from these baseline explorations is that the adoption 
of the VAT and the creation of ARAs appear to be less successful towards their revenue 
objectives (although they may have been successful in improving and simplifying tax systems). 
On average we find no evidence that these policy reform innovations demonstrably provide 
any revenue advantage to countries in Africa that have implemented them over those that did 
not. However, the results when lags are employed indicate that the ARA has an immediate 
positive and significant impact, but this dissipates over the medium term. 
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In this study we have also attempted to construct and test a picture of the process by 
which a ‘fiscal contract’ can emerge and impact on the revenue generation capacity in fragile 
states, even where any increase in taxes is politically risky. Our starting point was Rousseau’s 
idea that increased democratic accountability, in the form of a ‘fiscal contract’, will be good 
for effective tax collection and thence state-building. We then considered recent empirical 
findings, and argued that a ‘fiscal contract’ (much of it consisting of implicit understandings 
but some of it consisting of explicit covenants linking specific tax payments and public 
expenditures) will be most likely to emerge not only as a result of democratic participation and 
good bureaucratic practice within the tax system, but also if taxpayers trust the fiscal system 
as a whole, i.e., they feel that they are getting good value from government expenditures in 
exchange for their tax payments. These ideas go beyond the macro- economic, structural and 
even governance issues featured in the majority of empirical studies of tax yields, as 
summarised in Table 2.2 above. Our results show that, the two governance variables, 
democratic accountability and the value of service delivery provided by public expenditure 
emerge as significantly associated with the ability to build ‘fiscal contracts’ and generate tax 
revenues.  
 
We continued the analysis to understand whether the lack of statistical significance of 
our policy reform variables could be explained by the possibility that their beneficial gains tend 
to take some time because reforms can be complex and may require some refinements before 
their beneficial gain materialise. Our exploration was also extended to consider whether the 
success of policy reform innovations depended on the institutional environment within which 
they were implemented. Finally, we stretched our investigations into the possibility that there 
could be an endogeneity issue of selection among our policy reform variables and revenue 
performance, in particular that decisions to adopt the VAT or create an autonomous revenue 
authority are not exogenous to tax revenues collections, and need to be separately modelled for 
and then incorporated into the tax revenue function. Our principal findings are that the VAT 
has not provided any revenue advantage for countries that adopted them in relation to countries 
that did not have the VAT, whether in the short or long term. We established that its effect is 
not influenced by the institutional environment. On the other hand, the creation of ARAs 
appears to improve tax revenues in the initial years of the reform, but then these positive effects 
disappear over the medium to long term. Our findings also suggest that the ARAs are more 
successful in countries with a good institutional environment.  
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Further insight was gained by examining in more detail two countries with opposite over-
revenue tendencies over the same thirty-year period: Ghana and Zambia. This comparison 
enabled us to observe some of the causal factors underlying the apparent failure of the VAT 
and the processes by which effective fiscal contracts were built. The key causes of the lack of 
success of the VAT, which in our opinion are also relevant to other developing countries, relate 
to the difficulty in administration this tax-type contrary to what was initially expected. The 
VAT has complex information and system requirements which are difficult to meet in many 
poor countries and have thus created loopholes for under-declarations of goods supplied and 
multiple input tax claims on the same VAT certificates which was apparent in Zambia, unlike 
in Ghana. The design of the tax and the ability of the government to gain political acceptance 
of tax increases by taxpayers played a major role in the contribution of the VAT in Ghana in 
relation to Zambia.  
 
Our analysis has also revealed possibilities for bona-fides which may consolidate ‘fiscal 
contracts’, including the focussing of public expenditure on the poorest and/or politically most 
sensitive groups (see the significant coefficient on SD (service delivery) in Table 2.11 and on 
public expenditure (pro-poor expenditure) in Table 2.16), and establishing a level playing field 
for tax liability which publicly brings the large and powerful into the tax net. Comparative 
analysis of which of these bona-fides provides the most effective incentive for raising tax yields 
at the lowest cost constitutes an important horizon for future research. Finally, it illustrated that 
if there is widely disseminated evidence that big players (in particular multi-national 
corporations) are not paying what they owe, that will act as a disincentive to all the other players 
seeing their tax liability as contractual. Other issues, however, remain unresolved, in particular 
the ability of ARAs to reduce corruption and increase tax yields. 
 
There is now abundant evidence that several low-income countries (not only Ghana as 
illustrated by our case-study, but also Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda; see Figure 2.6 above) have 
been able to break out of the low income – weak government - fragile state – low tax capacity 
– low income trap, and that the formation of a ‘fiscal contract’, often with the assistance of the 
IMF and aid donors, is therefore possible in poor as well as middle-income countries. However, 
it remains the case that low-income countries still, on average, have worse tax performance 
than lower-middle and middle- income countries, and this holds their entire development back. 
The particular aspect of this that we would like to raise in conclusion is that the formation of 
‘fiscal contracts’ is not a one-shot action, but a process, often long-drawn out in time and often 
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requiring experimentation and policy reversal (the case of Ghana’s botched and excessive 
initial VAT increase in 1995 is relevant here). Moreover, it is a process requiring the slow 
building of trust, and this requires in turn the making of down payments or bona-fides which 
require risk-taking and financial sacrifices exceeding the capacity of the poorest developing- 
country administrations, -especially if they are also fragile, conflict-vulnerable states. To take 
a specific example, the crucial move made by Ghana in 1992, of liberalising its cocoa industry 
and reducing the implicit tax on cocoa, was important in presenting the Ghana government as 
a credible partner in a ‘fiscal contract’ and politically enabling the raising of taxes elsewhere 
in the economy; but it was a move with considerable short-term financial costs (note the dip in 
Ghanaian public revenue after 1992 on figure 2.6(a) and (c) above) and this implies costs, and 
political risks, not necessarily affordable by a state with a weaker bureaucracy and less access 
to aid donors. The question what kind of ‘down payments’ towards a ‘fiscal contract’ can 
feasibly be made by governments in this predicament represents, in our opinion, an important 
frontier for future research. 
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Appendix 2.1: VAT and ARAs in Africa  
  VAT rate  VAT adoption a Autonomous 
revenue authorityb 
1 Angola no VAT  no ARA 
2 Burundi 18% 2009 2010 
3 Benin 18% 1991 no ARA 
4 Burkina Faso 18% 1992 no ARA 
5 Botswana 10% 2000 2005 
6 Central African Republic 18% 2001 no ARA 
7 Cote d'Ivoire 20% 1960 no ARA 
8 Cameroon 19.25% 1999 no ARA 
9 Congo, Dem. Rep. 16% 2012 no ARA 
10 Congo, Rep. 18.9% 1997 no ARA 
11 Comoros no VAT  no ARA 
12 Cabo Verde 15% 2004 no ARA 
13 Ethiopia 15% 2003 2009 
14 Gabon 18% 1995 no ARA 
15 Ghana 12.5% 1999 1985 
16 Guinea 18% 1996 no ARA 
17 Gambia 15% 2013 2007 
18 Guinea-Bissau 15% 2001 no ARA 
19 Kenya 16% 1990 1996 
20 Lesotho 14% 2003 2003 
21 Madagascar 20% 1994 no ARA 
22 Mali 18% 1991 no ARA 
23 Mozambique 17% 1999 2007 
24 Mauritania 14% 1995 no ARA 
25 Mauritius 15% 1995 2005 
26 Malawi 16.5% 2005 2000 
27 Namibia 15% 2000 no ARA 
28 Niger 17% 1986 no ARA 
29 Nigeria 5% 1994 no ARA 
30 Rwanda 18% 2013 1998 
31 Sudan 10% 2000 no ARA 
32 Senegal 18% 1961 no ARA 
33 Sierra Leone no VAT  2003 
34 Eswatini 14% 2001 2011 
35 Seychelles 15% 2013 no ARA 
36 Chad 18% 2000 no ARA 
37 Togo 18% 1995 2014 
38 Tanzania 20% 1998 1996 
39 Uganda 17% 1996 1992 
40 South Africa 14% 1991 1998 
41 Zambia 17.5% 1995 1994 
42 Zimbabwe 15% 2003 2002 
Source: Ebrill et al. (2002), Crowe (2016),  
Notes: a and b refer to the year when the value-added tax was actually implemented and when the ARA became 
operational (operational presence), respectively 
  
103 
 
Appendix 2.2. Regression results for VAT and ARAs only 
Estimation method 
Explanatory variables 
OLS 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
RE 
(3) 
Adoption of the value-added tax (𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡) -0.066 0.045 0.042 
 (1.180) (0.820) (0.760) 
Value-added tax lagged 3 years(𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−3) 0.006 -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.070) (0.300) (0.290) 
Value-added tax lagged 5 years (𝑉𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−5) 0.134* 0.073 0.073 
 (1.690) (0.750) (0.750) 
Creation of autonomous revenue authority (𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡) 0.198* 0.152** 0.151*** 
 (1.960) (2.580) (2.740) 
Autonomous revenue authority lagged 3 years (𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡−3) -0.185 -0.145** -0.149** 
 (1.440) (2.200) (2.290) 
Autonomous revenue authority lagged 5 years (𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡−5) -0.085 0.034 0.030 
 (0.960) (0.640) (0.570) 
Constant  2.972*** 2.557*** 2.533*** 
 (92.880) (14.060) (12.460) 
Observations  908 908 908 
R-squared  0.0139 0.1704 0.0412 
All estimations including the pooled OLS are done with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (White) robust 
standard errors with t-values reported in the parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) 
and 10% (*). 
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Chapter 3 
 
Public expenditure on education, human capital and 
economic growth in developing countries 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, which is the second core chapter of this thesis, we shift our focus from 
the revenue dimension covered in Chapter 2, to the expenditure aspect of fiscal policy and 
African development. The research problem we wish to tackle is whether investment in human 
capital, including public expenditure on education, is effective in fostering economic growth 
since it has been given a pride of place in the theoretical literature. The literature defines human 
capital quite broadly and includes abilities, knowledge, skills, experience and competencies a 
person possesses, which are assumed to be acquired through such processes as education, 
health, migration, research and development. Although the theoretical literature regards these 
as essential elements in the accumulation of human capital, we focus on investment in 
education, especially public expenditure on education, because it is education rather than other 
forms of human capital which has been credited to generate technological change and thence 
growth, especially in developing countries30  (World Bank, 1986; 1995; Benos and Zotou, 
2014).  Of all the different forms of human capital, education is certainly the most central in 
the development literature and has been a dominant element of policy strategies in many 
developing countries and is the one on which we focus in this thesis. 
 
Theoretical work on the relationship between human capital and economic growth has 
historically been dominated by two main competing theories – ‘neoclassical theory’ and 
‘endogenous growth theory’. The former argues that human capital only leads to temporary 
(short-term) increases in national output but does not lead to long-run growth because growth 
is driven by technological progress which is determined by exogenous factors. The latter asserts 
 
30Also we focus on the education dimension here because this has been the major focus of development policies 
of poor countries but the evidence on education as a driver of growth remains more controversial than the evidence 
on health impacts (Harbison and Hanushek 1992; Hanushek 1995; Filmer and Pritchett 1999; Wolf 2004; 
Awaworyi et al.,2015) 
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that  human capital is a key factor input which can invert new ideas or products and utilise 
existing innovations in order to drive technological progress and therefore growth. 
‘Endogenous growth theory’ converts the temporary effects of human capital implied by 
‘neoclassical growth theory’ into permanent effects on growth. The ‘endogenous growth’ 
framework, which is typically attributed to the work of the 2018 Nobel Prize winner, Paul 
Romer (1986; 1989), has attracted a lot of attention and several studies have now identified 
various ways in which policies and institutions affect human capital and economic growth 
(Landau, 1983; Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1989; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992).  
 
The importance of investments in human capital, especially education, has also been 
recognised by development agencies and for several decades the World Bank has encouraged 
developing countries to invest in education because it is considered as “economically and 
socially productive” (World Bank, 1986: p.1). Recent development discourse has encouraged 
developing countries to invest in human capital so as to create a basis for rapid and sustained 
which plays a major role in the fight against poverty and inequality (Perotti, 1996; Ravallion 
and Chen, 1997; Moser and Ichida, 2001). The United Nations claims that strong economic 
growth rates have been at the centre of halving extreme poverty rates in developing countries 
between 1990 and the present (UN, 2015). The role of public expenditure on education in 
development has also earned a dominant role in development and academic circles, because 
expansion of human capital depends on fiscal resources. Thus, the link between human capital 
and economic growth has been of utmost interest in development economics and the 
international development community. 
 
For some while, investment in human capital attributable to education has been a key 
element of development strategies, on the advice of the World Bank (World Bank, 1991). The 
World Bank has specifically tended to stress policies which prioritise primary education in 
preference to secondary and tertiary education on the conventional wisdom that primary 
education is the most profitable (as well as the most equitable) form of educational investment 
and that “returns are by far the highest in the poorest countries” (World Bank, 1986: p.8).  The 
prominence of this policy initiative has been reflected not just in spending patterns, as many 
countries are “increasingly willing” to allocate more resources to education, but also in the 
“remarkable scope and speed” in expansion of school enrolments across low- and middle-
income countries in recent decades (World Bank, 2018: p.58, 185). Current data shows that 
public spending on education has become a major part of budgetary policies absorbing the 
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largest single share of national budgets in most developing countries. The research question we 
wish to tackle here is whether development policies which have emphasised investments in 
education-related human capital, including the increase in public expenditure on education, 
have been effective towards the growth objective as asserted by ‘endogenous growth theory’ 
and advised by development agencies including the World Bank. 
 
The empirical evidence from macro studies on the link between investments in human 
capital, public spending on education and economic growth remains controversial, as we 
observe later, whether education expenditure or overall human capital indicators are considered 
as the independent variable, there are as many studies reporting statistically significant as those 
establishing insignificant or negative results. As can be observed from Table 3.3, there is no 
consistent story from current macro studies on this relationship, and thus, there are limited key 
lessons for policymakers in developing countries. What is particularly disturbing is that studies 
that have properly analysed the robustness of the findings are sceptical in tone, suggesting that 
the original ‘endogenous growth’ hypothesis has severe difficulties defending its claims. This 
scepticism has also be expressed in the 2018 World Development Report, in which the World 
Bank concedes that educational policies of the past five decades which gave priority to the 
expansion of school enrolments have led to a ‘learning crisis’ and have not produced the 
expected outcomes in low-income countries (World Bank, 2018: p.57). The only solid 
conclusion which we are able to derive from this evidence is that none of the three measures 
of human capital proposed as an explanatory story to explain differences in growth rates across 
countries is robust or even markedly better or worse than any of the others. All are seriously 
imperfect. 
 
In attempting to contribute to our understanding of why the theoretically appealing and 
seemingly straightforward proposition, that investments in education can encourage the 
development of ‘competences, skills and abilities’ and therefore promote economic growth, 
has been difficult to defend empirically, we wrestle with three possible explanations. First, we 
explore the possibility that although aggregate measures of public expenditure on education 
may not emerge as significant correlates with growth, it is possible that some of its categories 
may differentially affect growth as suggested by the World Bank and others. In this study our 
focus is on public rather than total expenditure in education because education in low-income 
countries is “predominantly provided and financed by the government” due to market failures 
(World Bank, 1986: p.6). In relation to this, we study the impact of public expenditure on 
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education disaggregated into primary, secondary and tertiary levels. Although development 
agencies such as the World Bank have previously stressed differential investment in education 
favouring the primary level, no serious empirical work has been conducted to assess this World 
Bank conventional wisdom, in spite of such information being key in the budgetary process in 
terms of allocations. 
 
Second, to improve our understanding of the link between public expenditure on 
education and growth, especially why this type of expenditure often does not lead to the 
expected improvements in economic growth, we examine whether the institutional 
environment in which policies are designed and implemented matters in determining its 
effectiveness, since it has been argued that good economic policies do not always produce good 
outcomes, as their success may depend on non-economic factors (North, 1991; World Bank, 
2003; Acemoglu et al., 2008; IMF, 2015). The idea we wish to explore is that merely increasing 
public spending towards the education sector (as has happened in developing countries over 
the past decades) may not automatically translate into desirable outcomes if domestic 
institutions – involved in policy formulation and implementation – are weak or poorly 
functioning. Our other contribution in relation to this is that we adopt a different approach, a 
qualitative analysis of a case study involving Zambia, to try and trace some of the key non-
economic causal factors which may underlie the lack of impact of public spending on education 
on long run economic growth. 
 
Finally, we seek to explore the apparent paradox in the literature on education, which is 
that although investment in education has been found to have high private returns for 
individuals (higher earnings), policies which have stressed expansion of schooling have not 
been successful, across the board, towards improving economic outcomes. To address this 
problem, we turn to an issue which has recently drawn the attention of the development 
community, but to our knowledge not thoroughly explored on a cross-section basis, which is 
that common measures of education are seriously imperfect and that incorporating the ‘quality’ 
dimension in the analysis may be crucial. Again, this issue is well-recognised in the 2018 World 
Development Report, in which the World Bank observes that the massive expansion of 
schooling (quantity) has not resulted in improvements in learning for millions of students in 
low-income countries (World Bank, 2018). We investigate the possibility, suggested by van 
der Berg (2007) for South Africa, that while national educational policies may well have been 
successful in increasing the quantity of education all over Africa, thereby achieving goals of 
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universal primary education, they may have resulted in the stagnation or even falling of 
education quality, and thus exerted a drag on growth. Resolving this paradox may help 
developing countries improve the impact of education policies on growth, a necessary tool in 
the fight against poverty. 
 
These ideas are explored using an empirical approach that specifies and estimates a 
dynamic growth model which captures the essence of the ‘endogenous growth’ framework on 
a sample of 42 African countries covering the period 1980-2014. Our dynamic growth model 
is estimated using a robust OLS, the feasible generalised least squares (to make our findings 
comparable) and an instrumental variable two-stage least squares estimators (2SLS) to 
minimise the effects of any potential endogeneity due to simultaneities and reverse causality. 
As mentioned earlier, these findings are combined with those from a country case study to 
highlight some of the causal processes which may not clearly show in the econometric findings.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the 
trends in human capital, public expenditure on education and growth. Section 3.3 outlines the 
theoretical and empirical literature on human capital attributable to education. Within this 
section, we highlight the gaps and important areas of our innovations. In section 3.4, we 
propose and discuss the empirical approach including the estimation model, data and estimation 
techniques. The quantitative and qualitative empirical findings are presented and discussed in 
sections 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. Conclusions and policy recommendations are provided in 
section 3.7. 
 
3.2 Variations in education human capital investments and growth patterns  
 
Global comparisons of public investments in human capital over the past three decades, 
in particular public spending on education and school enrolment patterns, reveal striking 
parallels and disparities across countries. Aggregate trends indicate that most countries have 
devoted an increasing share of fiscal resources to the education sector, absorbing the largest 
single share of national budgets averaging about 15 percent across low- and middle-income 
countries (World Bank, 2018). These trends, as shown in Table 3.1, indicate government 
increasing willingness to invest in education across income groups. The largest increase 
between the 1990s and 2010s was in low-income countries where public spending on education 
(as a percentage of GDP) increased by an average of 0.23 percentage points every decade (from 
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3.1 to 3.8 percent of GDP). Spending increased by an average of 0.13 and 0.07 percentage 
points per decade over the same period in high- and middle-income countries respectively. 
These patterns also indicate that investments in education remains lower in low-income 
countries than other income groups, perhaps signalling that there is scope for additional 
investments in human capital to achieve development. However, the dilemma facing 
policymakers in low-income countries is whether allocating more fiscal resources towards the 
education sector will guarantee improved development outcomes.  
 
The data also reveals governments in low-income countries have made concerted effort 
towards expansion of education as part of the development strategy. Comparing school 
enrolment rates across income groups, there has been a remarkable increase in primary school 
enrolments particularly in low-income countries, almost closing up enrolment gaps with 
middle- and high-income countries in recent decades. The proportion of pupils enrolled at 
primary level almost doubled between 1980 and 2017 – from 67 to 101 percent31. On average 
low-income countries which were lagging behind other income groups in the 1980s and 1990s, 
are presently enrolling pupils almost at the same rate as the average middle- and high-income 
countries. Although concerted efforts have been made in improving secondary school 
enrolment rates over the same period, glaring gaps still remain, whereas there has been almost 
no tangible progress at tertiary level.  
 
Table 3.1. Trends in education spending, school enrolments and growth rates 
Variable  Group 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Public education spending (as % of GDP) 
High income 
 
4.8 4.9 5.2 
Middle income 
 
4.1 3.9 4.3 
Low income 
 
3.1 3.5 3.8 
Primary school enrolments 
High income 101 102 102 102 
Middle income 102 102 104 105 
Low income 67 68 90 101 
Secondary school enrolments 
High income 89 96 100 105 
Middle income 43 52 62 76 
Low income 23 23 31 41 
Tertiary school enrolments 
High income 36 49 65 76 
Middle income 8 10 19 31 
Low income 5 4 5 9 
Per capita GDP growth rate High income 2.2 1.9 1.0 1.4 
 
31 Note that increases in school enrolments beyond 100% will not necessarily lead to any welfare improvement 
because such increases are bound to lead to a deterioration in schooling conditions and an increase in repeater 
rates. We estimate the negative impact of this later on in the chapter. 
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Middle income 1.5 1.1 4.6 4.0 
Low income -0.3 -1.0 1.6 2.4 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2018) 
 
Data on per capita growth rates over the past three decades, 1983 to 2017, shown in the 
lower section of Table 3.1, reveals that after experiencing some of the slowest growth rates of 
per capita GDP during the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, both low- and middle-income 
countries have achieved some of the impressive growth rates since the 2000s. From Figure 3.1, 
which plots the trends in the annual growth rate of per capita GDP over the past decades, it can 
be observed that economic growth rates improved generally between the mid-1990s and 2010 
in low- and middle-income countries, albeit experiencing significant fluctuations during this 
period. Growth was relatively stable in high-income countries until the global crisis in 2008-9. 
 
Figure 3.1: Annual growth rates of per capita GDP by income-groups (1983-2017) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2018) 
  
Turning to Africa, the continent of our focus in this study, we observe close parallels in 
the overall trends in education spending, school enrolment rates and economic growth rates. 
Trends in public spending on education in Africa reveal that education has increasingly become 
a critical focus of investment and budgetary policies. Over the past three decades, from 1983 
to 2017, African countries have spent on average 4.2 percent of GDP on education, which is 
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slightly above the 3.5 percent which low-income countries as a group spent during the same 
period (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Over the same period, Africa has also made significant 
achievements in school enrolments, with primary enrolments averaging about 89.2 percent 
compared to the average of 81.5 percent for low-income group of countries; secondary 
enrolment rates averaged 32.4 percent in comparison to 29.5 percent; and at tertiary it was 
lower at 4.9 percent relative to the 5.8 percent for the group low-income countries.  
 
However, there are significant disparities among African countries. Education spending 
during the period 1983 and 2017 ranged between 1.6 percent in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and 10.8 percent in Zimbabwe. There are also significant variations in school enrolment 
rates with primary enrolments ranging between 40.3 percent in Niger and percent 143.5 in 
Gabon; variations in enrolment rates at secondary level fluctuated from 8.0 percent in Tanzania 
to 88.9 percent in Seychelles; and at tertiary level enrolment rates varied between 0.5 percent 
in Malawi and 15.3 percent in South Africa.    
 
Table 3.2: GDP per capita, education spending and school enrolments in Africa  
 
Country GDP per 
capita (%) 
Education spending 
(% of GDP) 
Primary 
enrolments (%) 
Secondary 
enrolments (%) 
Tertiary 
enrolments (%) 
1 Angola 0.6 3.6 91.2 14.4 2.9 
2 Burundi -0.7 4.5 80.7 15.6 2.1 
3 Benin 1.1 3.7 87.4 29.8 5.7 
4 Burkina Faso 2.1 3.4 50.2 13.8 2.0 
5 Botswana 4.0 6.8 103.8 53.5 9.9 
6 Central Afr. Rep. -1.1 1.7 73.7 13.6 1.6 
7 Cote d'Ivoire -0.9 4.5 75.0 28.6 5.5 
8 Cameroon 0.3 2.9 100.7 31.8 6.9 
9 Congo, DR. -1.7 1.6 89.4 31.8 3.4 
10 Congo, Rep. 0.9 4.2 112.8 55.6 5.6 
11 Comoros 0.0 4.8 105.2 40.5 4.2 
12 Cabo Verde 4.7 5.8 112.1 58.2 12.8 
13 Ethiopia 2.7 3.8 56.2 20.6 2.2 
14 Gabon -0.5 3.1 143.5 39.7 6.0 
15 Ghana 1.8 5.1 86.1 45.1 8.4 
16 Guinea 1.3 2.2 58.3 20.6 4.2 
17 Gambia, The 0.0 2.5 75.5 23.8 2.1 
18 Guinea-Bissau 0.4 2.6 68.4 12.6 1.8 
19 Kenya 0.8 5.8 103.1 41.3 3.2 
20 Lesotho 2.2 9.7 109.4 34.6 3.1 
21 Madagascar -1.0 2.9 118.6 29.3 3.3 
22 Mali 1.4 3.3 52.5 19.9 2.5 
23 Mozambique 3.0 4.3 86.3 14.1 2.3 
24 Mauritania 0.4 2.9 72.1 19.6 3.7 
25 Mauritius 3.8 3.9 104.7 72.7 15.1 
26 Malawi 0.5 4.2 108.3 25.5 0.5 
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27 Namibia 0.8 6.4 116.5 53.2 9.1 
28 Niger -0.7 3.7 40.3 9.8 1.1 
29 Rwanda 2.5 4.1 108.4 21.0 3.3 
30 Sudan 2.4 1.7 69.0 40.3 13.0 
31 Senegal 0.6 5.1 66.4 23.3 6.0 
32 Sierra Leone 0.2 3.1 72.9 25.6 1.4 
33 Eswatini 2.7 5.8 98.9 50.6 4.5 
34 Seychelles 2.2 6.6 104.5 88.9 10.5 
35 Chad 2.0 2.3 65.4 14.8 1.3 
36 Togo 0.3 4.4 108.8 30.7 5.2 
37 Tanzania 2.1 3.4 82.7 8.0 1.0 
38 Uganda 2.3 2.9 94.7 10.8 2.2 
39 South Africa 0.5 5.5 99.4 87.1 15.3 
40 Zambia 0.7 2.8 96.0 18.4 2.2 
41 Zimbabwe 0.1 10.8 108.6 39.7 4.2 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2018) 
Notes: Data on all variables are averages for the period 1980 to 2017 (or for any period for which data was 
available between 1980 and 2017).  
 
According to ‘endogenous growth theory’, development strategies which have 
emphasised investments in education, and have led to increased public spending on education 
and massive expansion in school enrolments in low-income countries should have generated 
higher rates of economic growth. However, it is not completely clear from the trends and 
variations based on indicators of human capital presented in this section that countries that have 
made more investments have achieved higher growth. Given the significant investments made 
in education during the past decades and the recognition in development circles that investing 
in additional human capital will be crucial in achieving higher growth rates required to reduce 
poverty, one can certainly be led to question whether previous policy strategies have been 
successful towards their development objectives in developing countries.  
 
3.3 Previous studies – survey of the literature  
 
As mentioned earlier, our objective is to improve our understanding of the link between 
investment in human capital, especially public spending on education, and to identify factors 
which may explain the surprising finding that most of the common measures of human capital, 
including educational spending, often do not emerge as strong correlates with growth. Also, 
the goal is to try and find any clues as to what could be going wrong in this relationship.  
 
Theories of economic growth have operated within a simple framework of growth as 
being determined by the stock of physical capital, labour and technological change. The 
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primary concern for researchers and policymakers is the source of technological progress or 
productivity growth. The theoretical literature on the source of technological change, and 
therefore long run growth, has evolved along two influential frameworks: the ‘neoclassical’ 
and ‘endogenous’ theories of growth. The simplest neoclassical model of growth is the Solow 
(1956) model in which output growth (𝑌) is determined by combining physical capital (𝐾) 
with labour or the workforce (𝐿) and the effectiveness of labour (𝐸). Technology is assumed 
to enhance the effectiveness of labour. A basic ‘neoclassical growth model’, linking output, 
capital, labour and the productivity of labour is typically specified as a production function of 
the following form: 
𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝐸)      (3.1) 
 
According to the ‘neoclassical theory’ of economic growth, the growth of the economy 
is determined by the accumulation of productive capital, and how the labour force utilises that 
capital, but that this growth is temporary due to diminishing returns to capital. These models 
claim that capital accumulation leads to short-run increases which move the economy from one 
steady state to the next (level effects) and once the new steady state is reached, technological 
progress is the only source of permanent growth in output per capita. Technological progress 
as a key growth determinant in these models is assumed to be exogenously determined, but 
what drives it is not explained by the model.  
 
‘Endogenous growth theory’ is built on the idea that technological changes are the 
primary drivers of economic growth but diverges from neoclassical models in explaining the 
source of technological progress. It is widely acknowledged that Romer’s (1986) work, in 
which the central idea was that new knowledge and skills lead to innovation and technological 
changes, marked the genesis of ‘endogenous growth theory’. Romer (1986) asserts that 
technological progress, which is a key driver of long run growth, does not happen randomly 
but is a by-product of deliberate policy decisions such as investment in human capital. The AK 
model is perhaps the simplest version of ‘endogenous growth models’ and is considered as 
“foundational” as subsequent models in this literature have been “derived” from it (Sala-i-
Martin, 1990: p.4). In the AK model it is assumed that human capital accumulation and learning 
generate technological change and thence growth over time. The basic AK model takes the 
following functional form: 
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𝑌 = 𝐴𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝐴𝐾    (3.2) 
 
In this model, the independent variable 𝐾, is defined more broadly to include the 
accumulation of productive physical as well as human capital, knowledge and other forms of 
capital such as stocks and access to finance. The parameter 𝐴 represents the marginal product 
of, or return to investment in, capital. Equation (3.2) assumes constant returns to returns to 
capital, in contrast with the diminishing returns assumed by neoclassical models. The 
parameter 𝐴 is assumed to endogenous to the expansion of knowledge, through such things like 
improvements in education, health, migration and can be affected by several factors including 
government policies, investment decisions and the institutional environment (Romer, 1986; 
Sala-i-Martin, 1990). Since the birth of ‘endogenous growth theory’ there has been a lot of 
interest in verifying empirically its claims that human capital accumulation is key to growth, 
and there is a large number of studies which has produced several models linking different 
indicators of human capital with the country’s long-run growth rate. A standard empirical 
framework typically utilised in this literature is of the following form:  
 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝐻) ≡ 𝐴(𝐻)𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝐻, 𝑃, 𝐼)   (3.3) 
 
where 𝐻 is an indicator of human capital (the product of its quantity and quality) and 𝑃 and 𝐼 
indicators of the quality of policies and institutions, respectively. Thus, human capital, on this 
view, has double leverage on economic growth – operating both through its direct impact on 
output and through its indirect impact on technical change. Therefore, these models argue that 
human capital is the key input which underlies technological progress and “policies targeted at 
human capital accumulation can have distinctive effects on long-run growth” (Barro, 1991: 
p.409). 
 
The theoretical literature emphasises different mechanisms through which investment in 
human capital attributable to  education affects economic growth increases the productivity of 
the labour force, the “innovative capacity of the economy, knowledge of new technologies, 
products and process” (Benos and Zotou, 2014: p.669). The empirical literature, summarised 
in Table 3.3, shows that there is a large number of studies that has examined the link between 
investment in education and growth, largely comprising cross-sectional and panel-data 
regression studies, with some of them focussing on school enrolment rates and average years 
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of schooling as indicators of human capital. There are also studies aiming to examine the effect 
of aggregate measures such as public spending on education. Table 3.3 brings together key 
findings from studies on educational spending, human capital and economic growth which we 
have reviewed in this chapter. They are divided according to those that report positive (on the 
left-hand side of the Table) and those that report negative or insignificant results (on the right-
hand side). We provided in Appendix 3.1, a more detailed compilation of findings the findings 
covering more studies. 
 
Our review of the empirical literature which focuses on the common measures of the 
education-linked human capital – public spending on education, enrolment rates and average 
years of schooling – shows that the evidence is limited: most of these indicators do not emerge 
as strong correlates with growth. Some of the early regression exercises which begun in the 
late 1980s with the analysis of initial levels of school enrolment and literacy rates as measures 
of education human capital establish a statistically significant positive association (Romer, 
1989; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992). For example, using the literacy rate as a proxying for 
education human capital, Romer (1989) and Azariadis and Drazen (1990) find that a positive 
link with GDP per capita. Barro (1991) employs initial primary and secondary school 
enrolments and shows that human capital has a significantly positive impact on the growth rate 
of per capita GDP. Mankiw et al. (1992) approximating human capital by a product of 
secondary school enrolment rates and the population of secondary school age, report a positive 
impact of the schooling variable on growth. These studies, which the literature considers as the 
most influential early papers, conclude that increased schooling can have salutary effects on 
the growth rate of the economy. Using secondary school enrolment rates, Barro and Lee (1994) 
find a positive effect of human capital on growth. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) report 
evidence that male secondary schooling has a statistically significant positive effect on growth, 
but female secondary schooling has an insignificant impact. Several other studies corroborate 
this finding (see for example, Sala-i-Martin (1995, 1997), Temple (1999), Krueger and Lindahl 
(2000), Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) and Baldacci et al. (2004)). However, within the same 
literature that employs schooling as a measure of education human capital, several other studies 
find no (or weak) association as estimates of human capital variables emerge as insignificant 
or even negative. The Lau et al. (1991) study disaggregated the impact of education by region 
and finds a negative impact of primary educational attainment in Africa and the Middle East, 
a significantly positive effect in East Asia, but an insignificant one in Latin America and South 
Asia. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) estimate a statistically significant and robust negative 
116 
 
coefficient on the average number of years of schooling and literacy rates. In his article “Where 
has all the education gone?” Pritchett (1996) finds a statistically significant negative effect of 
one of the conventional measures of education -  average years of schooling of the labour force 
– on growth rate of per capita GDP. In a meta-regression analysis of the findings of 57 studies 
on education and growth, Benos and Zotou (2014: p.670) conclude that “there is no 
homogenous genuine effect of human capital across studies”.   
 
Within this vast literature, there are also studies specifically focussing on the role of 
public spending on education as a key driver of economic growth. As shown in Table 3.3 
below, the picture that emerges from studies that are based on aggregate measures of public 
education spending32  matches the findings from studies based on schooling discussed earlier 
– there are as many studies confirming the positive influence as those questioning the 
effectiveness of educational spending in fostering growth. For example, Zhang and Casagrande 
(1998), Judson (1998), McMahon (1998; 2000), Kneller et al. (1999), Bose et al. (2007), Keller 
(2006), Blankenau et al. (2007), Baldacci et al. (2008) and Alfonso and Jalles (2013) all 
establish a positive association between aggregate measures of public education human capital 
expenditure and economic growth, whereas Landau (1986), Easterly and Rebelo (1993), 
Devarajan et al. (1996), Miller and Russek (1997), Blankenau et al. (2007), Mo (2007), Ghosh 
and Gregoriou (2008), Miyakoshi et al. (2010) and Bojanic (2013) find that these aggregate 
measures have a negative or statistically insignificant association. In a recent survey of 
empirical findings from twenty-nine studies on public spending education and growth, 
Awaworyi et al. (2017) find that the association was positive and statistically significant in 
fourteen studies, negative in twelve and statistically insignificant in the remaining three. From 
the thirty-four studies on both schooling and education spending surveyed here, eighteen 
establish a positive association while sixteen report a negative or statistically insignificant 
correlation. 
 
Now, we focus the discussion on the findings in Africa, from which our own data are 
derived. The evidence from this continent is not just limited but is also inconclusive. Easterly 
and Levine (1997) investigated some of the drivers of Africa’s economic growth rates in the 
1980s and found several variables, including the average number of years of schooling, to be 
 
32 There are two main aggregate measures of education spending commonly used in the literature: expenditure on 
education as a percent of total government expenditure (or national budget) and as a share of gross domestic 
product. (World Bank, World Development Indicators (2018)). 
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crucial to the continent’s long-run growth. Hoeffler (2002) uses a similar approach to Mankiw 
et al. (1992) and average number of years of education in Barro–Lee (1995) but finds no 
significant impact on economic growth in a sample of African countries. Bloom et al. (2006) 
analyse the link between human capital and economic growth based on a sample of countries 
from Africa and find that the average years of secondary education and tertiary education are 
not statistically significant, however, they emerge with a significantly positive impact when 
instrumented by literacy rates and doctors per capita, respectively. Appiah and McMahon 
(2002) and Chen and Gupta (2009), arrive at conflicting conclusions relative to the evidence 
adduced in Gyimah-Brempong et al. (2006) and Seetanah (2009). The former find no 
significant effects of school enrolment rates while the latter find a strong association for 
schooling years.  
 
From the empirical studies reported here, it is certainly clear that the ‘endogenous growth 
theory’ has encountered severe difficulties in justifying its claims as key findings remain 
inconclusive. Even the appearance of new studies with more robust techniques and approaches 
has done quite little to confirm the predictions of its original hypothesis. What is particularly 
disturbing is that  the only studies, to our knowledge, that have conducted proper robustness 
tests on the determinants of growth are sceptical in tone. Particularly eloquent among these 
sceptical writers are studies such as Levine and Renelt (1992), Levine and Zervos (1993), Sala-
i-Martin (1997), Hoover and Perez (2004), Hendry and Krolzig (2004) and Sala-i-Martin et al. 
(2004) who constructed robustness tests to analyse the sensitivity of previous findings. For 
instance, Levine and Renelt (1992) analysed the robustness of several variables but only found 
2 out of 40 to be robustly significant, and measures of education human capital were none of 
the robust ones. Sala-i-Martin (1997) using the Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) and 
Doppelhofer et al. (2000) employing the Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) 
confirm the lack of robustness of a variety of the commonly used explanatory variables. Hoover 
and Perez (2001) using a cross-sectional version of the general-to-specific search methodology 
and arrive at and smaller set of robust variables than found in Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
 
The only solid conclusion which we are able to derive from this evidence is that none of 
the three measures of human capital proposed as an explanatory story to explain differences in 
growth rates across countries is robust or even markedly better or worse than any of the others. 
All are seriously imperfect, in the sense that none of them survive the robustness tests 
conducted by Levine and Renelt, Sala-i-Martin, and others.  
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To account of the potential problem of endogeneity caused by reverse causality between 
fiscal variables and growth and simultaneities among the education variables, studies separate 
the timing of the analysis where the current value of the explanatory variable only affects future 
values of the dependent variable. The methods of estimation frequently utilised in which 
variables that are suspected to be endogenous are lagged include the 2SLS, 3SLS  and GMM 
(see Table 3.3). Several studies also lag the explanatory variables over a number of years so 
that the effect of a current change only materialises after some time.  
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Table 3.3: Regression studies on the impact of education on growth (Selection) 
 Studies reporting positive findings  Studies reporting negative or insignificant findings 
 Author(s) and sample Education variable  Author(s) and sample Education variable 
Overall  Landau (1983), 96 countries, 1961-72  
 
Primary & secondary enrolments 
 
 Landau (1986), 65 low income countries, 
1960-80 
Total government spending on education (% of 
GDP) 
 Romer (1989), 112 countries, 1960-85  
 
Literacy rates   Lau, Jamison and Louat (1991), 58 
developing countries, 1960-86 
 
Average education attainment of labour force 
 
 Azariadis & Drazen (1990), 71 countries, 
1960-80 
 
Literacy rates (in other countries but not 
high income) 
 
 Levine and Renelt (1992), 119 countries, 
1960-89 
Primary and secondary enrolments 
 Barro (1991), 98 countries, 1960-85 
 
Primary and secondary enrolment rates 
 
 Levine and Renelt (1992), 119 countries, 
1960-89 
Total government spending on education (% of 
GDP). Robustness tests find spending on education 
to be non-robust 
 Mankiw et al. (1992), 98  countries, 1960-85 Secondary enrolments  Easterly and Rebelo (1993), 100 countries, 
1970-88 
Share of educational expenditure (public and 
private) as a share of the economy 
 Harbison and Hanushek (1992), Brazil case 
study, 1980s 
Improvements in cognitive skills at primary 
level led to better learning outcomes 
(measured by the fall in repetition and 
dropout rates) 
 Barro & Lee (1994), 85 countries 1965-85 Years of secondary schooling for female 
 Barro & Lee (1994), 85 countries 1965-85 Years of secondary schooling for male   Benhabib & Spiegel (1994), 78 countries 
1965-85 
Years of schooling of adults (25+); adult literacy 
rate 
 Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995), 96 countries, 
1960-2000 
Male and female secondary and 
higher education 
 Durlauf & Johnson (1995), 98 countries  
1960-85 
Primary and secondary school enrolment rates; 
adult literacy rate 
 Lee & Lee (1995), 17 high-income countries, 
1970-85 
1970 science scores of secondary school 
students 
 Lee & Lee (1995), 17 high-income countries, 
1970-85 
Primary and secondary school enrolment rates 
 Barro (1996), 100 countries, 1960-90 Years of secondary and higher schooling 
for males 
 Devarajan, Swaroop & Zou (1996), 43 low 
income countries, 1970-90 
Total government spending on education (% of 
GDP). 
 McMahon (1998, 2000), East Asian countries 1965 primary and secondary gross 
enrolment rates 
Initial levels of secondary and higher 
education spending 
 Barro (1996), 100 countries  
1960-90 
Years of primary schooling for males 
Female schooling at all levels 
 Bloom & Sachs (1998), 65 countries, 1965-
90 
Average years of secondary schooling  Collins & Bosworth (1996), 88 countries, 
1960-94 
1965 average years of schooling of adult 
population 
 Zhang and Casagrande (1998), 69 countries, 
1970-85 
Expenditure on educational subsidies  Sala-i-Martin (1997), 1960-92 1960 primary school enrolment rates 
 Judson (1998), 138 countries, 1960-90 Growth rates of education spending  Kelly (1997) 73, countries, 1970-89 School enrolment rates 
 Temple (1999), 78 countries, 1965-85 Average years of schooling  Miller &  Russek (1997), 39 countries, 1975-
84  
Total spending on education (% of GDP), negative 
in developing countries 
 Kneller et al. (1999), 22 high-income 
countries, 1970-95, 
Educational expenditure as share of 
productive public spending 
 Kelly (1997), 73 countries, 1970-89 Total spending on education (% of GDP), is 
insignificant 
 Bils & Klenow (2000), 93 countries, 1960-90 Gross school enrolment rates and average 
years of schooling 
 McMahon (1998, 2000), East Asian countries Tertiary enrolment rates 
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Initial levels of spending on primary education is 
negative 
 Hanushek & Kimko (2000), 31 countries, 
1960-80 
1960 Average score on internationally 
comparable math and science tests 
 Hanushek & Kimko (2000), 31 countries, 
1960-80 
Average years of schooling of 
25+ year olds 
 Krueger & Lindahl (2001), 68 countries, 
1965-85 
Change in and initial average years of 
schooling 
 Pritchett (2001), 1960-85 Average years of schooling of adults aged 25+ 
 Bassanini & Scarpetta (2001), 21 OECD 
countries, 1971-98 
Average years of education of the working 
age population 
 Hoeffler (2002), 1960-90 Overall average years of secondary schooling of 
adult males aged 25+ 
 Hoeffler (2002), 1960-90 Male average years of secondary schooling 
of adult males aged 25+ 
 Barro & Sala-i-Martin (2004), 1960-96 1960 gross secondary and higher enrolment rates  
 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), 1960-96 1960 gross primary enrolment rates   Hoover & Perez (2004), 107 countries, 1960-
89 
Average years of primary and secondary schooling 
 Bloom et al. (2006), 1960-90 Change in, and initial, years of schooling  Gyimah-Bempong & Wilson (2004), 1960-
2000 
Average years of primary and secondary schooling 
 Gyimah-Bempong & Wilson (2004), 1960-
2000 
Average years of higher schooling  Keller (2006), 40 Asian countries, 1971-2000 Expenditures on education as a share of GDP 
 Bose, Haque & Osborn (2007), 30 low 
income countries, 1970-90 
Total spending on education (% of GDP)  Blankenau, Simpson & Tomljanovich (2007), 
23 developed countries, 1960-00 
Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP) 
 Baldacci, Clements, Gupta & Cui (2004), 120 
low income countries, 1975-00 
Education spending (% of GDP) has an 
indirect effect on growth 
 Mo (2007), 1960-85 Share and growth of education expenditure in GDP 
are negative and significant 
 Hanushek & Woessmann (2008), 1960-96 Mean international maths and science test 
scores 
 Ghosh & Gregoriou (2008), 15 developing 
Countries, 1970-99 
Education expenditure (% of total expenditure) has 
a negative effect 
 Baldacci, Clements, Gupta & Cui (2008), 118 
developing countries, 1971-2000 
Education spending (% of GDP) has an 
indirect effect on growth 
   
      
Africa  McMahon (1987), 30 African countries, 
1970-85 
Primary, secondary and higher education  Bloom, Cunning and Gupta (1998) 18 
African and 59 non-African countries, 1965-
90 
1995 years of secondary schooling 
 Easterly and Levine (1997), African, Latin 
American and East Asian countries, 1960-90 
Average years of schooling   van der Berg (2007), South Africa case study, 
10 years after abolition of Apartheid 
School enrolment rate expansion for black students 
did not close to learning gaps between black and 
white students 
Massive shifts of fiscal resources to black schools, 
did not reduce educational attainment differentials  
 Stroup & Heckelman (2001), 44 African and 
Latin American countries, 1975-89 
Average years of schooling of adult males   Eggoh, Houeninvo & Sossou (2015), 49 
African countries, 1996-2010 
Public expenditure on education as a share of GDP 
has a negative impact. 
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It is quite apparent from the current state of empirical knowledge, as summarised above, 
that development strategies encouraged by the development community focussing on education 
have not necessarily guaranteed higher growth in the context of low-income countries. Also, 
there are limited lessons for policymakers in developing countries and elsewhere who are 
desperately trying to promote higher economic growth rates into order to reduce poverty and 
inequality. There are several reasons identified for the lack of a consistent story on the 
education human capital-growth nexus are several ranging from omitted variable bias due to 
the few numbers of explanatory variables included in regressions, ‘crowding out’ effect created 
by the displacement of the more effective private sector efficiency by the seemingly inefficient 
public spending (Filmer at el., 2010), to variations in the institutional environment within 
which education policies are implemented (Pritchett, 1996; World Bank, 2003; Rajkumar and 
Swaroop, 2008). More recently, the issue of the quality of education human capital has also 
entered the debate. A few commentators have acknowledged that the mixed findings may be a 
reflection of the lack of improvements in ‘pupil learning or schooling’ which then limits the 
growth of the economy (Temple, 1999; Pritchett, 2001). However, for now these ideas have 
largely remained as suppositions: apart from very limited evidence from developed countries 
(Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Hanushek, 2013) and some anecdotal evidence from a few case 
studies based on the World Bank’s public expenditure trucking surveys, we do not have 
systematic evidence on the impact and drivers of the quality of education human capital in 
developing countries.  
 
Given the limited evidence on the relationship between investment in human capital, 
including public spending on education, this chapter revisits and contributes to this literature 
in three ways: examine whether various components of public spending on education are 
differentially productive; we allow for country heterogeneity to empirically examine whether 
education spending is more effective in promoting growth in countries with good institutions; 
and draw attention to an issue which has recently attracted international attention and debate – 
and has led to an apparent shift in World Bank policy on human capital from more enrolments 
to more learning – that the quality of education human capital, which has been underexplored 
in the literature, is crucial for development. We hope that the findings from here can help low-
income countries focus more of their scarce resources on strategies that are more effective in 
buoying long-run growth and avoid those that are less effective. 
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3.3.1 Differential impacts between education levels  
 
One crucial assertion of ‘endogenous growth theory’ is that spending on education is 
considered as investment in human capital because it helps in increasing innovation, knowledge 
and skills which are likely to foster economic growth over time (Barro, 1991). For several 
decades, the World Bank has encouraged countries to devote more resources towards education 
as a key development strategy to increase human capital, particularly at primary level in 
preference to secondary and tertiary education based on the conventional wisdom within the 
development community that primary education tends to provide the highest return and is more 
equitable (World Bank, 1986; 1995). Spending patterns in developing countries clearly show 
that governments have increasingly been willing to invest in education (see Table 3.1). 
However, as reported in Table 3.3, several studies have called into question the impact of 
education spending on growth rates. But the findings from these studies are limited to aggregate 
measures of public spending on education (total spending on education as a share of GDP or 
the budget). An important issue in this literature which has also been suggested by the World 
Bank, but not thoroughly investigated on a cross-country basis, is the possibility that although 
total public spending on education may not be robustly correlated with growth, shares allocated 
to different components of education spending may be differentially productive. Given that the 
overall level of public spending on education level is lower in low-income countries in relation 
to middle- and high-income groups of countries, signalling that there is potential for increasing 
public investment in human capital, and the fact that governments in developing countries have 
been misallocating public resources, understanding which components of education spending 
– primary, secondary or tertiary – have been shown to be more effective is crucial in directing 
additional spending on education in order to promote growth.  
 
We thus argue that clues to what is going wrong could also be derived from 
disaggregating human capital spending between its different components. Very little research 
exists on the link between components of education spending and economic growth. Research 
in this area has been hampered by a lack of data at a disaggregated level. A paper that is close 
to this study is one by Devarajan et al. (1996), who analyse the differential effects of specific 
components of education spending focussing on the shares spent on administration, 
management, inspection, operations of pre-primary, primary, secondary, tertiary and other 
forms of education, but excluding other important components such as infrastructure, books, 
teacher training and recruitment, which are equally important inputs in education. 
123 
 
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we analytically focus on the 
differential direct impact of government spending on primary, secondary and tertiary 
education, but refrain from an a priori classification of any these components as ‘more 
effective’ or ‘less productive’, as suggested by the World Bank and other micro studies, and 
allow the data to show us how each of these shares of education spending is associated with 
the rate of economic growth in developing countries. Second, geographically we focus on 
Africa, the poorest continent where governments have intensely implemented development 
strategies of devoting more resources to education over the past decades but there is still scope 
for increasing spending. Thirdly, for our empirical analysis we use the most recent and up-to-
date disaggregated dataset accounting for more recent developments from 1980 to 2014, as 
opposed the one employed by Devarajan et al. (1996), which cover the period 1970-1990.  
 
3.3.2 The quality of education human capital 
 
Another important mechanism recognised within ‘endogenous growth’ literature to lead 
to more human accumulation and higher growth is schooling (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
1992). The World Bank, UNESCO’s Education for All campaign and the UN Millennium 
Development Goals have stressed policies that promote human capital accumulation through 
expansion of school enrolments (World Bank, 1986; 1991; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008). 
It has been argued that increasing the number of pupils enrolled in schools in addition to other 
policies can create more human capital is growth related. An analysis of trends in developing 
countries clearly indicate that education policies have led to a massive expansion of school 
enrolments and have almost closed the gap with other countries, especially at primary level 
(see Table 3.1) However, as reported in Table 3.3, the evidence on the link between measures 
of education such as school enrolments and the average number of years spent in school is 
inconclusive. Recently, some commentators have argued that these indicators of human capital 
do not necessarily reflect the essence of human capital implied by the original ‘endogenous 
growth’ hypothesis, as what generate real education human capital are improvements in 
knowledge and learning outcomes (Hanushek, 2013).  
 
This issue, which has been less thoroughly investigated in macroeconomic studies, is 
now a big issue at present, and was at the centre of the 2018 World Development Report, in 
which the World Bank observes that pupils in low-income countries are facing a ‘learning 
crisis’ due to lack of effective learning (World Bank, 2018: p.71). The report notes that millions 
124 
 
of pupils that are attending school are “not actually learning”, fearing that this may have been 
due to lack of improvements in the “quality of human capital that is crucial for growth” (Ibid: 
p.5). The 2018 World Development Report) also highlights a significant policy shift by the 
World Bank from the emphasis on school enrolments to the quality of education (measured by 
how much pupils do actually learn). The Report has also brought to light a potential 
predicament of policies which have focussed on massive expansion of schooling as a strategy 
for economic growth in developing countries: these policies may have been successful in 
increasing the number of pupils that are enrolled in school but may have at the same time led 
to a deterioration in schooling conditions and therefore the quality of education. Although the 
2018 World Development Report and recent research has underscored the importance of 
learning and cognitive skills in the development process, the question of whether the quality of 
education is important in understanding the link between education and growth and what drives 
it is not completely clear. The research problem we wish to explore is whether the positive 
impact of increased investments in education are being overwhelmed by falling education 
quality as a consequence of over-expansion of quantity.  
 
van der Berg (2007) explores this issue in the context of the South African education 
system, focussing on the relationship between improvements in access to schooling (quantity) 
and performance of black and white students (quality). The South African government had 
implemented educational policies which stressed universal school attainment for black children 
and youths aged up to 15 years; provided more fiscal resources to underprivileged black 
schools; and broke down racial barriers to allow more black students to attend formerly white 
schools. These policies resulted in a substantial increase in the number of black students 
attending primary and secondary schools, thereby reducing education attainment differentials 
between blacks and whites (Ibid: p.851). However, van der Berg (2007) finds no evidence that 
these policies which had reduced school enrolment differentials had also reduced learning 
outcome disparities based on matriculation performance in mathematics and physical science. 
He argues that education policies may have reduced variations in years spent in school between 
blacks and whites, but have not narrowed qualitative learning differentials, and goes on to 
conclude that “education attainment measured by years of schooling may exaggerate progress 
in cognitive levels mastered” (Ibid: p.854). Although his findings are based on education 
inequalities in South Africa, we argue that his findings are a reflection of what has typically 
transpired across Africa: educational policies have promoted massive school enrolments and 
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successfully achieved policy goals such as universal primary education, but learning outcomes 
(quality dimension of education) may have stagnated or even fallen.  
 
The original ‘endogenous growth’ hypothesis human capital that reflects the amount of 
knowledge, skills or learning (Romer, 1990; Barro, 1991). However, there are severe 
difficulties in finding proper indicators of education human capital quality and the only studies 
that have attempted this exercise have employed measures such as internationally comparable 
mathematics and science test scores (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Hanushek and Woessmann; 
2008). Students’ scores in reading, mathematics and science tests published by the OECD’s 
Programme for International Student Assessment, provide more ideal measures of learning 
achievements and reflect more appropriately education quality (OECD, 1999). The latest 
comparable dataset on education quality made public by the World Bank compares student 
achievement scores across countries (Altinok et al., 2018). However, these data are only 
available for a limited set of high-income countries and less than half of African countries in 
our sample33, making it difficult for our use here. Another drawback of these data in the context 
of our study is that low-income countries are less frequently tested. In the absence of suitable 
proxies for education quality, the ‘repetition rates’ at primary level was selected as being the 
‘second best’ option due to its advantage of somehow reflecting learning achievements against 
national standards but also being readily available and comparable on a cross-country basis. 
Undoubtedly, this measure has the limitation of sometimes not being completely comparable 
between countries, as ‘repetition rates’ are based on each country’ national educational 
systems. 
 
As the ultimate objective of schooling is learning, one of the mechanisms of assessing 
the level of knowledge and skills achieved is student achievement against the set national 
standards. In almost all national educational systems, students are positively assessed and 
allowed to progress to the next grade when they have demonstrated that they have mastered a 
certain level of knowledge and cognitive skills appropriate for a particular level of education 
(typically based on results from national tests). Otherwise, they are forced to repeat grades 
when they can’t demonstrate the level of learning expected at that level of education. Thus, it 
is assumed that those who are forced to repeat grades have not mastered the requisite cognitive 
 
33 Except for Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland (Eswatini) and Zambia.  
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skills and knowledge. Some studies have shown that school ‘repetition rates’ is inversely 
linked to the level of knowledge and cognitive skills. In a study involving rural schools in 
Brazil, Harbison and Hanushek (1992: p.32) explored the link between acquisition of 
knowledge, cognitive skills and student learning achievements, as measured by “repetition and 
dropout rates” in primary schools in Brazil. They show that learning achievements (repetitions) 
at primary level were affected by student ability to acquire knowledge and the level of cognitive 
skills. On this evidence and the claim by ‘endogenous growth’ hypothesis, it is reasonable to 
suppose that the quality of education, and therefore economic growth, will be higher in 
countries where repetition rates are lower. However, what drives the quality of education and 
what impact it has had on growth is less thoroughly analysed in the literature. In this chapter, 
we seek to understand the growth impact and drivers of the quality of education in the light of 
the World Bank policy shift and the evidence from the South Africa case study by van der 
Berg. Resolving this puzzle could perhaps help policymakers in low-income countries focus 
more of their scarce resources on development strategies that are more effective in buoying 
long-run growth and avoiding those that inappropriately cause a drag on growth if they are to 
fight poverty and inequality.  
 
3.3.3 Institutional factors determining the effectiveness of public spending on education 
 
It is recognised in the literature that the quality of institutions of governance is an 
essential element in determining the effectiveness of policy, and especially in developing 
countries weak or poorly functioning institutions are cited as one of the main reasons why 
countries find it difficult to translate policies into tangible development outcomes (World Bank, 
2003). Several empirical studies have examined the relationship between various indicators of 
institutions of governance and development outcomes, and many of them show that 
development outcomes tend to be better in countries with well-functioning institutions. 
Research has recognised that the link between public spending and development outcomes may 
in practice possibly be broken when institutions are weak or malfunctioning. For example, 
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008: p.102) establish that public expenditure on health and education 
leads to improved school attainment and lower infant mortality rates in countries with good 
governance – as measured by the “level of corruption and the quality of bureaucracy”. 
Morozumi and Veiga (2015) find evidence that aggregate measures of public capital 
expenditure promote economic growth in countries where institutions compel the executive to 
be accountable to the citizens using a range of different proxies of government accountability. 
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Other studies also show that high levels of corruption lead to inefficient allocation of public 
resources, which may possibly effect growth (Gupta et al., 2005). Based on this evidence, it is 
clear that studies which have examined the link between public spending on education and 
growth have captured only a part of the story. We argue that we need to bring into the story 
country heterogeneity such as the institutional environment within which educational spending 
policies are designed and implemented.  
 
The institutional environment can in practice affect the effectiveness of public spending 
on education in several other ways. In countries with weak or poorly functioning institutions, 
public resources tend to be inefficiently allocated both across and within sectors and therefore 
are less likely to guarantee the desired outcome. An example of poor budgetary allocations 
being a situation where resources are sub-optimally allocated towards a single or few activities 
at the expense of other equally important activities which are crucial in promoting growth, 
resulting in wasteful or inefficient utilisation. Also, public spending on education is less likely 
to deliver desired outcomes (higher learning, competencies and skills) crucial for the 
accumulation of human capital if there is no incentive mechanism in the public sector to use 
available resources for productive purposes or when fiscal resources allocated towards 
education are poorly managed. For instance, public spending may not lead to desired outcomes 
if both externally and internally generated resources are not actually spent on the intended 
programmes due to leakages, embezzlement or theft in the flow of funds towards such 
programmes, as the associated loss hampers human accumulation and thence economic growth. 
Leakage in public resources has been identified as one of the problems affecting the 
management of the public resources in developing countries such as Peru in 2001-02 (Lopez-
Calix et al., 2002). Reinikka and Svensson (2004: p.679) report that “only 13 percent of the 
capitation grant for non-wage expenditure was received in Ugandan schools during the period 
1991-95”. Lastly, education spending policies may not be effective where institutions 
mandated to implement them lack the capacity to effectively do so.  
 
The crux of the matter here is that public spending is likely to be more productive if 
additional spending is optimally allocated and utilised on intended education programmes so 
that it translates into things which matter for the accumulation of human capital such as 
recruitment and training of more teachers; availability of more teaching and learning materials 
so that teachers effectively perform their duties and students learn more and better; and more 
classrooms built so that more students have access to education. These are the issues at the 
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centre of transforming education spending into better-quality education and ultimately, growth 
(Gemmell, 2004). Therefore, our argument here is that the weak link between education 
spending and growth reported in some studies does not necessarily imply that governments are 
spending on unproductive programmes, but that its effectiveness may be hampered by other 
non-economic factors including the environment in which education policies are designed and 
implemented. It is these interlinkages between education spending, institutional environment 
and economic growth that we wish to examine empirically in this chapter. 
 
Acknowledging the major role played by the institutional environment, in this chapter 
we seek to assess whether and how institutions affect the effectiveness of public spending on 
education in promoting growth. In particular, we focus on institutional aspects that affect 
government’s accountability to its citizens and its effectiveness in policy design and 
implementation. We measure the quality of institutions by democratic accountability and 
institutionalised constraints on the executive (both of which are proxies of accountability) and 
bureaucratic effectiveness as likely to affect the effectiveness of public education spending and 
the economy’s productivity. This study is closely related to the work of Rajkumar and Swaroop 
(2008) and Morozumi and Veiga (2016). A crucial difference is that Rajkumar and Swaroop 
(2008) analyse the link between impact of governance on the effectiveness of public spending 
on education and health on schooling and infant mortality rates, respectively. Morozumi and 
Veiga (2016) analyse the role of democratic accountability in promoting the growth effect of 
capital and recurrent expenditure. Also, none of these studies focuses exclusively on Africa. 
 
3.4 Empirical approach 
 
Our empirical approach follows the standard approach employed in the literature, with 
some adjustments in variables included, to empirically analyse the three ideas conjectured in 
the previous section, namely: the differential effects of education spending, importance of 
education quality in human capital accumulation and whether the institutional environment 
matters for the effectiveness of education spending. Apart from specifying a model that 
captures the essence of ‘endogenous growth theory’ and enables us to empirically test these 
relationships, in this section we also describe the data and its sources, and the estimation 
techniques used. 
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3.4.1 Model specification – new growth model 
 
Our starting point is to outline a model which embodies the central ideas of ‘endogenous 
growth theory’, in which human capital propels other factors of production to generate growth, 
and that policies which raise human capital, and for our purposes here, improvements in the 
quality of human capital can lead to more growth. Several studies that follow this framework 
have identified channels linking public spending on education and human capital with long-
run growth. According to the standard growth models developed in Barro (1991), Devarajan et 
al. (1996), Temple (1999), Pritchett (2001), Baldacci et al. (2008) and others, the main 
dependent variable (per capita GDP growth) is assumed to be determined by the accumulation 
of physical capital, labour, human capital and policies and institutions that propel human 
capital. We then modify these models, by incorporating the influence of shares of public 
spending on primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education, quality of education and the 
quality of institutions, as discussed above. The picture of the story we have discussed in the 
previous section can be formally presented in an arrow diagram as illustrated in Figure 3.2, 
which represents our baseline empirical model: 
 
Figure 3.2. The core model linking key variables and growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our baseline framework suggests that long-run growth is driven by the stock of physical 
capital (K), labour (L), the quantity and quality of human capital accumulation (H), which is 
in turn influenced the public spending on education and the quality of institutions (I), and that 
Physical capital 
(K) 
Labour (L) 
Human capital accumulation 
(H) (quantity & quality) 
Public expenditure 
on education (P) 
GDP per capita 
growth rate (Y) 
Institutions  
(I) 
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institutions can also directly influence economic growth. The picture in Figure 3.2, which 
captures the essence of ‘endogenous growth theory’, may be represented as a linear single 
equation as is standard in the literature in the functional form as specified earlier in equation 
(3.3) and restated here as follows: 
  
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝑃, 𝐻, 𝐼)    (3.3) 
 
Our baseline estimating equation for growth, based on the baseline model in Figure 3.2 
and equation (3.3) can be specified in the following reduced form: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝜗∑𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑘
3
𝑘=1
+ 𝛿∑𝐻𝑖𝑡
𝑗
2
𝑗=1
+  𝜑𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                    (3.4)            
 
where 𝑖 stands for country and 𝑡 for year. The other notations in the equation represent 
our variables as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡  =  annual GDP growth rate in percent observed in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡. This 
dependent variable is measured by the average annual growth rate of  real GDP 
per capita based on constant 2010 US dollars. This variable is converted into 5-
year forward moving averages to capture long-run effects of current policies. 
This implies that current values of explanatory variables are expected to affect 
growth in 5 years’ time;  
𝐾𝑖𝑡  = is our measure of the stock of physical capital in the economy commonly used 
in the empirical literature (Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992), represented by 
the ratio of total investment or gross capital formation in GDP. The variable 
includes expenditure on fixed asserts, improvements to land, plat, machinery 
and purchase of equipment. It also includes construction of physical 
infrastructure such as housing, office and commercial buildings, schools and 
hospitals. It also includes increases in inventories such as stocks or interest.  
𝐿 𝑖𝑡 = represents the change in the stock of labour available in the economy. A 
common proxy employed in these studies is population growth rate. It is 
measured by annual population growth rate from year (t-1) to (t), expressed as 
a percentage; 
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𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑘  = a vector of sectoral composition of public spending on education, disaggregated 
into shares of public resources allocated towards primary (𝑃𝑖𝑡
1), secondary (𝑃𝑖𝑡
2), 
and tertiary (𝑃𝑖𝑡
3) levels of education;  
𝐻𝑖𝑡
𝑗
    =  our measure of human capital attributable to education and enters the model as 
a product of the quantity (𝐻𝑖𝑡
1 ) and quality (𝐻𝑖𝑡
2) of education. These variables 
enter the model separately given the desire to capture whether they are 
differentially effective in promoting growth. The quantity of education is 
expressed as gross school enrolment rates and represented by the ratio of total 
enrolment to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the 
level of education shown. Primary education provides basic reading, writing, 
and mathematics skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects 
as history, geography, natural and social sciences. Secondary education 
completes the provision of basic education started at primary, and aims at laying 
the foundations for lifelong learning and human development. Tertiary 
education focuses on advancing specialized and lifelong skills. The quality of 
education, which is one of the variables of interest in this study, is measured by 
the proportion of students who are forced to repeat at all levels of primary 
education and used here as the second-best option as mentioned earlier. This 
variable is assumed to have an inverse association with quality, a higher 
percentage of repeaters generally corresponds to a lower quality of education 
human capital;  
𝐼 𝑖𝑡= indicators of institutional environment measured by three different indicators, 
namely ‘democratic accountability’ and the extent of ‘constraints on the 
executive’ from the Polity IV database. This is the measure of institutionalised 
accountability produced by the Polity IV index and is derived as an aggregate 
of Polity’s measures of competitiveness of political participation, openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the president or 
chief governmental executive. We also use ‘bureaucratic effectiveness’ from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. The variable measures institutional strength and 
effectiveness of the bureaucracy towards policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
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policies. Because of high correlations between each of these variables, the three 
indicators enter the model separately; 
𝜆𝑡 = captures unobservable time-specific fixed effects not captured by the other 
explanatory variables; and  
𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  denotes the error term. 
 
Our estimating equation (3.4) incorporates the innovations which we have suggested 
above as a possible step towards explaining the paradox of an inconsistent empirical impact of 
investments in education human capital in growth regressions, namely that public spending on 
education is disaggregated by educational levels (primary, secondary and tertiary) and that the 
estimated coefficients are not equal; we devise and estimate a new ‘quality of education human 
capital’ measure namely ‘repetition rates’, as described above whose estimated coefficient is 
expected to be negative given the inverse relationship; and we incorporate the role of 
institutional quality indicators into the growth equation with the estimated coefficient expected 
to be positive. Thus, our key variables of interest here are 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑘 , 𝐻𝑖𝑡
2  and 𝐼𝑖𝑡; 
 
An important extension to our baseline model relates to the role of the institutional 
environment in determining the impact of public spending on education human capital on 
growth. In order to assess this institutional influence, the standard approach is to interact the 
two variables – the measure of public education expenditure policies (𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑘) with the indicator 
of the institutional environment (𝐼𝑖𝑡). This method draws upon the approach in Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) who examined whether the effects of foreign aid on growth was conditional on 
good policies and Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) who explored whether the quality of 
governance can affect the effectiveness of social spending on social outcomes. The inclusion 
of the interaction term (𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡), which is specified in 3.5, will enable us to test empirically 
whether the quality of domestic institutions can propel or foil the impact of public education 
spending on education to generate more economic growth. We bring the influence of 
institutional factors on education spending into the model, closely following the work of 
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008), by specifying our new model in the following form: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝜗∑𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑘
3
𝑘=1
+ 𝛿∑𝐻𝑖𝑡
𝑗
2
𝑗=1
+  𝜑𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓∑𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡
3
𝑘=1
 +  𝜆𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                     (3.5) 
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The interaction term 𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑡 in equation 3.5 will enable us to empirically examine 
whether public spending on education is more effective in promoting economic growth in 
countries with strong and sell-functioning institutions. Several studies in this area, including 
some of the influential contributions by Romer (1989), Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992) and 
others employ cross-sectional regression analysis involving a large number of countries, where 
the left-hand side variable is averaged over a fairly long period (usually 5 or 10, or more years), 
and the right-hand side variables are either long run averages or variables relating to the 
beginning of the period. Here we use panel data regression analysis, which has the advantage 
of exploiting the time dimension of the data. Estimating our models using panel data 
regressions has the advantage of controlling for unobserved country-specific fixed effects as 
well as capturing the evolution of the variables overtime.  
 
Different types of estimators have been employed in previous studies. In this chapter we 
first employ the robust OLS to estimate the two main equations, 3.5 and 3.5. The OLS is 
preferred because it allows us to compare our results with most of the previous findings, 
because it is one of the widely utilised estimators as can be noted in selected studies provided 
in Appendix 3.1. Incorporating time-specific fixed effects has the advantage of producing 
estimates that are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. We also implement a variant 
of the Generalised Least Squares estimator, the Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) 
estimator, as a check on the robustness of our findings. The FGLS also has the advantage of 
correcting for both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. However, there may also be 
potential problems of simultaneity or reverse causation among the variables. For instance, 
government spending on education can raise per capita GDP, and can also be influenced by per 
capita GDP. There are various ways of reducing this problem. In this study we try to reduce 
this problem by utilising an instrumental variable estimator commonly employed in previous 
studies, Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), to try and address any concerns for potential 
endogeneity and reverse causality. Although the 2SLS estimator enables us to address the 
potential endogeneity issues including reverse causality, its success depends on finding valid 
instruments which are strong enough to deal with this problem. Tests for the validity of 
instruments are conducted and reported together in respective tables of estimates below. 
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3.4.2 Data description and summary statistics 
 
In our empirical analysis, we use an unbalanced dataset of annual observations on a 
sample of 42 African countries covering the period from 1980 to 2016 to examine the effects 
of public spending on primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education, the importance of 
quality in assessing the effects of education and the role of institutions in propelling public 
spending to generate economic growth. A full list of countries in our sample is provided in 
Appendix 3.2. Most empirical studies in this field use data which is averaged over some period, 
typically ranging between five and ten years. The period is even longer in studies that use cross-
sectional data. In our analysis here, we convert our dependent variable into 5-year forward 
moving averages to abstract from short-term business cycle fluctuations, smooth out temporary 
fluctuations in the data and possibly address the problem of missing observations. The use of 
multi-year forward moving averages also helps in capturing the long-run effects. All our 
explanatory variables that are used in this chapter are based on annual observations. 
 
However, one potential critique of converting the data into forward moving averages is 
that this can introduce a problem of autocorrelation in the error terms within a country sample 
due to the use of overlapping observations (when generating forward moving averages). Using 
the standard OLS estimator in such circumstances may lead to incorrect standard errors, 
although the estimates will be consistent. To correct the standard errors, we follow Devarajan 
et al. (1996: p. 324) and estimate our parameters using an OLS estimator whose standard errors 
are corrected for possible autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity but also the FGLS estimator 
to check for the robustness of the results.  
 
Our dependent variable for the growth models, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, is the annual GDP per capita growth 
rate measured in percent based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars, from the International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database (October 2018). The data for this variable is 
converted into 5-year forward moving averages as discussed earlier. Turning to our explanatory 
variables, we follow the standard literature as reported in Table 3.3 and employ total investment 
as a share of GDP to proxy for a country’s physical capital formation (𝐾𝑖𝑡). Capital formation 
entails improvements to an economy’s fixed assets (land, plant, machinery, equipment, and 
physical infrastructure like roads, railways, schools, hospitals, housing and private buildings, 
etc) and inventories (stocks of goods and work in-progress). We employ the annual growth rate 
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of the population as a measure of changes in the stock of labour (𝐿𝑖𝑡), obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (2018); 
 
The indicators of public education spending on education, which again are of significant 
interest here are educational spending categories of primary (𝑃𝑖𝑡
1), secondary (𝑃𝑖𝑡
2) and tertiary 
(𝑃𝑖𝑡
3) levels of education, expressed as percentages of total government expenditure on 
education. The disaggregation of public spending into these components also helps in 
evaluating the long-held conventional wisdom in development circles that low-income 
countries should prioritise investments in primary education, which has led to the prioritisation 
of spending on primary education in preference to secondary and tertiary levels of education. 
One possible weakness of the categories of education spending is the large number of missing 
observations, especially prior to the 1990s resulting in the variables which have the smallest 
number of observations among our variables, are obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (2018)  
 
The other explanatory variable of interest in this chapter is education human capital (𝐻𝑖𝑡
𝑗 ), 
which has two dimensions: quantity and quality of education human capital. The dimension 
representing the quantity of education human capital (𝐻𝑖𝑡
1 ) is measured by primary and/or 
secondary gross enrolment rates. These variables measure the number of pupils that are 
enrolled in a particular grade as a proportion of the total population of children corresponding 
to that age group. The quality dimension (𝐻𝑖𝑡
2) is proxied by our second-best choice, repetition 
rates, because quality is often difficult to capture. The path-breaking study by van der Berg 
(2007) uses mathematics and science matriculation scores in South Africa, however, to the best 
of our knowledge, such data are hardly publicly available in most African countries. Our own 
approach, therefore, is to employ the percentage of repeaters at all levels of primary education, 
which of course embody an element of students’ achievement in various subjects. A priori we 
would expect, therefore, that the percentage of repeaters would to have an inverse association 
with the quality of education human capital and thence with the effectiveness, ceteris paribus, 
of public educational expenditure. Such data have newly become available at the World Bank 
and for this study are taken from the World Development Indicators database.  
 
Our indicators of the institutional environment: ‘democratic accountability’ measures the 
existence of procedures for citizens to express their preferences about policies and leaders, 
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voice their concerns, demand explanations and impose sanctions for the performance of elected 
officials and ranges between -10 (complete absence of accountability mechanisms) and +10 
(existence of very strong accountability mechanisms); ‘institutionalised constraints on the 
executive’ measures the extent to which decision-making powers of the executive are legally 
constrained by the existence of checks and balances, and variable ranges between 0 (very few 
restrictions) and 7 (very many restrictions); and ‘bureaucratic effectiveness’ which measures 
the level of expertise in policy formulation and implementation and commitment to such 
policies, and ranges between 0 (very poor capacity) and 4 (very good).  
 
Standard ‘endogenous growth’ regressions also include the initial level of per capita GDP 
in growth estimations to capture the idea of conditional convergence34 first introduced by Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and is expected to be negative; measures of the macroeconomic 
environment such as inflation; and the budget deficit as a proxy for how additional education 
spending is financed and also to capture possible crowding-out effects from borrowing. Data 
for the initial level of development and deficits are from World Development Indicators, while 
annual inflation rate data are from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database.  
 
Table 3.4: Summary statistics  
Variable Notation Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita growth Y 334 1.04 3.28 -11.89 11.80 
Physical capital K 325 21.97 11.21 1.11 67.32 
Population growth L 336 2.59 0.87 -3.67 5.54 
Human capital quantity       
Gross primary school enrolment rates H 313 89.98 27.45 20.20 146.90 
Gross secondary school enrolment rates H 280 32.87 23.03 2.86 113.24 
Human capital quality       
Repetition rates, primary (% of total enrolment) H 270 16.20 9.71 0 41.44 
Quality of policies       
Expenditure on education (% of total 
government expenditure) 
P 185 16.78 5.18 5.26 29.23 
Expenditure on primary education (% of 
government expenditure on education) 
P 192 44.83 11.40 19.20 98.67 
Expenditure on secondary education (% of 
government expenditure on education) 
P 188 29.62 10.01 0 64.14 
Expenditure on tertiary education (% of 
government expenditure on education) 
P 202 18.25 7.98 0 44.59 
Quality of institutions       
Bureaucracy quality I 228 1.36 0.89 0 4 
Institutionalised constraints on the executive I 313 3.47 1.94 0 7 
Democratic accountability  I 313 -1.32 19.16 -10 10 
 
34 The concept of conditional convergence provides that countries that are relatively poor tend to grow faster 
than richer countries (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). 
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Macroeconomic factors       
Inflation rate  329 39.37 364.45 -4.24 6,424.98 
Initial GDP per capita  304 1,622.73 2,238.29 190.48 12,139.81 
Deficit  246 -2.62 3.84 -22.58 14.81 
Pupil-Teacher Ratio PTR 292 42.88 13.31 12.96 94.49 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators; IMF World Economic Outlook. For the following countries, 
there are missing values: Countries with missing data are: Angola, Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African 
Republic, Cameroon, Congo Rep., Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali and Mauritania. 
 
3.5 Empirical findings – quantitative results 
 
Before presenting and discussing our estimation results, we first estimate simple 
correlations, using the Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation between our variables of 
interest, education and institutional variables, and per capita GDP growth rate. These 
correlations provide insights into the association between the variables and the direction of the 
relationship. We conducted both simple and partial correlations based on the model 
specification in equation 3.4. The Pearson’s pairwise correlation matrix is presented in Table 
3.5.  
 
Table 3.5: Pearson’s pairwise correlation matrix of key variables 
  Growth 
(𝑌𝑖𝑡) 
School enrolment  
rates (𝐻1) 
Quality 
(𝐻2) 
Public spending on  
education (𝑃𝑖) 
 
Institutions 
(𝐼𝑖) 
 
   Prim  Sec  Ter Repeat   Prim  Sec  Ter Democ  Xconst 
Growth (Yit)  1          
School 
enrolments  
(𝐻1) 
Prim 0.30 1         
Sec 0.32 0.53 1        
Ter 0.30 0.31 0.77 1       
Repetition 
rates (𝐻2) 
Repeat -0.29 0.00 -0.37 -0.32 1      
Public 
spending on 
education 
(𝑃𝑖) 
. 
Prim -0.14 -0.04 -0.37 -0.38 0.07 1     
Sec 0.13 -0.01 0.42 0.43 -0.17 -0.60 1    
Ter 0.04 0.07 -0.23 -0.09 0.24 -0.32 -0.36 1   
Institutions 
(Ii) 
Democ 0.24 0.16 0.20 0.13 -0.16 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 1  
Xconst 0.23 0.15 0.15 0.09 -0.13 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.996 1 
 
The results indicate positive but weak partial correlations between all our measures of 
education, government spending on secondary and tertiary education, our indicators of the 
quality of institutions and the growth rate per capita GDP. The correlation between our measure 
of education quality and growth has the projected negative sign indicating possibly that the 
quality of human capital important for growth. Government spending on primary education 
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which emerges with a counter-intuitively negative sign. For the simple bivariate correlations 
between different explanatory variables, the results indicate that, with the exception of the 
correlation between democratic accountability and executive constraints, most of the 
correlations are less than 0.50, suggesting that multicollinearity may not be a serious issue in 
our estimations. The coefficient of almost 1.000 between democratic accountability and 
executive constraints suggests that these two may not be included in equation 3.4 at the same 
time. 
 
3.5.1 Baseline results – education spending, human capital and institutions  
 
In this section, we present and discuss our baseline findings. Table 3.6 presents the 
results from the robust OLS, feasible generalised least squares and the instrumental variable 
two-stage least squares estimators based on equation (3.4). In column (1), we show the results 
for the indicator of aggregate public education spending  as a starting point, and is intended to 
assess whether education spending as a whole has any effects on growth in Africa. The 
estimated coefficient emerges as positive but statistically insignificant using all estimation 
methods, indicating like several other studies reported in Table 3.3, that overall public spending 
on education has not made a significant contribution to economic growth in Africa over the 
past three decades35.  
 
In column (2), we disaggregate education spending into three shares of primary, 
secondary and tertiary expenditure. The estimated coefficients on all categories of spending 
emerge with ambiguous estimates. For primary education, the estimated coefficient is positive 
and significant at 10 percent level under the OLS estimator (column 2), negative and 
insignificant under the FGLS estimator (column 3) and negative and statistically significant 
under the instrumental variable estimator 2SLS (column 4). However, because of the 
differences in the estimates and given the superiority36 of the instrumental variable estimator 
in the presence of endogeneity (simultaneities and reverse causality), we interpret our findings 
 
35 In our 2SLS regressions, the instruments are the lagged values of the endogenous variables (physical capital, 
education spending, and human capital) and also overall government expenditure as an additional instrument for 
physical investment, and  population under 15 as an instrument for human capital. Using lagged values of 
endogenous variables as instruments could potentially create a problem if those lagged values are also 
endogenous. However, the tests for endogeneity and overidentification restrictions carried out in Table 3.5 suggest 
that these instruments are in fact valid. 
36 In the presence of endogenous explanatory variables, OLS estimates tend to be biased (Glewwe et at., 2014: 
p.381). The FGLS on the other hand only provides estimates when heteroscedasticity or first-order correlation is 
suspected but does not address endogeneity (Baldacci et al. 2004: p.12). 
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on educational spending in terms of 2SLS, which suggests that primary education not only has 
an insignificant impact on growth but may in fact have a negative effect. 
 
Table 3.6: Education spending, human capital and institutions [equation 3.4] 
Estimation method  Robust OLS FGLS 2SLS 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant  0.687 5.212* 3.924* 10.618** 
 (0.90) (1.96) (1.79) (2.21) 
Physical investment (K) 0.058*** 0.044** 0.030** 0.041*  
(3.78) (2.25) (2.30) (1.74) 
Labour supply (L) -0.474** -0.620*** -0.324* -0.774**  
(2.79) (2.75) (1.65) (2.43) 
Total education spending  0.118    
 (1.17)    
Primary education spending  0.045* -0.027 -0.085** 
  (1.65) (1.25) (2.12) 
Secondary education spending  0.019 -0.001 -0.039 
  (0.66) (0.005) (0.73) 
Tertiary education spending  -0.011 -0.018 -0.030 
  (0.39) (0.80) (0.66) 
Primary enrolment rates 0.004 0.008 0.017** 0.0005  
(0.73) (1.24) (2.40) (0.06) 
Secondary enrolment rates -0.012 -0.006 0.004 -0.0007  
(0.81) (0.40) (0.28) (0.38) 
Tertiary enrolment rates 0.096*** -0.074 -0.016 -0.018  
(3.18) (0.69) (0.45) (0.47) 
Repetition rates  -0.074*** -0.108*** -0.058** 
  (2.77) (5.00) (2.33) 
Democratic accountability  0.027*** 0.024** 0.012* 0.031***  
(3.44) (2.44) (1.76) (2.75) 
Initial income level -0.0003* -0.0007*** -0.0006** -0.0006**  
(1.82) (3.14) (2.15) (2.41) 
Budget balance 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.044 
 (0.90) (0.21) (0.68) (1.45) 
Observations  222 164 159 115 
R-squared 0.3194 0.4116  0.4734 
Test for endogeneity     
Durbin score    0.7258 
Wu-Hausman    0.7754 
Test for over-identification restrictions     
Sargan score     0.3867 
Basmann     0.4317 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: The dependent variable is measured as 5-year forward moving averages of the annual growth rate of GDP 
and all control variables are measured as annual observations (see Table 3.2). Our estimation methods are OLS 
with white-corrected standard errors, FGLS correcting for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and 2SLS. Time-
fixed effects which are expected to affect growth are included where appropriate to reduce potential bias caused 
by omitted variables (Temple, 1999). Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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The estimated coefficients on secondary and tertiary spending categories emerge as 
insignificant correlates, with surprisingly negative signs across the FGLS and the 2SLS for the 
secondary category and negative across all specifications for the tertiary category. At this stage,  
it remains unclear whether the shares of education spending are differentially productive. A 
possible explanation for these ambiguous results is the paucity of education spending data, 
which as mentioned earlier are notoriously weak with many gaps over many years.  
 
 Turning to the results for another variable of interest in this study, the importance of 
both the quantity and quality of education in understanding the link between human capital 
accumulation and long-run economic growth. Initial results based on the baseline equation 
indicate that across all the three specifications reported in columns (2), (3) and (4) that common 
indicators of human capital attributable to education, school enrolment rates do not emerge as 
significant correlates with growth. These regression results show that the estimated coefficient 
on primary school enrolments is positive but insignificant, while on secondary and tertiary they 
are mainly negative and insignificant. A joint F-test for the significance of the three quantity 
variables used here produces a test statistic, F(2,   72) =  1.65 with a probability Prob > F =  
0.1861, apparently giving support to the sceptical view in several empirical studies reported in 
Table 3.3 that education human capital quantity has no impact on growth. The policy 
implication of this finding is that development strategies that have placed undue focus on the 
expansion of school enrolments have not put African countries on a strong foundation for long-
run economic development. Also, this finding offers no support towards the conventional 
wisdom in development circles that countries which prioritise and invest in primary education 
are likely to reap more growth dividends than those which invest in secondary and tertiary 
education, as asserted by the World Bank and others (World Bank, 1995).  
 
Turning to another variable of great significance to this study, the quality of education, 
the results show a negative and statistically significant relationship between repetition rates 
and per capita real GDP growth. A one percentage point increase in repetition rates (lower 
quality) reduces the per capita real GDP growth rate by between 0.6 and 1.0 percentage points. 
Given that there is an inverse relationship here, this finding can also be interpreted as a fall in 
repetition rates (improvement to quality) leads to a 0.6-1.0 percentage point increase in per 
capita real GDP growth. on this evidence, we argue that that improving the quality of education 
provides a clear boost to economic development, much more than by school enrolments. The 
policy significance of these finding is that although focussing on increasing school enrolments 
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is important, it is not sufficient and should be complemented with the goal of improving the 
quality of education in order to make human capital more effective in promoting growth.   
 
Table 3.7 also shows the results on the direct influence of institutions of governance. 
At this stage we focus on the effects of democratic accountability as our first measure of 
institutional environment. The estimated coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically 
significant, implying that in Africa an improvement in democratic accountability of one 
standard deviation improves the growth rate of per capita real GDP by about 0.02-0.03 
percentage points. This finding, which corroborates the findings of other studies (Baldacci et 
al., 2004; Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008) is robust across all estimators. This result suggests 
that growth is expected to be higher on average in countries where the quality of institutions is 
better. This finding has important implications for enhancing economic growth, as lessons from 
this can be particularly relevant for low-income countries, where the quality of institutions and 
economic growth rates are often low (Collier, 1991; Barro, 2002).  
 
The results for the other variables in our model show that the estimated coefficient on 
physical capital is positive and significantly correlated with the growth rates of per capita real  
GDP. A one percentage point increase in physical capital is associated with a 0.03-0.05 percent 
point improvement in per capita real GDP growth rate. This robust positive relationship 
between investment and growth is consistent with the findings of other studies on drivers of 
growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992). A comparison of the estimated coefficients between 
physical and human capital shows that in Africa the quality of education which had a larger 
growth effect than physical capital during the period 1980-2016.  
 
In recent decades, the rapid population growth rates have frequently been invoked to 
try and explain Africa’s poor development performance. In this study, population growth rate 
which is our measure of labour supply (𝐿) appears to have imposed a great burden on the 
region’s economic growth prospects. The estimated coefficient is negative and significant, with 
a one percentage point increase in population size predicted to lower the growth rate of the 
economy by 0.3 to 0.8 percentage points. The estimated coefficient also indicates that the 
population growth rate is one of the factors which significantly contribute to low economic 
performance in Africa. The coefficient on the initial level of income at the beginning of every 
period is negative but very weak in most specifications, suggesting the existing of weak 
conditional convergence in Africa. Finally, the budget deficit, which is included to account for 
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how increases in educational spending are financed, emerges with an insignificant coefficient 
– perhaps indicating that it does not play a significant role.  
 
3.5.2 Institutional factors determining the effectiveness of public spending on education 
    
Our next primary interest here is in gaining a better understanding of public spending 
on education and its interaction with institutions of governance. In its 2018 World Development 
Report, the World Bank claims that to overcome the learning crisis of the past five decades and 
“achieve educational goals will certainly require better and more effective ways of spending in 
the coming decades” World Bank, 2018: p.187). Thus, the question we wish to tackle here as 
part of our contribution to the literature is whether the quality of institutions, measured by the 
executive constraints, democratic accountability and bureaucratic effectiveness, can propel 
public spending on education to generate higher growth and enable African countries their 
educational goals. We continue to focus on the share of primary, secondary and tertiary 
education spending, which we estimate using equation 3.5. The results are reported in Tables 
3.7 and 3.8. In columns (5), (6) and (7) of Table 3.7 we report estimates from the OLS, FGLS 
and 2SLS on executive constraints, respectively and columns (8) and (9) of Table 3.8 OLS 
results for bureaucratic effectiveness and democratic accountability.  
 
Table 3.7. Institutional factors and effectiveness of educational spending [Executive 
constraints] 
Estimation method  OLS FGLS 2SLS 
Explanatory variables (5) (6) (7) 
Constant  2.774 2.783 3.575  
(0.93) (1.29) (0.62) 
Physical investment (K) 0.043** 0.026** 0.050** 
 (2.20) (2.08) (2.10) 
Labour supply (L) -0.534*** -0.275 -0.599*  
(2.35) (1.39) (1.79) 
Primary education spending -0.024 -0.014 -0.040  
(0.82) (0.65) (0.73) 
Secondary education spending 0.034 0.001 0.004  
(1.10) (0.06) (0.07) 
Tertiary education spending 0.024 0.002 0.095  
(0.73) (0.08) (1.28) 
Primary enrolment rates 0.011 0.017** 0.011  
(1.51) (2.43) (1.13) 
Secondary enrolment rates 0.007 0.020 0.004  
(0.46) (1.32) (0.24) 
Tertiary enrolment rates -0.054* -0.045 -0.047  
(1.78) (1.33) (1.20) 
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Repetition rates -0.086*** -0.109*** -0.084***  
(3.30) (5.34) (3.27) 
Executive constraints (xconst) 0.185*** 0.158*** 0.320***  
(5.13) (4.09) (3.04) 
Executive constraints x primary education spending -0.001*** 0.000** -0.001  
(2.69) (2.34) (1.16) 
Executive constraints x secondary education spending 0.000 0.000 0.001  
(0.54) (0.01) (0.77) 
Executive constraints x tertiary education spending -0.001*** -0.001** -0.003*  
(2.85) (2.03) (1.66) 
Initial income level -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001***  
(2.87) (2.23) (2.18) 
Budget balance 0.001 0.012 0.045  
(0.05) (0.95) (1.47) 
Inflation rate  -0.000 -0.000 -0.003**  
(0.09) (0.41) (2.48) 
Observations  164 159 115 
R-squared 0.4466  0.5306 
Test for endogeneity    
Durbin score   0.8973 
Wu-Hausman   0.9250 
Test for overidentification restrictions    
Sargan score    0.1054 
Basmann    0.1417 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: The dependent variable is measured as 5-year,  forward moving averages of the annual growth rate of GDP and all 
control variables are measured as annual observations (see Table 3.2). Our estimators are OLS with white-corrected standard 
errors, FGLS correcting for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and 2SLS. Time-fixed effects which are included where 
appropriate to reduce potential bias caused by omitted variables (Temple, 1999). Significance levels are indicated as 1% 
(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
 
The estimated coefficients on the interaction term between each of the shares of 
education spending and constraints on the executive emerge with ambiguous and insignificant 
signs. The results are negative on primary and tertiary education spending, and positive but 
statistically insignificant on secondary. These results may suggest that executive constraints 
may be an imperfect measure of the quality of the institutions or that its effect cannot be 
properly estimated since it does not often change. These estimates are counterintuitive but not 
surprising, for example Lopez and Miller (2007) fail to establish a systematic correlation 
between institutions of governance (using corruption as a measure) and spending efficiency 
across sectors. An important issue in relation to these findings is that they do not necessarily 
imply that improvements in the quality of institutions will have greater effects on the 
effectiveness of public spending on growth. The challenge for the cross-country analysis, data 
on factors that are likely to have a direct impact on the effectiveness of spending such as 
leakages in the flow of public funds towards the targeted beneficiaries, misallocation of 
resources due to lack of administrative capacity, are not readily available on a large and 
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comparable basis. Even though spending on education has a high growth elasticity, it is realistic 
that results such as these can emerge if in practice resources allocated towards education are 
hardly spent on actual educational programmes. These unobserved heterogeneities are better 
analysed in country-focussed studies. We attempt to gain a better understanding of some of the 
institutional characteristics, which are not clear in cross-country findings, which can influence 
the efficiency of public spending in bolstering long-run economic growth by examining a 
country case of Zambia in the final section of this chapter. 
 
Other interesting results from this analysis, which we consider as part of the robustness 
check on our earlier findings, include a consistent finding that sectoral composition of 
educational spending does not seem to matter for growth in Africa. The other is that even under 
this new formulation of the growth model we are unable to find evidence of the World Bank’s 
conventional wisdom that emphasises primary education in low-income countries. The 
estimated coefficients of the sectoral composition and our measures of educational human 
capital quantity (school enrolment rates) remain statistically insignificant across all our three 
estimators, but more importantly even in our instrumental variable estimator (2SLS). More 
fundamentally, the results continue to show overwhelming evidence for the positive and direct 
role of the quality of educational human capital (measured by repeater rates) and institutions 
in promoting economic growth. However, it should be noted that although the 2SLS technique 
is widely used in growth regressions, as reported in Table 3.3, there may be some imperfections 
in the findings due to the possibility of weak instruments (lags of endogenous variables with a 
few external instruments). The use of this estimation technique here should therefore be seen 
as an attempt to test the sensitivity of our key findings, and indeed these appear to be 
remarkably consistent: in table 3.7, the inflation rate is the only independent variable which is 
significant only in the 2SLS regressions. The 2SLS based results presented here have provided 
us with a robustness check on our OLS and FGLS estimators. It should also be noted that we 
have also employed another method as an attempt to minimise the effects of any endogeneity, 
the use of forward lags of the dependent variable as discussed earlier.  
 
We now present and discuss the findings on the impact of democratic accountability 
and bureaucratic effectiveness on the link between public spending on education and economic 
growth. On bureaucratic effectiveness regressions the results reported in Table 3.8 the 
estimated coefficients on the three interaction terms  are positive and statistically significant, 
thereby supporting our basic hypothesis education spending at all the three levels of education 
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is more effective in promoting economic growth in countries with strong and well-functioning 
bureaucratic institutions. This finding is fairly consistent with other studies on public 
expenditure and growth. Our alternative measure of institutional quality, democratic 
accountability, although emerges as a strong predictor of growth in Table 3.7, it does not propel 
public spending into generating higher growth rates. the estimated coefficients on the 
interaction terms between democratic accountability and the three levels of education spending 
emerge statistically insignificant. As possible explanation is that some of the institutional 
variable rarely change in developing countries but also the small number of observations (146) 
may have an impact of the estimates. Therefore, we treat any conclusion based on these 
findings as cautious.  
 
Table 3.8. Institutional factors and effectiveness of educational spending [democratic 
accountability and bureaucratic effectiveness] 
Estimation method  Robust OLS Robust OLS 
Explanatory variables  (8) (9) 
Constant  -61.978 25.243 
 (1.350) (0.830) 
Physical investment (K) 0.005 0.010  
(0.510) (1.250) 
Labour supply (L) -0.391* -0.281*** 
 (1.970) (2.670) 
Primary education spending 0.079 -0.046** 
 (1.260) (2.310) 
Secondary education spending 0.079 -0.028 
 (1.320) (1.360) 
Tertiary education spending 0.093 -0.035 
 (1.460) (1.560) 
Repetition rates -0.055*** -0.048*** 
 (3.330) (3.990) 
Bureaucratic effectiveness 6.209**  
 (2.090)  
Bureaucratic effectiveness x primary expenditure 0.064**  
 (2.020)  
Bureaucratic effectiveness x secondary expenditure 0.060*  
 (1.930)  
Bureaucratic effectiveness x tertiary expenditure 0.065**  
 (2.080)  
Democratic accountability   -0.301 
  (1.270) 
Democratic accountability x primary expenditure  0.003 
  (1.070) 
Democratic accountability x secondary expenditure  0.003 
  (1.250) 
Democratic accountability x tertiary expenditure  0.004 
  (1.280) 
Budget balance  0.039*** 0.014 
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 (2.860) (1.030) 
year 0.028 -0.010 
 (1.180) (0.640) 
Observations  146 227 
R-squared 0.3485 0.2530 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: The dependent variable is measured as 5-year forward moving averages of the annual growth rate of GDP and all 
control variables are measured as annual observations (see Table 3.2). Our estimator is OLS with white-corrected standard 
errors. Time-fixed effects which are included to reduce potential bias caused by omitted variables (Temple, 1999). 
Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
 
Based on the results presented in this section, our main finding suggests that the weak 
link between spending and growth is a feature of the different institutional environments in 
which education systems operate. Environments with higher bureaucratic effectiveness are 
more likely to use resources more effectively to raise human capital and thence growth. 
Education spending seems to be more effective in promoting growth in countries with better 
bureaucratic effectiveness than the level of democratic accountability and constraints on the 
executive. However, these findings should be treated with caution given that indicators of 
institutional quality rarely change in Africa (as will be seen in the case study) and also the ones 
we have employed here only capture particular dimensions rather than all aspects of 
institutional quality.  
 
3.5.3 Possible determinants of educational quality 
 
Until this point, we have analysed the impact of the quality of education and concluded 
that it matters even more than the quantity dimension in the growth process and should, 
therefore, be a central part of development strategies. As mentioned earlier, the World Bank 
has also shifted its emphasis from expansion of school enrolments to quality of education – 
actual learning and acquiring skills (World Bank, 2018). While we have found some evidence, 
based on repletion rates as our measure of quality in this study and test scores in science, maths 
and reading in other studies, not much is completely understood about what drives the quality 
of education. More fundamentally, a crucial issue which we hope to shed some light on is 
whether the rapid expansion of school enrolments such as those promoted in low-income 
countries, might have contributed to a stagnation or even fall in the quality of education, and 
could probably explain its lack of growth effects. Although this seems to be the case in South 
Africa where van der Berg (2007) shows that policies that led to expansion of education access 
for black students after apartheid (both by the allocation of more resources to black schools 
and increasing enrolments for black students across the country) did not close the student 
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achievement gaps between black and white students after a decade, it is not known to what 
extent such policies have affected the quality of education in the African context.  
 
In this section we attempt to present a simple framework which may be used to 
approximate determinants of the quality of education. We focus on some factors which have 
been identified in the literature to have a direct or indirect association with learning outcomes. 
Our aim is to contribute to the debate on whether development policies which focussed on 
enrolments might have had unintended consequences on the quality of education as observed 
in South Africa by van der Berg (2007) and other low-income countries by the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2018). This approach departs from the standard ones which have focussed on 
assessing the impact of education policies on access to education (quantity) mainly through 
increasing school enrolments. These studies have also ignored an important aspect of these 
policies (expansion of schooling) which that such policies might have led to excessively fast 
growth in school enrolment rates, but which are not matched by a proportionate increase in 
resources, leading to a deterioration in learning conditions and an ultimate decline in the quality 
of education. This is one possible explanation why education measured by enrolments does not 
appear to be correlated with growth. As mentioned above, van der Berg (2007) shows for South 
Africa that expansion of access to education for blacks in South Africa did very little to close 
gaps in learning achievements between black and white students, all things considered. The 
2018 World Development Report argues that the massive expansion of schooling in low-
income countries has been nothing short of impressive over the past five decades, with few 
parallels in history and globally but it has left millions of pupils behind – learning outcomes 
have remained low – but offers little empirical explanations why millions of children with more 
access to schooling than before have been left behind. Answers to this question can have 
important policy significance in helping low-income countries target better national 
development policies towards more effective programmes and activities. 
 
An important implication of the expansion of school enrolments is that, for any given 
level of efficiency, the quality of education may fall if excessive growth of school enrolments 
is not matched by an appropriate increase in resources. An excessive growth in enrolments, 
which is not matched by additional resources, can lead to poor learning conditions such as 
overcrowding in classrooms, insufficient provision of learning and teaching materials 
(textbooks and sanitation facilities), overworking of teaching staff which can lead to limited or 
absence of attention provided to individual learners (pupils), shortage of classrooms, all of 
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which are central to learning and achievement of educational outcomes. Therefore, to maintain 
the quality of education, expansion of school enrolments should be accompanied by more 
resources for investments in teaching and learning materials, training and deployment of more 
teachers and provision of appropriate infrastructure. In studying this issue, a cross-country 
implication is that, as the number of pupils enrolled in schools increases and that their 
educational achievements will be influenced by the existence of a conducive learning 
environment, we expect that in countries where massive expansion of access is not supported 
by an increase in resources the quality of education will be lower.   
 
To try and capture the extent to which governments provide resources to maintain the 
quality of education, we include total public spending on education as a share of total 
expenditure. We also include an indicator of the quality of institutions to measure government’s 
strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions to 
government services, to capture the ability of the government to maintain educational 
efficiency, which in turn influences educational quality. Two indicators of institutional quality 
are relevant and are added to the right-hand side of the model - ‘constraints on the executive’ 
and ‘bureaucratic effectiveness’. To capture systematic changes which happen overtime in 
factors such as nutritional status of pupils, grading standards on the examinations, distributional 
of schools, management styles and other variables not included in our model (mainly for lack 
of data), we include the time dummies as regressors. Also, as an additional indicator to capture 
the schooling and learning conditions which matters for the quality of education, our indicator 
is the pupil-to-teacher ratio (PTR), measured as the average number of pupils per teacher in 
primary school. Higher absolute values of the PTR denote a deterioration in schooling and 
learning conditions. The data for this variable is obtained from the World Development 
Indicators (2018).  
 
Our empirical strategy to test this hypothesis draws upon the methodology used by 
Duraisamy et al. (1997) who examine a possible trade-off between quantity and quality as a 
result of an increase in enrolments in India, Baldacci et al. (2003) who analyse the drivers of 
educational quantity, Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) who examine the link between primary 
education and public spending and others and specify an estimating model of the following 
linear functional form:  
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𝐻𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑖𝑡
1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑜 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                (3.6) 
 
where our dependent variable (𝐻𝑖𝑡
2), is measured as 5-year forward moving average of 
repletion rates measured as the percentage of students who are forced to repeat grades at all 
levels of primary education (as before), 𝑃𝑖𝑡
0 , is the share of public expenditure on education in 
total public spending, which measures how much the government allocates towards the 
education sector, 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of the number of pupils to one teacher, our indicator of the 
schooling conditions, and the rest of the variables are as defined before. The regressions also 
incorporated country- and time-specific fixed effects to account for unobservable heterogeneity 
and also to minimise a possible problem of omitted variable bias. One potential limitation of 
this approach was our inability to account for individuals’ attributes (such as parents’ 
education, IQ scores, etc) in a cross-country set up. 
 
The parameter of primary interest in this estimation equation is 𝛽1, the coefficient on the 
variable which measures primary school enrolment rates (defined net of repetition rates). If our 
hypothesis that expansion of school enrolments may have adversely impacted education quality 
is true, the estimated value of 𝛽 is expected to be positive (because of the inverse measurement 
of quality). This relationship has policy relevance for low-income countries, which have 
emphasised development policies that favour enrolments over quality. Like we have stated on 
public spending on education, the policy implication in studying this relationship is that 
although increasing schooling is critical for growth, merely expanding school enrolment rates 
may not be enough to achieve this objective, improving the quality of learning may be central 
as well.  
 
The regression results for equation 3.6 are displayed in Table 3.9.  In columns (10) and 
(11) we focus on the role of expansion of primary school enrolment, changes in school and 
learning conditions, the quantity of resources provided to maintain the quality of education and 
the role of institutions in maintaining educational efficiency and quality of education. In 
columns (12) and (13), we provide an alternative specification in which we assess an alternative 
measure of institutional quality ‘bureaucratic effectiveness’ and the rest of the variables of 
interest. The last two columns, (14) and (15), present findings when both measures of 
institutional quality are included, plus the rest of the variables, to assess the robustness of our 
findings. 
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Table 3.9. Possible determinants of education quality [equation 3.6]  
Estimation method OLS FGLS OLS FGLS OLS FGLS 
Explanatory variables (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Constant  -14.29*** -8.22* -18.71*** -6.24 -16.06*** -5.003 
 (3.22) (1.73) (6.05) (1.090) (4.820) (0.740) 
Primary school enrolment   0.107***  0.062**  0.177***  0.086***  0.167***  0.085**  
  (4.000)  (2.140)  (6.590)  (2.650)  (6.020)  (2.380) 
Total expenditure on education   0.101   0.073   0.049   0.102   0.031   -.0129  
  (0.820)   (0.540)  (0.390)  (0.610)   (0.250) (0.74)  
Pupil-to-teacher ratio  0.356***  0.378***  0.235***  0.355***  0.194**  0.367***  
  (7.340)  (6.910)  (3.450)  (4.380)  (2.420)  (4.000)  
Executive constraints   0.090   -0.089    -0.251 -0.376 
  (0.230)   (0.250)    (0.520)  (0.680) 
Bureaucratic effectiveness   -3.723*** -1.616 -4.205*** -1.185 
   (4.55) (1.080) (4.700) (1.030) 
Observations  149 149 101 101 94 94 
R-squared 0.4518  0.5471  0.5740  
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the 5-year average of repetition rates at primary level. White-corrected standard errors are in 
parentheses. Time-fixed effects which are expected to affect growth are included where appropriate to reduce potential 
problems of omitted variables (Temple, 1999). All estimations including the pooled OLS are done with heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation (White) robust standard errors with t-values reported in the parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 
1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
 
Our results across the different specifications as reported in Table 3.9 indicate that, 
holding other things constant, expansion of primary school enrolments is negatively correlated 
with educational quality37. The estimated coefficient suggests that every 1 percentage point 
increase in the rate of primary school enrolments, leads to a fall in the quality of education by 
between 0.06 and 0.18 percentage points. In other words, the proportion of pupils who are 
forced to repeat grades at all levels of primary education increases by between 0.06 and 0.18 
percentage points for each percentage point increase in enrolments. This finding has important 
policy implications, that growth-promoting strategies which have focussed on expanding 
access to education in low-income countries have been successful at getting more children in 
schools, yet these policies may have compromised the quality of educational human capital.   
 
Our results also appear to suggest that public resources allocated to the education sector 
have not contributed to maintaining or improving the quality of education in low-income 
countries. The estimated coefficient indicates that public spending has a negative impact on the 
quality of education although this effect is not statistically significant. This ambivalent finding 
could perhaps arise from the possibility that annual public spending on education has not 
matched with the spending requirements for the excessive growth in school enrolments or 
 
37 Note that our educational quality indicator, repeater rates, rises as educational quality deteriorates therefore, 
larger classes and larger enrolments, as in Table 3.7, are associated with a significantly higher repeater rate and 
thus a lower quality of education. 
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resources allocated to the educational sector have not been effectively used to maintain 
educational quality.   
 
The next issue we examine is the impact of changes in learning conditions on the quality 
of education. As documented by the World Bank (1997: p.2), because education systems in 
low-income countries always depend heavily on public resources, and because of severe 
budgetary constraints, rapid and sustained expansion of enrolments leads to sharp declines in 
schooling and learning conditions. Assessing whether this in turn has had a negative impact on 
the quality of education, our regression results provide strong evidence that schooling 
conditions measured by pupil-teacher ratios are negatively correlated with the proportion of 
pupils who repeat grades at primary education level. The estimated coefficient suggests that a 
1 percentage point reduction in pupil-teacher ratio is associated with an increase of between 
0.19 and 0.38 percentage points in the number of repeaters. 
  
Finally, our results from this analysis indicate that improving conditions of learning 
such as the pupil-teacher ratio, in addition to other complementary inputs like provision of 
learning and teaching materials, and improving the quality of institutions, especially 
bureaucratic effectiveness, can contribute towards better quality of education. These 
preliminary findings also point to the possibility that policies that have strongly focussed on 
expansion of school enrolments may have compromised quality, confirming the scepticism 
about education quantity expressed by the World Bank’s 2018 World Development Report. 
 
3.5.4 Robustness checks 
 
To check the robustness of the results obtained in the previous section, particularly the 
findings on the differential effects of the shares of primary, secondary and tertiary education 
spending, the importance of quality of education in understanding the impact of education and 
the role of institutions of governance in this process, we introduce year-dummies into equation 
3.4 to capture time-specific fixed effects, whose exclusion in our earlier estimations may have 
led to omitted variable bias. The results are reported in columns (16), (17) and (18) of Table 
3.10. Equation 3.4 is also re-estimated by examining how the estimated coefficients on the 
variables of interest behave when time-specific fixed effects, a different measure of 
institutional quality is employed (constraints on the executive) and also accounting for the 
macroeconomic environment, proxied by the annual rate of inflation. The findings from a 
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modified specification that incorporates these factors are reported in columns (19), (20) and 
(21). Given the surprising nature of the results of some of our key variables, we also conduct 
further robustness checks by dropping one set of education variables, in particular enrolments, 
to assess whether the coefficients on the other variables are affected. These tests are not formal 
but are based on our view that there could be a problem of multicollinearity. The re-estimations 
of the affected variables are reported in Table 3.8 and Appendix 3.3. As can be noted, the main 
results on these variables of interest are not sensitive to the different specifications and, thus, 
our conclusions do not change but remain substantially similar to those reported in Tables 3.6, 
3.7 and 3.8. 
 
Table 3.10. Robustness checks of key explanatory variables  
Estimation method OLS FGLS 2SLS OLS FGLS 2SLS 
Independent variables (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
Constant    3.551 3.212 6.243 3.907  5.397 
 (1.07) (1.27) (0.93) 1.19  (0.81) 
Physical investment (K) 0.051** 0.037*** 0.046* 0.051** 0.035*** 0.045*  
(2.32) (3.09) (1.93) (2.33) (2.94) (1.91) 
Labour supply (L) -0.624** -0.321 -1.228** -0.630** -0.332 -1.353***  
(2.17) (1.42) (2.52) (2.21) (1.46) (2.85) 
Public spending on primary education -0.044 -0.027 -0.051 -0.047 -0.030 -0.038  
(1.15) (1.28) (0.80) (1.24) (1.40) (0.59) 
Public spending on secondary education  0.023 0.016 0.014 0.026 0.018 0.024  
(0.610) (0.71) (0.19) (0.67) (0.81) (0.34) 
Public spending on tertiary education  -0.009 -0.002 -0.004 -0.018 -0.008 0.022  
(0.24) (0.09) (0.07) (0.48) (0.35) (0.37) 
Primary school enrolment rates 0.010 0.019** 0.007 0.009 0.021*** 0.006  
(0.86) (2.59) (0.61) (0.76) (2.72) (0.51) 
Secondary school enrolment rates -0.006 0.014 -0.015 -0.006 0.017 -0.018  
(0.40) (1.17) (0.72) (0.38) (1.42) (0.88) 
Tertiary school enrolment rates -0.010 -0.012 -0.029 -0.015 -0.011 -0.016  
(0.29) (0.48) (0.71) (0.42) (0.40) (0.41) 
Human capital quality (repeaters) -0.087** -0.116*** -0.085** -0.087** -0.122*** -0.082**  
(2.47) (5.74) (2.52) (2.48) (6.16) (2.48) 
Democratic accountability  0.027** 0.019*** 0.048***     
(2.42) (2.98) (3.20)    
Constraints on executive actions    0.032*** 0.021*** 0.058*** 
    (2.88) (3.26) (3.89) 
Initial level of income -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
(2.95) (3.44) (3.51) (2.98) (3.71) (3.72) 
Budget balance -0.009 -0.008 0.047 -0.016 -0.008 0.052  
(0.26) (0.63) (1.36) (0.50) (0.66) (1.49) 
Inflation rate    0.001* 0.001 -0.002 
    (1.72) (0.69) (1.57) 
Year dummies  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations  164 159 115 164 159 115 
R-squared 0.4631  0.5441 0.4767  0.5638 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
Endogeneity tests 
   
   
153 
 
Durbin score 
  
0.693   0.6855 
Wu-Hausman 
  
0.822   0.8199 
Tests of overidentifying restrictions 
   
   
Sargan 
  
0.737   0.5158 
Basmann 
  
0.8099   0.6349 
Notes: The dependent variable is measured as 5-year forward moving averages of the annual growth rate of GDP and all 
control variables are measured as annual observations (see Table 3.2). Our estimators are OLS with white-corrected standard 
errors, FGLS correcting for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and 2SLS. Time-fixed effects which are included where 
appropriate to reduce potential bias caused by omitted variables (Temple, 1999). All estimations including the pooled 
OLS are done with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (White) robust standard errors with t-values reported in 
the parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
. 
 
3.6 Qualitative Results: Zambia case study  
 
The quantitative analysis we have conducted in the previous section indicates that there 
is a weak link between investment in human capital as measured by common indicators, in 
particular school enrolments including public spending on education (whether as aggregate 
measures or shares of public spending on primary, secondary and tertiary levels). We have 
explored the importance of the quality of education for growth and further developed in section 
3.5.3 in relation to its drivers, albeit the current findings are very tentative. Several suggestions 
have been made to shed some light on the causes of the weak correlations but at macro level 
studies are not unanimous on the causes of the low education impact, making it difficult to 
draw robust policy conclusions, as much depends on country-specific situations which go 
beyond the econometric findings. Our aim in this section is to try and add a detailed country-
specific situation and gain more insights into the causal factors which may underlie the low 
education impact as suggested by our regression analysis, by examining a case study of 
Zambia. As indicated earlier, in this section we adopt a different approach mainly based on 
qualitative analysis using data from interviews conducted with officials in government 
ministries, national assembly (parliament) and office of the Auditor General, and a review of 
several publicly available policy and budgetary documents provided by the Cabinet Office, 
ministries of finance (MoF) and general education (MoGE), Central Statistical Office (CSO) 
and the World Bank Zambia office, during the periods 11-29 June 2018 and 7-21 January 2019. 
 
Zambia falls in the lower middle-income range of the World Bank’s classification of 
countries based on income levels, with per capita income that has averaged about US$1,523 
since 2010s and is a mineral dependent country. In terms of the performance of the economy, 
our focus in this study, this has generally improved in the last three decades, with the average 
per capita GDP growth rate increasing from the negative performance of -1.7 percent and -1.4 
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percent in the 1980s and 1990s respectively, to an annual average of 4 percent in the 2000s 
before declining to 2.3 percent per year since 2010. The lack of significant growth in per capita 
real GDP has happened in spite of religiously implementing development strategies that 
focussed on improving education. As can be observed from Table 3.11, Zambia has shown 
increasing willingness to invest in education since independence: school enrolments have 
increased considerably since the 1970s, especially at primary level in comparison to secondary 
and tertiary, in line with World Bank conventional wisdom of prioritising primary education; 
Public expenditure on education, as a share of the national budget, has been favourable 
(increased between 1970s and 1980s but fell to 9.2 percent during the economic crisis of the 
1990s but has improved to an average of almost 20 percent since 2010, the largest single share 
of the national budget (according to the World Development Indicators, the African average is 
16.5 percent since 2010). These patterns in school enrolments and public expenditure on 
education suggest that Zambia has been willing to invest in education to promote economic 
development. The country has also experienced progression in terms of institutions of 
governances with the spread of democratic practice, increased constraints on the executive but 
very minimal improvements in bureaucratic effectiveness, as can be observed at the bottom of 
Table 3.11.   
 
According to ‘endogenous growth theory, investment in education is expected to lead 
to a higher rate of economic growth. In Zambia, in spite of government increased investment 
in education and a more favourable political environment, the quality of education (as 
measured by the repetition rates) has fallen from 1.7 percent in the 1970s to 5.7 percent since 
2010. Figure 3.3 shows that the growth rate of per capita real GDP (economic growth rate) 
remained low during the 1970s up to the 1990s, albeit being significantly unstable, improved 
markedly during the 2000s but has been falling since 2010. These findings the qualitative 
approach appear to confirm our findings from the quantitative analysis, in particular that 
investment in education does not necessarily lead to better economic conditions. The objective 
here is to identify causal factors which may help to explain why the relationship is often weak. 
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Table 3.11: Zambia. Trends in major educational and governance indicators  
 10-year averages 
School enrolments (% of population age group) 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Since 2010 
Primary school enrolments 91.0 94.6 85.8 98.8 105.4 
Secondary school enrolments 14.5 17.8 20.3   
Tertiary school enrolments 1.4 1.7 2.2  4.0 
      
Education quality       
Proportion of repeaters at primary  
(% of students enrolled in primary school) 1.7 1.7 4.4 6.6 5.7 
      
Public expenditure on education      
Educational expenditure (% of budget) 21.3 28.6 9.2 10.6 19.7 
Shares of expenditure (% of educational spending)      
Primary level 40.6 40.8 38.0 59.5  
Secondary level 33.4 33.4 17.8 17.9  
Tertiary level 16.8 16.4 23.4 21.1  
      
Institutional quality (units)      
Democratic accountability (Polity IV) 0 0 4 5 7 
Constraints on the executive 0 1 5 5 5 
Bureaucratic quality (government effectiveness) - - -1.00 -0.82 -0.60 
      
Source: World Development Indicators (2018), Polity IV database and World Bank Governance Indicators (2018)   Note: All 
our institutional variables are based on public perception scores: democratic accountability is measured on scale of -10 (very 
weak democratic accountability) and +10 (very strong democratic accountability); constraints on the executive on a scale of 0 
(very weak restrictions of decision-making powers) and 7 (very strong restrictions) and bureaucratic quality on scale of 0 (very 
poor capacity for policy formulation and implementation) and 4 (very strong capacity).  
 
We suggest that this is due to three factors. In Zambia, as in many countries in Africa: 
1) public spending on education is sub-optimally allocated and is not adequately rationalised 
to make a positive contribution to effectively to human capital accumulation (learning); 2) 
education policies have emphasised school enrolments (quantity) which matters less than the 
more potent education quality; and 3) institutional reforms have not provided a robust 
environment which can sufficiently propel education spending to generate human capital and 
economic growth.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the government in Zambia has have followed the World Bank’s 
conventional wisdom38, by increasingly allocating more fiscal resources towards the education 
 
38 The World Bank has often supported, through its lending programmes in low-income countries, policies 
which stress investment in education, especially primary level (World Development Reports 1991; 2018).  
 
156 
 
sector with most of them being spent on primary education (see Table 3.11). Public spending 
on primary and secondary levels of education, which between them constitute over 70 percent 
of the entire allocation to the education sector, is allocated along three broad categories: 1) staff 
and teacher salaries; 2) grants to schools for education materials; and 3) capital spending for 
construction and upgrading of school infrastructure. A review of the budgetary allocations and 
financing towards these education inputs suggests there are serious structural imbalances which 
have lived on from independence. Increasingly, a disproportionately large share of public funds 
allocated to education, averaging about 70 percent between 1980 and 2017, is devoted to staff 
and teacher salaries, and too little is left for purposes that are central to education but cannot 
be undertaken without the provision of funds. There have been very limited efforts made since 
the 1970s to break this structural imbalance in resource allocation. What is even more 
disturbing is that a large part of the increments to education spending over the past several 
years have been utilised to improve teacher salaries and employ more teachers. This is similar 
to what the World Bank has found in other developing countries where “teacher salaries absorb 
more than 80 percent of education budgets” (World Development Report, 2018: p.173). 
Because very little is devoted to inputs that are strong predictors of human capital accumulation 
(student learning), coupled with massive expansion of school enrolments, there have been 
serious shortages of complementary inputs like textbooks, teaching and learning materials, 
libraries and other learning materials for several years. Partly as a result of poor allocation of 
public funds, in Zambia it is estimated that five students at primary school level share less than 
one textbook for each subject, five students at secondary level share between 1 and 1.5 
textbooks (World Bank: Zambia PETS39, 2015: p.4). Thus, these imbalances have certainly 
contributed in undermining improvements in the quality of education, which according to our 
analysis is an important determinant of the growth rate of an economy. It is, therefore, not 
unreasonable to expect public spending on education in a low-income country like Zambia to 
have little positive impact on growth when allocations are biased against expenditure on key 
educational inputs that directly affect student learning, and thus human capital development. It 
is also the case in Zambia and other developing countries that education may have a weak link 
with economic growth because of the low demand for human capital due to lack of private 
sector dynamism which has led to no jobs for educated workers.  
 
 
39 PETS is the World Banks Expenditure Tracking and Service Delivery Survey conducted for Zambia in 2015) 
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The second issue we wish to consider is the quantity versus quantity. Our quantitative 
findings indicate that the quality of education is a more potent as a driver of economic growth 
than the quantity (enrolments). In Zambia, as in many low-income countries, government 
policies have put strong emphasis on schooling and access to education and most of the policies 
implemented since the 1960s have placed undue focus on enrolments. At independence on 24th 
October 1964, Zambia inherited a relatively “weak educational profile with just about 100 
university level graduates, under 1,000 people with secondary school level education” and 
more than half of the population of about three-and-a-half million aged below 15 years with no 
access to education (Musambachime, 1990: p.82). The government recognised early on that 
the new country was not adequately prepared to meet the development challenges of the post-
colonial era and placed the expansion of education high on the list of priorities. Investment in 
formal education was thus seen as a means through which requisite skills, competences and 
abilities necessary to foster economic development could be developed. In its various 
development plans and other development strategies the government emphasised access to 
education as key to economic development. For instance, the Transitional National 
Development Plan (1965) emphasised universal primary education, the First (1966-70) and 
Second (1972-76) National Development Plans placed emphasis on increased enrolments at all 
levels of education, and in the Fourth National Development Plan (1989-93) this policy goal 
was clearly captured by the following caption:  
 
“[I]ncreasing access to education will remain a priority because the government attaches great 
importance to education due to its central role as a means of imparting the skills needed for 
national development” (GRZ, 1989: p.298).   
 
Other key policy reforms within the sector have included the abolition of racial 
segregation in schools, introduction of free education, rapid expansion of education 
infrastructure and training and recruitment of teachers. These reforms were made possible by 
a favourable economic environment due to favourable copper prices (the country’s main 
foreign exchange earner). As reported in Table 3.11, the emphasis on investments in education 
in Zambia, supported by the growth in government expenditure on education, have resulted in 
improvements in some of the quantitative indicators such as school enrolments rates and 
improved school infrastructure and the number of teachers. However, student learning 
outcomes (here measured by repetition rates), which according to our econometric analysis 
matter for the quality of education and human capital accumulation, and a strong predictor of 
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economic growth, have deteriorated and remained persistently low since the 1970s. This is 
evident in both national patterns as well as student test scores. The data shows that the quality 
of education, measured by repetition rates, declined from an average of 1.7 percent in the 
1980s, reaching its peak of 6.6 percent in the 2000s before improving slightly to 5.7 percent 
since 2010. Student learning measured by the results in national learning assessment in math, 
English and science at grade 5 and 9 with all scores falling below the benchmark score of 40 
percent in the period 1999-2014. The expansion in school enrolments particularly after the 
1980s appear to have coincided with the deterioration in quality (see Table 3.11), which is 
consistent with our preliminary findings in section 3.5.3: that in Africa the massive expansion 
in school enrolments may have compromised the quality of education and human capital 
accumulation, which on our analysis negatively affects growth. The picture that emerges from 
student scores based on cross-country tests also shows similarly worrying patterns of low 
quality of education. For instance, there has been no improvement in student scores in English, 
maths, science and the country’s local languages at grades 5 and 9, with the average scores 
falling below the benchmark passing score of 40 percent. Between 1999 and 2014 national 
scores in maths increased marginally from 34.3 percent to 35.3, while for English score fell 
from 33.2 percent to 31.4 percent (World Bank, 2015). The Southern and Eastern Africa 
Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality40 ranked Zambia as the second lowest on 
student achievement in 2007, and this has not changed as confirmed by the World Bank’s 2015 
Educational Sector Public Expenditure Tracking and Service Delivery Survey in Zambia report 
(World Bank, 2015).   
 
Many respondents interviewed for this study do not see Zambia having suitable policies 
that are conducive for improving the quality of education. Apart from the negative effects of 
poor resource allocation and utilisation, and massive expansion other factors brought to the 
fore during our interviews (as possible causes of the weak link between spending, quality and 
growth) included weak implementation of policies and management of public resources which 
undermines the effectiveness of the education policies. In spite of the presence of approved 
policies and spending allocations such as grants to schools for education activities to ensure 
student learning, this is undermined by schools that are supposed to receive school grants from 
the government not receiving the grants in full. For instance, 30 percent of schools did not 
 
40 The Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality is an association of 16 
African ministries of education established in 1993 as a research and training institution, to monitor and assess 
educational quality, and provide policy-based research advice to member states. 
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receive any government school grants to support the free primary education policy in 2013 
(World Bank, 2015). This is exacerbated by schools often being unaware of how much they 
are supposed to receive, and weak or poorly functioning institutions of governance. Several 
reports, including the Auditor General’s reports for various financial years, have also shown 
that the link between education spending and outcomes has been broken because funds have 
not reached the targeted schools and have not been spent on intended education activities. 
When funds are diverted from education activities that are central to student learning this can 
have significant implications for human capital accumulation. For instance, although the full 
amount budgeted for textbooks in 2013 of K42 million was funded to the ministry of Education 
in Zambia, actual spending was reported as K8 million significantly lower than the amount 
budgeted because funds were partly diverted to procure vehicles and furniture for the newly 
appointed minister and other senior officials (MoE, 2016; World Bank, 2015).  
 
The 2016 report of the Zambian Auditor General claims that misapplication of public 
funds has been a major cause of financial leakages and has been on the rise since the 1990s. 
Reports for the period 2010-2016, show that in Zambia almost one-third of the grants allocated 
mostly to rural primary schools including funds for school operations were diverted towards 
district operations. The report also highlights significant failure to follow procurement 
procedures, failure to account for public funds and delays in implementing projects as the top 
three causes of poor performance in the MoE. The World Bank’s 2016 Education Sector Public 
Expenditure Tracking and Service Delivery Survey in Zambia reports that 28 percent of 
primary schools and 70 percent of secondary schools reported having not received a school 
grant between 2013 and 2014. The report further shows that in addition to delays or failed 
delivery of school grants, many schools experience shortages of textbooks, desks and chairs, 
staff, and building maintenance, and of these issues, textbook shortages are the most serious in 
Zambia. It is, therefore, possible to find no association between education expenditure, human 
capital and economic growth under these circumstances, simply because public resources are 
not used on education activities, and thus fail to contribute towards student learning. This is a 
micro-level illustration of the well-documented problem of fungibility of spending (see for 
example, Devarajan and Swaroop, 1998). However, to fully develop this element of the story 
goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
The final issue requiring further discussion in the context of low education impact in 
Zambia is the role of institutions. We shall focus here on the impact of institutions created to 
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promote policymakers’ accountability, leaving on one side the broader measures of 
institutional quality examined earlier in the chapter. Since the beginning of the structural 
adjustment process in the 1980s, it has been an argument of reformers – and the World Bank 
in particular – that strengthening institutions that promote accountability is key to improve the 
effectiveness of macroeconomic policies (World Bank, 2003). Zambia has made effort in 
creating institutions of governance aimed at ensuring that there is prudent and effective 
utilisation of public resources. These reform initiatives, supported by aid donors and have also 
sprung up all over Africa and have involved entrenching the powers to ensure public 
accountability in the utilisation of public funds, in offices such the Auditor General (AG) and 
Public Accounts Committees of Parliament (PAC), among other institutions. Aid donors and 
civil society organisations expect that these institutions would be effective in ensuring 
accountability on policymakers and have a significant positive impact directly on economic 
performance or indirectly through their impact on the effectiveness of public expenditure. Our 
econometric evidence has consistently signalled that the quality of institutions has a direct 
positive effect on long run growth, but only bureaucratic effectiveness appears to propel the 
effectiveness of education expenditure in promoting long-run growth. Other forms of 
institutional governance like constraints on the executive, which the AG and PAC were created 
to represent emerge as insignificant drivers of public spending on education. 
  
The mission of the AG, which draws its mandate from the Constitution of Zambia, is 
to “independently and objectively provide quality auditing services in order to assure our 
stakeholders that public resources are being used for national development and wellbeing of 
citizens.”  (http://www.ago.gov.zm/images/OAG_Strategic_plan.pdf). The AG was initially 
obliged by the Constitution to conduct annual audits since 1994 but its portfolio has expanded  
to include value for money or performance audits. However, there is very little evidence that 
the establishment and strengthening of AG and PAC has had any impact either on economic 
growth (as shown in Figure 3.3) or on the efficiency of public expenditure in Zambia. First, 
because the activities of these institutions on government accountability were initially very 
limited during the seventeen years of one-party rule (1972-91) because the one-party system 
created some institutional limitations due to the supremacy of the party in government – 
including limiting accountability, transparency and good governance. With progress in 
democratic practice it was that Zambia would adopt a much more democratic and transparent 
system of governance which would espouse the principle of accountability. In spite of being 
strengthened after 1991, the AG and PAC still remain deficient in the enforcement of effective 
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accountability because they lack a proper mechanism for sanctioning non-observance of 
accountability standards. Some commentators describe such shortcomings in the exercise of 
oversight responsibilities as institutional mechanisms for accountability that lack the means to 
ensure enforcement (Burnell, 2001; 2002). Thus, the attainment of multi-party rule has not 
delivered since 2001, in the territory of ‘voice and accountability’, the degree of institutional 
change that was hoped for, and the deterioration  in the country’s growth performance over the 
majority of years since dominant-party rule was replaced by multi-party government in 2006 
may have something to do with this (see Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3. Zambia: chronology of democratic changes and growth of GDP per capita (1964-2017) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2018), freedomhouse.org, www.elections.org.zm 
 
The common things which often come out of the AG and PAC reports, are much the 
same pictures of glaring financial irregularities in the public sector, but which are not followed 
up with sanctions for any misbehaviour. As a consequence, ministries have mustered the art of  
manipulating the financial system for private benefit or unproductive purposes because it’s 
expected that they will not face any stringent sanctions beyond just being cited in the audit or 
parliamentary report. Specifically, for the MoE, PAC observed in 2017 that the financial report 
for the Ministry was the worst that PAC had witnessed in that year. The Ministry had applied 
funds meant for the implementation of key programme namely: early childhood education to 
unintended programmes. The AG lamented that the MoE lacked discipline and that it had a 
tendency of failing to produce documents required during audits. At political level, although 
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the Ministry of Finance has repeatedly promised to take a tougher line against erring ministries, 
there appears to have been very little effective action over the past few decades. More effective 
financial accountability could lead to improvements in policy outcomes, through reductions in 
misallocations, misuse and misappropriation of scarce public funds, however, for politicians 
with vested interests in retaining political power there are advantages in maintaining the status 
quo. This has severely compromised the control process.  
 
In terms of other institutional reforms, in Zambia improvements in the country’s 
political institutions by formal adoption of electoral competition has had little effect on policies 
because democratic rules are imperfectly respected and policy choices largely depend on 
patron-client relationships. Other institutional reforms have included, inter alia, civil service 
reforms to improve government bureaucratic efficiency and effectiveness, constitutional 
reforms aimed at strengthening the oversight role of Parliament and public sector financial 
reforms to promote accountability in the use of public resources. Thus, while a strengthening 
of the formal institutional mechanisms of accountability is necessary, in the case of Zambia we 
find some evidence that it may not be sufficient for the installation of greater financial 
accountability that is crucial in promoting the effectiveness of policy. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the objective was to understand whether investment in human capital, 
including public expenditure on education, is effective in promoting economic growth and how 
it can be improved since it has been given a place of pride in the theoretical literature by the 
2018 Nobel Prize winner, Paul Romer, and other ‘endogenous growth theory’ advocates. The 
focus on education rather than on all human capital is because it is education that has been 
credited in the theoretical literature as a key element in human capital accumulation and 
therefore growth especially in developing countries. The international development community 
has encouraged developing countries to invest in education human capital because it has been 
considered one of the major “economically and socially productive investments”. Thus, 
investment in education has been a central part of the development strategies of most 
developing countries 
 
Although the rationale for the economic importance of investment education human 
capital is theoretically appealing, the empirical evidence on the growth impact of education has 
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been surprisingly weak. As can be observed from Table 3.3, there are as many studies reporting 
a negative or insignificant linkage between education and growth as there are those reporting 
a positive one. What is particularly disturbing is that studies that have properly analysed the 
robustness of the findings are sceptical in tone, suggesting that the original ‘endogenous 
growth’ hypothesis has severe difficulties defending its claims. 
 
 In this chapter, we examine the possibility that although aggregate measures of 
education spending may not emerge as significant correlates with growth, some of the 
categories of education spending may differentially affect growth as suggested by the World 
Bank and others. We also draw attention to an issue which has recently attracted international 
attention and debate – and has led to an apparent shift in World Bank policy on human capital 
from more enrolments to more learning – that the quality of education, which has been 
underexplored in the literature, is crucial for development. Our indicator of human capital 
quality (repetition rates) being used as the second-best option due to data limitations on other 
more ideal measures such as test results in our sample. The significance of this study is it could 
perhaps help low-income countries focus more of their scarce resources on development 
strategies that are more effective in buoying long-run growth and avoiding those that 
inappropriately drag growth down. 
 
These ideas are tested empirically using a simple ‘endogenous growth’ framework on 
a sample of 42 African countries between 1980-2016. To make our results comparable to 
previous studies, we rely on the robust ordinary least squares, feasible generalised least squares 
(a variant of the GLS estimator) and the instrumental variable two-stage least squares 
estimators, with time- specific fixed effects where appropriate. 
 
Our findings provide no evidence that increasing public spending on education and 
expanding school enrolments are associated with economic growth. Further, the analysis of 
disaggregated data on education spending levels could not validate the World Bank’s 
conventional wisdom that prioritising primary over secondary and tertiary levels of education 
can be associated with higher per capita real GDP growth rate. Tentatively, public spending 
across all the three levels appears to be more effective in promoting growth in countries with 
higher bureaucratic effectiveness, but not democratic accountability or constraints on the 
executive. We find strong evidence that improving the quality of education provides a clear 
boost to economic development, much more than merely expanding school enrolments 
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suggesting that focussing on universal education is important, but not sufficient and must be 
complemented with the goal of improving quality. Our preliminary findings also point to the 
possibility that policies that have strongly focussed on expansion of school enrolments may 
have compromised quality, confirming the scepticism about education quantity expressed by 
the World Bank’s 2018 World Development Report. The policy implication of this finding is 
that improving schooling conditions and strengthening institutions of governance can improve 
the quality of education and propel its growth effects. 
  
More insights were gained into these issues by considering the case of Zambia, which 
shows that the government has followed development strategies promoted by development 
agencies (World Bank policy) since independence in 1964. Public expenditure on education 
has increased significantly since the 1990s and school enrolments, especially at primary level 
have expanded massively. However, the quality of education has remained persistently low 
and slowly declining, whereas the growth rate of per capita real GDP does not show a 
significant link to changes in education variables – perhaps confirming the apparent lack of 
association between spending, school enrolment and growth. Insights were also obtained on 
factors which may underlie the low education impact: inefficiencies in managing public 
resources, including disproportionate allocation of scarce resources to wages/salaries versus 
other educational inputs leading to widespread lack of the necessary teaching and learning 
materials; failure to send resources designated for specific areas to those areas.; and educational 
quality has been compromised by a failure to recognise that growth in enrolment cannot 
effectively deliver better learning unless complementary inputs such as teaching materials, 
additional teaching staff and maintenance of school buildings are delivered at the same time: a 
problem which in Zambia has been compounded by weak budgetary discipline and switching 
of such resources away from the areas to which they had been destined. 
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Appendix 3.1: Regression studies of human capital and educational expenditure as drivers of growth (selection) 
Study  Sample and period Education variable Estimation method Measurement of variables Main finding 
Educational human capital and growth 
1. Landau (1983) 96 countries 
1961-72 
Primary and secondary school 
enrolments; percent of 20-24-year-
olds in higher education 
Cross-section analysis OLS 
and 2SLS 
Average annual growth rates Growth is positively related to investment in education 
2. McMahon (1987) 30 African countries (1970-
85) 
Primary, secondary and higher 
education 
OLS 5-year time periods Investment in primary and secondary education has a 
positive effect on growth 
3. Romer (1989) 112 countries 
1960-85 
1960 level of literacy (initial level) OLS and Instrumental 
Variables 
Annual observations measured in 
current prices 
Initial level of literacy predicts subsequent rate of 
investment, and indirectly, the growth rate 
4. Azariadis and Drazen (1990) 71 low- and middle-income 
countries  
1960-80 
Literacy among the population 
above 10 years old 
OLS Annual observations measured in 
current prices 
Literacy rates is positively related with growth in middle- 
and low-income countries, but not in high-income  
5. Barro (1991) 98 countries 
1960-85 
1960 primary and secondary 
enrolment rates 
Pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) 
OLS and weighted least 
squares 
Annual average observations Initial school enrolment rates (in 1960) are positively 
related with real per capita GDP growth rate 
PTR for primary has a negative relation, PTR for secondary 
is insignificantly related with growth 
6. Mankiw et al. (1992) 3 samples (98, 75 and 22)  
countries  
1960-85 
Working-age population in 
secondary school (15-24 years) 
OLS Cross-sectional regression, data 
averaged over 1960-85  
The measure of human capital accumulation enters 
positively and significantly in all three samples 
7. Levine & Renelt (1992) 119 countries  
1960-89 
1960 primary and secondary 
enrolment rates 
OLS and Extreme Bound 
Analysis 
Cross-sectional data set Out of 42 variables only 2 are robust and educational  
enrolments are none of the robust ones 
8. Barro & Lee (1994) 85 countries 1965-85 
95 countries 1975-85 
Average years of 
secondary schooling  
Seemingly unrelated 
regressions 
10-year cross-sectional analysis Male (female) secondary education has a positive (negative) 
effect 
9. Benhabib & Spiegel (1994) 78 countries 
1965-85 
Average years of schooling of adults 
age 25+; adult literacy rate 
OLS Cross-section, data averaged over 
1960-85 
Human capital emerges insignificant and negative. 
10. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) 
1960-2000 Male and female secondary and 
higher education, 
Seemingly unrelated 
regression with country 
random effects 
Cross-sectional analysis for 2 
periods: 1965-75 and 1975-85 
Male secondary and higher education positively impact 
growth 
11. Durlauf & Johnson (1995) 98 countries  
1960-85 
Primary and secondary school 
enrolment rates; adult literacy rate 
(all measured at 1960) 
OLS Annual averages The measure of human capital has a positive but 
insignificant coefficient 
12. Lee & Lee (1995) 17 high-income countries 
1970-85 
1970 science scores of secondary 
school students, primary and 
secondary school enrolments 
OLS  Cross-section, data averaged over 
1970-85 
Science scores have positive effect. Primary and secondary 
school enrolment rates are positive but insignificant. 
13. Barro (1996) 100 countries  
1960-90 
Average years of schooling at 
secondary and higher school at start 
of each period 
OLS and seemingly unrelated 
regressions 
10-year averages for two periods 
and 5-year for one period 
Male schooling at secondary and higher levels, but not at 
primary, predict economic growth. Female schooling at 
various levels is not significantly related to growth 
14. Collins & Bosworth (1996) 88 countries 
1960-94 
1965 average years of schooling of 
adult population 
OLS Cross-section, data averaged over 
1960-94 
Schooling does not enter significantly in the regressions on 
its own 
15. Easterly and Levine (1997) African, Latin American 
and East Asian countries 
1960-90 
Average years of schooling at 
beginning of each decade  
Seemingly unrelated 
regressions 
10-year averages Schooling has a positive and significant impact 
16. Sala-i-Martin (1997) 1960-92 1960 primary school enrolment rate OLS and Extreme Bounds 
Analysis 
Cross-sectional regression Primary school enrolment rates are not significantly 
 correlated with growth 
17. Kelly (1997) 73 countries 
1970-89 
School enrolment rates OLS Cross-section averaged over 1970-
89 
The coefficient on school enrolment variable is consistently 
positive but generally insignificant  
18. Bloom, Cunning and Gupta 
(1998) 
18 African and 59 non-
African countries 
1965-90 
1995 years of secondary schooling OLS 10-year averages over 1960-90 Direct effect of schooling on economic 
growth is insignificant 
19. Bloom and Sachs (1998) 65 countries 
1965-90 
Years of secondary schooling 25-year cross-section   
20. McMahon (1998, 2000) East Asian countries 1965 primary, secondary and tertiary 
gross enrolment rates 
 5-year average of growth rates Primary and secondary impact positively and tertiary 
enrolment rates negatively 
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21. Temple (1999) 78 countries 
1965-85 
Average years of schooling Least trimmed squares Cross-section of averaged data for 
the period 1960-85 
Strong correlation between increases in human capital and 
output growth 
22. Bils & Klenow (2000) 93 countries 
1960-90 
Gross school enrolments and 
average years of schooling 
OLS with White-corrected 
standard errors 
Annual observations  Schooling explains less than one-third of economic growth  
23. Hanushek &Kimko (2000) 31 countries 
1960-80 
Barro and Lee’s average 
years of schooling (of 
adults age 25+) in 1960 Average 
score on internationally 
comparable math and science tests 
OLS  Both education variables are 
significant when entered alone; only test scores are 
significant if both entered 
24. Pritchett (2001) 1960-85 Average years of schooling of adults 
age 25+ 
OLS/IV 5-year averages No effect of any education variables on GDP growth 
25. Krueger & Lindahl (2001) 68 countries 
1965-85 
Change in years of schooling. Initial 
(1965) average years of schooling 
OLS/IV Cross-section with data averaged 
over the period 1965-85 
Both initial education and change in education have 
significant and positive impacts 
26. Stroup & Heckelman (2001) 44 African and Latin 
American countries  
1975-89 
Average years of adult 
male educational attainment 
Fixed effects approach  5-year averages Education has a positive effect on growth 
27. Bassanini & Scarpetta (2001) 21 OECD countries 
1971-98 
Average years of education of the 
working age population 
  Positive and significant impact of human capital 
accumulation on output per capita growth 
28. Hoeffler (2002) 1960-90 Average years of secondary 
schooling of adult males, age 25+ 
OLS and GMM 3SLS with IV 5-year averages 
10-year averages 
Education has no significant effect in most specifications. 
Adult males’ years of secondary 
education have a positive and statistically significant impact 
on economic growth 
29. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004) 
1960-96 Primary, secondary and 
higher education gross 
enrolment rates in 1960 
Bayesian averaging of OLS 
estimates 
 Primary enrolment in 1960 has significant and robust 
impact on subsequent growth rates 
30. Hoover & Perez (2004) 107 countries  
1960-89 
Average years of primary and 
secondary schooling 
OLS with white corrected 
standard errors 
Cross-sectional data set  No robust or statistically significant impact of  years of 
schooling on growth rate 
31. Bloom et al. (2006) 1960-90 Change in years of schooling. Years 
of schooling, 1960 
OLS/FE 10-year averages Education variable has a significant and positive impact on 
growth rate 
32. Gyimah-Bempong & Wilson 
(2004) 
(1960-2000) average numbers of years of higher, 
secondary, and primary education 
completed by 
the adult population (25 years or 
older) 
Dynamic Panel Data estimator 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
5-year averages Education-only human capital, including higher education, 
have positive and statistically 
significant effect 
33. van der Berg (2007)      
34. Hanushek & 
Woessmann (2008) 
1960-96 Years of schooling, 1960. Mean 
score, internationally significant if 
both entered 
comparable tests 
OLS  Years of education is significant if 
entered alone; only test scores are significant if both entered  
Public spending on education and growth 
35. Landau (1986) 65 low income countries 
1960-80 
Total investment in education Pooled OLS Lagged 3-year averages The level of government educational spending is not 
correlated directly with growth or indirectly through 
generating actual education 
36. Levine and Renelt (1992) 119 countries 
1960-89 
   Government spending on education is not robustly 
correlated with growth rates 
37. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 100 countries 
1970-88 
Spending on education OLS Cross-section (averaged over 19 
years) 
Educational expenditure as a share of the economy is 
insignificant  
38. Devarajan, Swaroop & Zou 
(1996) 
43 low income countries  
1970-90 
Sectoral government expenditure, 
including educational spending 
Pooled OLS, and an 
alternative OLS with fixed 
effects 
Five-year forward moving average 
dependent variable vs annual 
observations for controls 
Education expenditure is negatively associated with growth 
39. Perotti (1996) 1970-88 Average share of government 
expenditure on education in GDP 
OLS and 2SLS Cross-section   
40. Miller &  Russek (1997) 39 countries  
1975-84 
Total spending on education (% of 
GDP) 
OLS, fixed and random 
effects 
Annual data Educational spending is negative for developing countries 
and positive for developed countries. It is negative for the 
whole sample 
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41. Kelly (1997) 73 countries 
1970-89 
Average ratio of education 
expenditure to GDP 
OLS Cross-section averaged over 1970-
89 
Educational spending fails to exhibit a significant 
relationship with growth 
42. Kneller et al. (1999) 22 high-income countries 
1970-95 
Educational expenditure as part of 
productive public spending 
OLS, fixed and random 
effects, instrumental variables 
5-year averages of all variables Productive expenditures have a significant positive 
coefficient 
43. Zhang and Casagrande 
(1998) 
69 countries  
1970-85 
Educational subsidies  OLs and 2SLS Cross-section data averaged over 
1970-85 
Increasing education subsidies has a positive effect on 
growth 
44. McMahon (1998, 2000) East Asian countries 1965 primary, secondary and tertiary 
expenditures in GDP 
 5-year average of growth rates Secondary and higher education spending show 
significantly favourable effects. Primary  education 
expenditures are negatively related to growth rates 
45. Haque (2004) 33 developing 
Countries 
1980-97 
 OLS with error correction 5-year forward-moving 
averages of dependent  
variable 
 
46. Baldacci, Clements, Gupta & 
Cui (2004) 
120 low income countries 
1975-00 
Education spending (% of GDP) Fixed-effects (LSDV), FGLS, 
2SLS, sys-GMM 
5-year averages An indirect positive and significant effects of  educational 
spending on outcomes 
47. Adam and Bevan 
(2005) 
45 developing 
Countries 
1970–99, 
Level effects of public spending on 
education 
 5-year 
Averages 
 
48. Gupta et al. (2005) 39 developing 
Countries 
1990-2000 
Level effects of public spending on 
education 
 Annual observations for all 
variables 
 
49. Keller (2006) 40 Asian countries 
1971-2000 
Expenditures on education as a share 
of GDP 
OLS with White’s 
heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors 
10-year lagged averages  Primary education spending is significantly positive, while 
spending on secondary education is unfavourable among 
low-income countries and insignificantly negative globally 
50. Bose, Haque & Osborn 
(2007) 
30 low income countries 
1970-90 
Total spending on education  Seemingly unrelated 
regression 
10-year averages Government investment in education and total expenditure 
on education are significantly associated with growth 
51. Blankenau, Simpson & 
Tomljanovich (2007) 
23 developed countries 
1960-00 
Total public education spending  Pooled OLS with two-way 
fixed effects where 
appropriate 
5-year average of the dependent and 
independent variables 
Public expenditure on education negatively influences 
growth rates except when the impact of crowding effects is 
considered 
52. Mo (2007) 1960-85 Share and growth of education 
expenditure in GDP 
OLS with white-
heteroscedasticity standard 
errors 
5-year averages Negative and significant? effect of educational expenditure 
on growth 
53. van der Berg (2007) South Africa  
1999-2000 
   Despite massive shifts of fiscal resources to black schools, 
qualitative educational attainment differentials did not 
reduce 
54. Ghosh & 
Gregoriou (2008) 
15 developing 
Countries 
1970-99 
Education expenditure (% of total 
expenditure) 
OLS 5-year forward-moving 
averages of LHS 
variable 
Expenditure on education has a negative effect on long-run 
economic growth rate 
55. Baldacci, Clements, Gupta 
and Cui (2008)\ 
118 developing countries 
1971-2000 
Education spending (% of GDP) Fixed-effects (LSDV), FGLS, 
2SLS, sys-GMM 
Current and lagged 5-year averages 
for all variables to reduce 
measurement error 
Education spending has an indirect impact on growth 
through its positive effect on education human capital 
56. Miyakoshi et. al (2010) Japanese prefectural 
governments 
1981-2002 
Share of education spending in total 
government expenditure 
Fixed effects Annual observations Educational spending has negative effects on GDP growth 
57. Alfonso & Jalles (2013) 155 countries 
1970-2008 
1960-2000 
 LSDV, IV-GLS, GMM Non-overlapping 5-year averages Positive and significant impact of educational spending on 
growth 
58. Bojanic (2013) Bolivia  
1940-2010 
Share of education spending in total 
expenditure 
GMM Annual observations for all 
variables 
Positive but insignificant correlation between educational 
spending and growth.  
59. Eggoh, Houeninvo & Sossou 
(2015) 
49 African countries 
1996-2010 
Aggregate public spending on 
education as percentage of GDP 
OLS corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and GMM 
Cross-sectional and panel data 
analysis 
Public expenditures on education has a negative impact on 
economic growth 
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Appendix 3.2: List of countries in our sample 
  
1 Angola 
2 Burundi 
3 Benin 
4 Burkina Faso 
5 Botswana 
6 Central African Republic 
7 Cote d'Ivoire 
8 Cameroon 
9 Congo, Dem. Rep. 
10 Congo, Rep. 
11 Comoros 
12 Cabo Verde 
13 Ethiopia 
14 Gabon 
15 Ghana 
16 Guinea 
17 Gambia 
18 Guinea-Bissau 
19 Kenya 
20 Lesotho 
21 Madagascar 
22 Mali 
23 Mozambique 
24 Mauritania 
25 Mauritius 
26 Malawi 
27 Namibia 
28 Niger 
29 Nigeria 
30 Rwanda 
31 Sudan 
32 Senegal 
33 Sierra Leone 
34 Eswatini 
35 Seychelles 
36 Chad 
37 Togo 
38 Tanzania 
39 Uganda 
40 South Africa 
41 Zambia 
42 Zimbabwe 
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Appendix 3.3: re-estimations of human capital and growth equations 
Explanatory variables 1 2 3 
Constant  -9.710*** -4.879*** -6.049*** 
 (4.650) (2.860) (2.270) 
Physical investment (K) 0.028** 0.071*** 0.055*** 
 (2.220) (3.890) (4.440) 
Labour supply (L) -0.201 -0.288** 0.027 
 (0.960) (2.390) (0.250) 
Primary enrolments 0.000   
 (0.020)   
Secondary enrolments  -0.012   
 (1.110)   
Tertiary enrolments 0.095***   
 (3.820)   
Primary expenditure   -0.083***  
  (3.360)  
Secondary expenditure   -0.043  
  (1.550)  
Tertiary expenditure   -0.042  
  (1.620)  
Repeaters   -0.079*** 
   (7.230) 
Democratic accountability 0.018** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
 (2.210) (2.740) (2.590) 
Initial income level -0.0002** 0.0002*** 0.000 
 (2.290) (4.770) (0.400) 
Budget balance  0.033 0.024 0.033 
 (1.010) (1.130) (1.530) 
Year dummy 0.091*** 0.074*** 0.039** 
 (4.680) (2.930) (2.320) 
Observations  367 357 622 
R-squared 0.2681 0.2931 0.2513 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Chapter 4 
 
The political economy of fiscal deficits in developing countries 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In this last core Chapter of the thesis, we bring together the tax and expenditure dimensions 
of fiscal policy to consider why fiscal deficits41 – the excess of public spending over revenue – 
have become common and getting out of control, especially in Africa. Chapter 2 is an analysis of 
the causes of low tax revenue performance and how effective systems of taxation and Chapter 3 
explores how to make investment in human capital more effective, both of which matter for a 
country’s fiscal balance. Fiscal discipline entails containing public spending within the bounds of 
domestic revenues (Collier, 1991) to promote macroeconomic stability, but often times 
expenditure outpaces revenues creating a negative fiscal imbalance – fiscal deficit. Policymakers 
and development agencies are profoundly concerned about large and persistent fiscal deficits 
because of their macroeconomic implications. A key link between fiscal deficits and the 
macroeconomy is how they are financed. It is recognised that “regardless of how they are 
financed”, large and persistent fiscal deficits (and by implication, public debt) can have 
considerable macroeconomic implications (Beaugrand et al., 2002; p.7). There is growing 
consensus in development circles that large and persistent have wider implications: considerable 
macroeconomic instability (inflationary spirals which hit the poor the most), loss of control over 
the budget when public debt becomes unsustainable, undermine a country’s ability to conduct 
prudent fiscal policy (ability to conduct effectively countercyclical fiscal policies), loss of investor 
confidence which negatively affects investment and the economy’s competitiveness (Alesina and 
Drazen, 1991; Cukierman et al., 1992; Neyapti, 2003). Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993: p.211) 
have observed that fiscal deficits which emerged in the 1970s and intensified during the 1980s 
were blamed for the “unsustainable public debt, weak government finances, high inflation rates 
 
41 Our measure of the fiscal deficit or balance is government revenues minus expenditure, and is considered a summary 
measure of the extent to which government is putting financial resources in the economy or utilising financial 
resources generated by the economy or from abroad.  
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and slow or the lack of economic development” in developing countries. Recently, the IMF, the 
leading agency on global fiscal matters, has advised that “fiscal discipline is essential for economic 
performance, macroeconomic stability and reducing fiscal vulnerabilities” (IMF, 2007: p.3).   
 
Until the 1970s, fiscal deficits were a tolerable occurrence because they were only incurred 
in exceptional circumstances such as wars or recessions, and countries would run surpluses during 
booms or peace times to pay for previous deficits, and this helped to keep them in check. John 
Maynard Keynes formalised this argument in his “General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money” in which he argued that during recessions when income and employment fall, 
governments will run deficits or turn to borrowing to raise consumption (and boost aggregate 
demand) or provide unemployment reliefs, as a necessary. However, even Keynes acknowledged 
that deficits were only short-term policy instruments for stabilisation and would lead to chronic 
inflation if they prolonged. Thus, fiscal policy during this period, mainly promoted by Washington 
institutions in developing countries, was confined to short-term macroeconomic stabilisation and 
income distribution. However, analysts begun to reconsider these views as many countries entered 
a period of stagflation, large and persistent deficits which could no longer be explained by the 
Keynesian school of thought.  
 
Data shows that low-income countries have on average run more frequent and larger fiscal 
deficits than high-income countries. In Africa some countries have experienced more frequent 
episodes of fiscal deficits over prolonged periods than others. Although global initiatives of the 
1990s towards fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability managed to bring down fiscal deficits 
until the 2000s (see Figure 4.1), but especially in Africa and the Middle East deficits have become 
increasingly common since the global economic crisis of 2008 and are getting out of control. An 
important issue for researchers and policymakers is to understand why fiscal deficits are frequent 
and what causes them to get out of control. For some while, analysts and international development 
agencies have sought to analyse and tackle this issue, and these efforts have culminated into 
making fiscal discipline a key element of the IMF and World Bank supported structural adjustment 
programmes in low-income countries. 
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The literature on the drivers of fiscal deficits, which mainly comprises cross-country 
regressions, has identified several factors. Some studies based on the ‘tax smoothing’ hypothesis42 
argue that deficits are expected when there are temporary changes in government spending and 
economic activity to avoid the distortionary effects of tax increases (Barro, 1979: Lucas and 
Stokey, 1983). Other studies explore the impact of political attributes such as different types of 
political regimes – multiparty coalition, minority and short-lived governments. A popular belief 
among these studies is that economies governed by weak governments tend to be associated with 
larger deficits (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Edin and Ohlsson, 1991). There are also studies 
considering if existence of an independent central bank can also be an important player for pushing 
for fiscal discipline due to the long-term connection between deficits and inflation, which central 
banks are more concerned about (Bodea, 2013: p.82). Fiscal deficits have also been associated 
with the myopic behaviour of governments because politicians when in office have strong 
incentives to optimise their behaviour within a short-term perspective by running large deficits in 
order to please the electorate and maximise their chances of being re-elected (Nordhaus, 1975; 
Rogoff, 1990; Alesina and Tabellini, 1987; Alesina and Perotti, 1995). A key finding within this 
‘political business cycle’ literature is that deficits are caused by re-election motivated political 
parties and leaders who manipulate fiscal and other policies to stay in power to advance their 
political and private objectives.  
 
Our point of departure is that we go beyond just identifying the determinants of fiscal deficits 
as is common in previous studies, to explore factors which may contribute towards fiscal discipline 
and prevent deficits from getting out of control. This study attempts to break new ground in relation 
to previous work, by examining ‘political business cycles’ and fiscal deficits in a comprehensive 
and systematic way: explore their incidence, the extent to which post-election cutbacks 
counterbalance pre-election boosts and also allow for country heterogeneity by considering 
whether their intensity depends on the relationship with aid donors as claimed by some studies and 
 
42 The ‘tax smoothing’ theory of optimal fiscal policy is credited as the theoretical foundation of how to think about 
fiscal policies, including deficits. Tax smoothing literature makes a distinction between permanent and temporary 
changes in government spending and economic activity and asserts that governments should adjust tax rates only when 
there are permanent changes in government spending by spreading tax distortions over time, otherwise they should 
finance any temporary changes to government spending and economic activity by running deficits.  
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natural resource endowments. This approach gives us a complete and better characterisation of the 
relationship between ‘political business cycles’ and fiscal deficits than previous studies.  
 
The literature has also recognised that natural resource endowments can undermine fiscal 
discipline and lead to occasional catastrophic loss of fiscal control because fiscal policy in natural 
resource economies is directly linked to the use and management of resource revenues (Adam et 
al.,2003). Recent development literature has stressed that countries with large resource 
endowments face a complex range of fiscal management issues both on the revenue and 
expenditure sides of the fiscal balance: lower domestic tax effort from non-resource tax bases and 
which reduces the incentive for public scrutiny of government (Gupta, 2014); inability to 
effectively tax powerful mining and other natural resource companies which damages the 
perception of equitable treatment between taxpayers and therefore, tax capacity; inappropriate 
fiscal policies and weak absorptive and investment capacities lead to wasteful, unproductive or 
uneconomical projects with no bearing on economic diversification and growth; score very poorly 
in terms of linking short- to medium-term spending plans to clear long-run economic plans; and 
the weak ability to resist political demands for increased public spending during booms. Although 
clearly central to fiscal policy and development in Africa, the question of how natural resource 
endowments can damage fiscal discipline has been the subject of remarkably limited empirical 
work focussing on hydrocarbon exporters. Our study contributes to the literature by attempting to 
analyse the short- to medium-term effects of larger amounts of natural resource revenues on the 
fiscal balance, and to illustrate how poor management of natural resource revenues and their 
susceptibility to boom-bust cycles can contribute to the loss of fiscal control using a typical natural 
resource-intensive African country. 
 
The third and final issue we consider is, what kind of policies and institutions can play a 
major role in preventing fiscal deficits from getting out of control in Africa? The literature has 
recognised that strong institutions can serve as powerful tools of restraint and deliver good fiscal 
performance (Collier, 1991). Both domestic and external institutions can help ensure government 
accountability and prevent the leakage of public; increase the efficiency of public spending (as we 
found in Chapter 3) and improve the prospects of achieving and maintaining fiscal sustainability 
(Dabla-Norris et al., 2010: p.3). During the past few decades, several developing countries have 
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made some steps towards institutional reforms which have essentially involved a shift towards 
improved institutions of governance (Morrissey and Stewart (eds), 1995). Most of the research on 
domestic institutions and fiscal policy has focussed on fiscal rules, central bank independence and 
the quality of budgetary institutions (IMF. 2012). Efforts to strengthen fiscal control and foster 
fiscal discipline have also featured quite prominently in donor technical assistance and IMF-
supported structural adjustment programmes in the past decades. According to Easterly and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (1994), restoring fiscal discipline and reducing fiscal deficits has been central in 
most donor-supported reform programs adopted in many developing countries. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that domestic institutions and the relationship between aid donors and 
recipient countries will be important determinants of the size of the fiscal deficit, and needs to be 
factored in any analysis of fiscal deficits in poor countries such as those in Africa. In this chapter, 
we focus on bureaucratic effectiveness and the capacity to control corruption as measures of 
domestic institutions, and the share of official development assistance as an indicator of the 
relationship between donors and recipient countries. Aid donors have for several decades financed 
a large part of development and recurrent expenditure of poor countries, and through aid allocation 
and conditionality attached to it, donors have had (or at least expected to have) influence on fiscal 
performance. However, a huge number of studies are sceptical about the link between aid and 
reforms in developing countries, but not much has been documented on why aid sometimes does 
not induce strong fiscal discipline in recipient countries. 
 
As in the previous core chapters, the empirical approach is ‘qual-quant’. Following existing 
literature, we begin by specifying a dynamic model representing the essence of the ‘Nordhaus-
type’ opportunistic behaviour, but then include measures of the effects of natural resource 
endowments over the short- to medium-term and the impact of domestic and external institutions. 
Our estimating regression model is specified in a dynamic form to account for the strong inertia 
associated with fiscal variables. The baseline model is first estimated as a single equation using 
robust OLS and two-way fixed effects estimators with White standard errors which can address 
biases caused by autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, whilst at the same time controlling for 
country-specific and time-specific unobserved heterogeneity to minimise any effects that may arise 
from omitted variable bias. We then estimate a system of equations by the instrumental variable 
estimator three-stage least squares (3SLS) to try and address any simultaneities and reverse 
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causality in the model. In the final section, we employ a qualitative approach mainly using 
scatterplots for case study of Zambia to highlight particularities of causation which do not emerge 
properly from the regressions. The data is primarily from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook databases. The statistical package used in our 
estimations is Stata/IC 14.2. 
 
4.2 Variations in fiscal performance  
 
The latest data from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook, shows that 
there are variations in fiscal deficits across income groups, geographical regions and within income 
and regional groups. As can be noted from Figure 4.1, which shows fiscal balances as a share of 
GDP, on average fiscal deficits43 have been larger and more frequent in developing than in 
developed countries over the past few decades (1980s-2015). In other words, during the period 
between 1980 and 2005, on average governments in developing countries ran more expansionary 
fiscal policies than developed countries. Other notable trends from these groups of countries are 
that fiscal deficits have fluctuated more widely in developing than developed countries and that 
there were marked improvements from the mid-1990s until the global financial crisis of 2007/8.  
As can be observed from Figure 4.1, except for the 2007/8 global financial crisis, several other 
important global economic phenomena – black Monday, Latin American currency crisis and Asian 
financial crisis – do not appear to have had any significant effect on fiscal deficits in both advanced 
and developing countries.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 The fiscal deficit is estimated as government expenditure (net of aid flows) less government tax and nontax 
revenue as a share of GNP, as published by the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database.  
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Figure 4.1: Fiscal balances in developing and advanced countries (1980-2016) 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook database (IMF, 2017) 
Note: The classification of countries into developing and advanced is based on the IMF classification by the level of development. 
The graphs reflect averages for selected countries for which data was available and do include all eligible countries in each category. 
Major economic crises represent episodes which simultaneously affected a large number of countries. 
 
Figure 4.2 shows fiscal trends according to geographical regions since the early 1990s. 
Again, even here there are noticeable variations across regions. Although most countries were 
negatively impacted by the global financial crisis, the biggest deterioration in deficits over the past 
decade has been observed in the Middle East from a surplus of 10.6 percent of GDP in 2006 to a 
large deficit of almost 10 percent in 2016 and Africa from a surplus of 4.8 percent to a deficit of 
4.5 percent of the same period.   
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Figure 4.2: Fiscal balances by geographical regions (1991-2016) 
 
*Source: World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2018). The annual rate of change has been calculated by the author using IMF data.  
Notes: Fiscal performance figures reported in here represent decade long averages between 1991 and 2016. Note: The classification 
of countries by geographical region is based on the IMF classification. The graphs are based on annual data as published by the 
IMF. 
 
An examination of data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook for selected sub-Saharan 
African countries in our sample, which are reported in Table 4.1, also reveals that there are cross-
country variations even within this group. Firstly, few countries in the sample reported here entered 
the 1980s with strong fiscal positions (surpluses or low fiscal deficits). Secondly, eleven out of 
thirty-three African countries were able to reduce their fiscal deficits over the decades 1990/99 to 
2010/17, achieving significantly low end-period deficits or even recording surpluses, yet twice as 
many experienced a deterioration in fiscal balances over the same period. As reported in Figure 
4.2, deficits in the Africa region are among the fastest growing globally since 2006. Finally, it is 
quite striking that fiscal deficits have protracted for decades in nineteen out of thirty-one countries 
in Africa, suggesting that lack of fiscal discipline may be a serious problem in certain countries. 
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Table 4.1: Fiscal balances in selected African countries (decade averages) 1980-2017 
 Country 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010sa 
Annual rate of 
change, 2008-2017b 
 Angola  -2.9 0.8 -0.5 -0.2 
 Benin 0.9 -0.9 -2.2 -3.2 -0.6 
 Botswana   1.1 -0.3 0.6 
 Burkina Faso -0.6 -2.4 -2.3 -3.7 -0.4 
 Burundi  -2.5 -8.2 -4.5 -0.5 
 Cabo Verde  -10.6 -6.0 -7.0 -0.2 
 Cameroon   4.4 -3.5 -0.7 
 Cent. Afr. Rep. -3.5 -4.3 -0.5 -1.9 0.0 
 Chad  -3.7 -2.5 -1.7 -0.4 
 Comoros -6.1 -3.2 -2.1 3.3 0.3 
 Congo, DR  -1.1 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 
 Côte d'Ivoire  -1.3 -0.9 -3.1 -0.4 
 Eswatini 1.0 0.1 -0.5 -4.2 -0.8 
 Ethiopia -4.0 -4.8 -4.2 -2.0 0.0 
 Gabon  -2.3 7.6 0.8 -1.3 
 Gambia   -1.4 -4.4 -0.5 
 Ghana -1.8 -4.9 -3.7 -6.7 0.2 
 Guinea  -2.4 -2.4 -3.7 -0.2 
 Guinea-Bissau  -1.9 -4.0 -2.4 -0.1 
 Kenya -3.4 -4.3 -1.9 -6.4 -0.4 
 Lesotho 0.9 1.7 3.0 -2.1 -1.1 
 Madagascar -6.7 -5.1 -3.1 -2.4 0.0 
 Malawi   -3.0 -4.5 -0.4 
 Mali   0.4 -2.6 -0.1 
 Mauritius   -4.1 -3.0 0.0 
 Mozambique -7.0 -2.6 -3.3 -5.4 -0.1 
 Namibia  -2.0 0.1 -5.8 -0.8 
 Niger  -3.5 1.7 -4.5 -0.7 
 Nigeria  -1.1 1.8 -2.6 -1.1 
 Rwanda  -5.9 -0.3 -2.1 -0.3 
 Senegal  1.7 -1.5 -3.9 0.1 
 Seychelles -0.2 -3.4 -3.5 1.7 -0.8 
 Sierra Leone   -0.9 -5.3 -0.5 
 South Africa   -1.0 -4.4 -0.4 
 Tanzania  -1.9 -2.1 -3.2 0.1 
 Togo -2.9 -4.5 -1.5 -5.7 0.1 
 Uganda  -1.2 -1.2 -4.2 -0.1 
 Zambia -3.8 -4.8 -4.6 -7.2 -0.7 
 Average (for above countries)   -1.1 -3.2 -0.4 
*Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (2018). The annual rate of change has been calculated by the authors using IMF data.  
Notes: Fiscal performance figures reported in the first three columns represent decade averages between 1980 and 2017. Where 
there are data limitations, the decade averages have been calculated based on the data available in that decade. a Data in column 
2010/17 is averaged over eight years. b The annual rate of change represents the annual percentage increase (or decrease) in the 
fiscal deficit during the period 2008-2017.   
 
In summary, these data show that on average fiscal deficits are more prevalent in developing 
countries than developed countries; there are variations even across geographical regions with sub-
Saharan Africa, the content with the largest concentration of natural resource dependent countries, 
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emerging with one of the worst deterioration trends in deficits since over the past decade. These 
developments are against the backdrop of Africa having experienced some of the most significant 
political developments over the last three decades, with many countries having transformed their 
governance structures to more democratic and competitive systems. Africa has also undergone a 
long process of economic reform, focusing on macroeconomic stabilisation and restoring fiscal 
discipline as a major component of this reform. The stylised statistics clearly demonstrate that 
despite the substantial progress made in economic and political reforms since the mid-1980s, many 
developing countries are now suffering from chronically recurrent large deficits. Although global 
and national efforts of the 1990s and 2000s helped to improve fiscal balances and led to significant 
progress towards macroeconomic stability and stronger economic growth, recent developments 
have revived interest in fiscal deficits. The re-emergence, and apparently widening fiscal deficits 
and the corresponding rise in public debt in many developing countries, warrants an investigation 
into the causes of such trends.  
 
4.3 Previous studies – A survey of the literature 
 
A deficit in a country’s budget reflects the fact that public spending has exceeded revenues. 
As mentioned earlier there is a huge literature on various causes of fiscal deficits, but because this 
chapter is about the political economy of deficits, we focus on the literature which points to 
features of politics that affect incentives to overspend. A growing political economy literature has 
developed theories to explain how political factors determine fiscal outcomes and has provided 
supporting empirical evidence; see, for example, Table 4.2. Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Persson 
and Tabellini (1997) also provide an excellent survey of this literature. These studies have 
identified channels such as political instability, government fragmentation, centralisation of 
authority in budgetary decisions and socio-political polarisation as drivers of deficits (Roubini, 
1991; Edin and Ohlsson, 1991; Blais et al., 1993; Woo, 2003). Other political economy studies 
aim to assess the conduct of fiscal policy around election time. In particular, the literature known 
as ‘political budget cycle’ models predicts that incumbent political leaders and parties tend to have 
strong incentives to choose or manipulate policy instruments so as to maximise their chances of 
re-election. This literature has evolved overtime mainly distinguishing between opportunistic 
models (Nordhaus, 1975) and partisan models (Hibbs, 1977). The opportunistic models assert that, 
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because politicians are in control of fiscal policy instruments which can affect economic 
performance, and because voters are myopic, they have strong incentives to manipulate such 
instruments in their favour around election time. The rationale behind these models is that chances 
of re-election strongly depend on the “existence of good macroeconomic conditions” (Schultz, 
1995: p.79). The partisan-type models of ‘political business cycles’ emphasise ideological 
orientation. These models claim that left-wing governments are inclined towards more income-
redistribution and expansionary policies than right-wing governments. The implication of 
‘political business cycle’ theories is that politicians will engage in expansionary economic policies 
and create cycles in fiscal and other macroeconomic variables during elections. However, because 
of the long-term cost implications of expansionary fiscal policies, it is expected that governments 
will counterbalance pre-election boosts with post-election cutbacks to bring down the deficits.  
 
Because of the detrimental effects that such policy manipulation and reversals might have on 
a country’s future economic prospects, there has been significant interest in this area since the 
1970s. Early studies prior to the 1990s focus on developed countries and largely reports very 
limited and weak evidence. A comprehensive review of these early studies is found in Alesina et 
al. (1997) and Drazen (2001). Our focus here is on recent studies, which have analysed this 
phenomenon in developed and developing countries from the 1990s mainly because this period 
covers important political developments in Africa – democratisation of the continent which has 
brought about more frequent and fairer elections. As can be observed from Table 4.2, studies show 
strong evidence of the existence of election-linked cycles in fiscal deficits in developing countries 
and ‘new democracies’44. One of the first studies focussing on fiscal policy instruments, 
Schuknecht (1996), shows evidence of expansionary fiscal policies during elections, with public 
expenditure being the more preferred policy than tax policy. The two studies which have 
systematically analysed African data are from the 1980s (Schuknecht, 1996) and 1990s (Block, 
2002) mostly covering periods when most of these countries were non-democratic and elections 
were not competitive, thus brining into question whether there was ‘real’ fiscal manipulation as it 
is now recognised in the literature that political business cycles are not encountered in political 
 
44 Other studies also focus on the manipulation of the composition of government spending which does not necessary 
affect the level (Rogoff, 1990; Bove, Efthyvoulou and Navas, 2016) and categories of tax instruments (Ehrhart, 2012; 
Ebeke and Ölçer, 2013). However, our focus is on the manipulation of the fiscal deficits. 
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systems where the incumbent is a ‘dominant party’ (Mosley and Chiripanhura, 2012: p.3) or is the 
only party as was the case in most African political systems prior to the 1990s.  
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Table 4.2: Selected studies on the determinants of fiscal deficits  
Author(s) Sample  Focus of study Political factor proxied 
by 
Estimation method Main finding(s) 
Schuknecht 
(1996) 
35 developing 
countries 
1970-1992 
PBCs and economic 
policies  
Election year dummy 
variable 
Fixed effects 
specification  
First paper to show that governments in developing 
countries engage in expansionary fiscal policies around 
elections, but such cycles are less significant in more trade-
oriented countries. they also show that certain types of IMF-
supported programme help to counteract fiscal  
De Haan and 
Sturm (1997) 
21 OECD 
countries 
1982-1992 
State weakness and 
fiscal outcomes 
 
Index of political 
cohesion, represented by 
the number of political 
parties in government 
Weighted least 
squares 
In contrast to the findings of Roubini and Sachs (1989a), de 
Haan and Sturm do not find a statistically significant 
relationship between the power dispersion index and fiscal 
outcomes. 
De Haan, 
Sturm and 
Beekhuis 
(1999) 
21 OECD 
countries 
1979-1995 
  
State weakness and 
fiscal outcomes 
 
Index of political 
cohesion, represented by 
the number of political 
parties in government 
 
Weighted Least 
Squares regressions 
No evidence that the number of political parties in coalition 
government is not correlated with fiscal outcomes, in 
contrast with previous findings of Roubini and Sachs (1989) 
and Edin and Ohlsson (1990). 
 
Schuknecht 
(2000) 
24 developing 
countries 
1973-1992 
Political business 
cycles in budget 
deficits 
Election year dummy 
variable 
Fixed effects 
estimator 
The main vehicle for expansionary fiscal policies around 
elections public expenditure rather than lowering taxes, and 
public investment cycles 
Sakamoto 
(2001) 
18 OECD 
countries 
1961-1994 
State weakness 
 
 
Minority governments, 
coalition governments, 
short tenure governments 
OLS with panel-
corrected standard 
errors 
The evidence shows that budget deficits are lower under 
weak governments (minority, coalition or less durable 
governments). 
Block (2002) 44 Sub-Saharan 
African 
countries 
1980-1995 
Political business 
cycles 
 
 
Election and post-
election year dummy 
variables 
 
OLS, Fixed Effects 
and GMM 
There is evidence of systematic electorally linked 
manipulation of fiscal and monetary policies in new 
democracies in Africa, and that the cycle is completed 
during the year after elections when deficits are smaller than 
normal. 
Block et al. 
(2003) 
44 sub-Saharan 
African 
countries 
1980-1999 
PBC-type policy 
manipulation 
Election year dummy 
variable, competitive 
elections and founding 
elections  
OLS, Fixed Effects 
and GMM 
PBC-type policy manipulations are smaller or non-existent 
in countries where elections are not competitive but are 
larger in countries with ‘founding elections’. 
Persson and 
Teballini 
(2003) 
60 countries 
1960-1998 
 Constitutional rules 
leading to different 
election systems and 
forms of government 
 The election cycle is significantly affected 
by the various constitutional rules 
Neto and 
Borsani (2004) 
10 Latin 
American 
countries 
1980-1998 
Political factors, 
institutions and 
fiscal policies 
Size of president’s party 
Ministerial stability 
Ideology of cabinet 
Electoral cycle 
GSL with standard 
errors corrected for 
panel data 
Evidence that elections cause deterioration in fiscal 
performance in Latin America. All the political variables 
were statistically significant 
Brender and 
Drazen (2005) 
68 DC and LDC 
countries;  
1960–2001 
PBCs in new and 
old democracies 
Election year dummy 
variable, democracy 
from Polity IV 
Fixed Effects on full 
sample and GMM on 
Evidence of a highly significant PBC in fiscal deficits in 
new but not in established democracies.  
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sub-samples of new 
and old democracies  
Shi and 
Svensson 
(2006) 
85 countries; 
1975–1995 
Causes of 
differences in size 
of PBCs 
Corruption, ICRG 
institutional quality 
index, 
and access to free media 
 
Fixed Effects and 
GMM 
PBCs in budget deficits are larger in developing countries 
but small or non-existent in developed countries. There is 
also evidence that PBCs are smaller in countries with strong 
institutional constraints on politicians and a large share of 
informed voters. 
Alt and Lassen 
(2006a, 
2006b) 
19 OECD 
countries, 
1989–1998 
Institutional 
transparency, 
political 
polarisation and 
PBCs  
Index of transparency of 
fiscal policy in Alt and 
Lassen (2006b) and 
measure of party 
polarization in Laver and 
Hunt(1992) 
GMM PBCs are larger in countries with low fiscal policy 
transparency and in more polarized developed countries. 
Brender and 
Drazen 
(2007) 
68 countries; 
1960–2001 
New and 
established 
democracies and 
PBCs 
Democracy variable from 
Polity IV 
Fixed effects PBC effect in total sample is caused by the elections in new 
democracies 
Barberia and 
Avelino (2011) 
18 Latin 
American 
countries 
1973-2008 
Democratic regimes  Democracy variable from 
Polity IV and Cheibub et 
al. (2010) 
Pooled OLS and 
GMM 
There is evidence of PBCs in Latin American democracies, 
but the study does not find a robust result, like Brender and 
Drazen, who argue that nascent democracies are more prone 
to PBCs. They also find evidence that PBCs are mainly 
present in tax revenues and not in deficits or expenditure.  
 
Klomp and de 
Haan 
(2013b) 
70 democracies 
1975–2005 
 Majoritarian system 
Parliamentary System 
Minority Governments 
Number of coalition 
parties 
 
GMM In industrial countries, the election effect is strongest under 
majoritarian electoral systems. In developing countries, the 
election effect is strongest under proportional electoral 
systems 
Ebeke and 
Ölçer (2013) 
68 low income 
countries 
1990-2010 
Fiscal rules and 
IMF sponsored 
programme 
Dummy variable if fiscal 
rules are adopted 
Dummy variable if IMF 
programme in place 
System-GMM In an election year government consumption expenditure 
increases leading to larger budget deficits. Post-election 
fiscal adjustment takes the form of higher tax effort and cuts 
to government investments. PBCs are lower where there are 
fiscal rules or participating in IMF programmes. 
Veiga, Veiga 
and Morozumi 
(2017) 
70 developed 
and developing 
countries 
1975-2010 
Election dummy for 
the year of election 
Democracies, 
excluding non-
democracies 
Media freedom (low, 
medium and high) 
 
Fixed effects and 
System GMM 
Budget deficits increase in elections years and this is driven 
by an increase in the recurrent component of government 
expenditure and not capital expenditure 
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Although the ‘political business cycle’ literature has improved our understanding of how 
political factors can affect government fiscal policy choices and outcomes, and how this can 
potentially exacerbate the risks of significant macroeconomic instability and fiscal 
unsustainability, important issues with possible policy implications still remain. One such 
significant issue is that it is typically assumed that politicians effectively implement the 
deflationary part of the ‘political business cycle’ to bring the deficits down and prevent them from 
prolonging. We, however, have very limited evidence on how symmetrical the reflationary and 
deflationary phases of the ‘political business cycles’ are and how long election-linked fiscal 
deficits take to come down. While re-election motivated incumbent political parties and leaders 
may have very strong incentives to engage in fiscal manipulation, it is reasonable to expect that 
the incentives they face when implementing the deflationary phase of the cycle may be different 
or even stronger. It is recognised that in fragile political environments, although it is easier to 
implement a pre-election boost to win the support of powerful constituencies, it is much more 
politically difficult to counterbalance such with drastic cutbacks or higher tax revenues (as we 
discovered in Chapter 2) because of the political weakness of governments and excessive 
politicisation of fiscal policies in developing countries (Snider, 1990: p.1263). Governments in 
politically fragile environments, face strong constraints in implementing austerity measures for 
fear of alienating the base and the potential political reprisals from voters and powerful interest 
groups on whom their stay in power or political stability depends. Huebscher et al. (2018) find 
evidence that the popularity of incumbent governments decreases when they “propose austerity”, 
especially spending cuts and can contribute to political instability. The existence of such political 
constraints can make it difficult to implement austerity measures which reduce the welfare of these 
groups, thus presenting African governments with an unpleasant choice of surrendering to the 
cycle and thus causing a temporary deficit to persist. However, for now this is just a proposition 
as we have very limited evidence concerning whether politicians are able to implement 
symmetrical deflationary measures or how long the deflationary phase take and what impact this 
has had on the ability to prevent temporary deficits from persisting. Our aim here is to try and 
contribute to this debate. We seek to explore the incidence of ‘political business cycles’, the extent 
to which post-election cutbacks counterbalance pre-election boosts and also allow for country 
heterogeneity since it has been recognised that ‘political business cycles’ are neither universal nor 
homogenous (Mosley and Chiripanhura, 2012) by considering whether the ability to finance a pre-
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election boost depends on the relationship between recipient countries and aid donors who finance 
a large part (more than 35 percent in some countries) of public expenditure as claimed by some 
studies or natural resource endowments. This approach gives us a complete and better 
characterisation of the relationship between ‘political business cycles’ and fiscal deficits than 
previous studies.  
 
The second issue we wish to explore is the relationship between natural resource 
endowments and fiscal deficits. It has been recognised in the literature that natural resource 
endowments can undermine fiscal discipline and lead to occasional catastrophic loss of fiscal 
control because fiscal policy in natural resource-intensive economies is directly linked to the use 
and management of resource revenues (Adam et al.,2003). Recent development literature has 
stressed that countries with large resource endowments face a complex range of fiscal management 
issues both on the revenue and expenditure sides of the fiscal balance (Crivelli and Gupta, 2014; 
IMF, 2013). Although resource endowments represent an opportunity for the government to 
increase tax revenues studies show that in practice a large share of resource revenue flows actually 
lowers the performance of non-resource tax revenues and this reduces the incentive for public 
scrutiny of government (Moore, 1998; Gupta, 2007; Bornhorst et al., 2008). Also, many 
governments of resource-intensive economies are unable to collect the taxes that natural resource 
companies owe for a number of reasons, inter alia, sub-optimal fiscal regimes and inability to 
resist threats from powerful mining and other natural resource companies not to be subjected to 
higher taxation (or else they threaten to leave), which damages the perception of equitable 
treatment between taxpayers and therefore, tax capacity (Crivelli and Gupta, 2014; IMF, 2013). It 
is also documented in the literature, and from our own experience working in the Ministry of 
Finance in Zambia, that although additional resource revenues represent an opportunity for 
government to finance higher current spending. Cuddington (1998), Lane and Tornell (1999), 
Alesina et al. (2008) and Sinnott (2009) show evidence that current tax revenues and royalties 
from natural resources and public expenditure increase during resource booms in developing 
countries. However, inappropriate fiscal policies and limited absorption and investment capacities 
often lead to wasteful spending typically on consumption, unproductive and uneconomical projects 
with no bearing on economic diversification and growth. This is well illustrated by the case of 
Chad, where 70 percent of the fiscal resources come from oil, but rather than translating into better 
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economic and human development, much of the revenues generated in the past decade (18 percent 
of the budget) have instead been spent on security services with the result of a growing debt stock 
and one of the lowest rankings on the human development index (184th). Gelb (1986) and Medas 
and Zakharova (2009) also show that additional resource revenues are typically spent on 
investments projects with a medium- to long-term completion period, higher wages for 
government workers and increased number of public sector workers. Management of resource 
revenues is further compromised by the fact that inflows are very unpredictable and volatile, and 
often create ‘boom-bust’ cycles with significant implications for budgetary planning and debt 
management (Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). A key issue for fiscal management is that during 
‘booms’, public spending rises to match current revenues but during ‘busts’, spending tends to 
remain elevated, thereby creating large deficits which may prolong for some time. These fiscal 
risks are exacerbated by the short-term nature of budget cycles. Although clearly central to fiscal 
policy and development in Africa, the question of how natural resource endowments can cause 
occasional loss of fiscal control has been the subject of remarkably limited empirical work and 
mainly focuses on oil exporters. Our study attempts to contribute to the literature by analysing the 
short- and medium-term effects of larger amounts of natural resource revenues on the fiscal 
balance. We also attempt to illustrate how natural resource endowments and their susceptibility to 
boom-bust cycles can contribute to the loss of fiscal control using a typical example of a natural 
resource-intensive African country. Our analysis focuses on the impact of the ‘boom-bust’ cycles 
created by natural resource endowments by exploring whether additional resource revenues that 
accrue to the government during booms help to cushion current fiscal deficits, but because of poor 
fiscal policies and weak management of these additional revenues, coupled with weak absorption 
and investment capacities, these additional resources are wasted on consumption and unproductive 
projects, and therefore over the medium term (2-3 years) revenues fall (as the boom disappears) 
and create fiscal deficits.  
 
The political economy literature has also shown that natural resource endowments tend to 
weaken or retard institutional development through various mechanisms (Ross, 1999: p.308; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). The theoretical literature shows that in a grabber-friendly 
environment, a greater amount of natural resource increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged 
in rent-seeking rather than productive activities, because natural resources “produce rents” (Collier 
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and Venables, 2010: p.1). Isham et al. (2005) argues that access to natural resources by the elite 
often suppresses voice and accountability, because governments that generate most of their 
revenues from natural resources are not constrained by the need to negotiate for domestic taxes. 
The literature has also singled out corruption as one of the most significant mechanisms through 
which natural resources can damage institutions (Bannon and Collier (eds), 2003). Because natural 
resource abundance diminishes the quality of institutions, weakens systems of checks and 
balances, limits the development of more democratic systems of governance and produces less 
accountable leaders and citizens (Ross, 2001), it is reasonable to expect a priori that they are likely 
to be negatively correlated with fiscal discipline and therefore, fiscal deficits. This has become one 
of areas of focus of international debate and therefore an important issue in this study.  
 
Finally, undeniably, the study of fiscal deficits cannot be complete without considering the 
major role played by domestic and external institutions in preventing fiscal deficits from getting 
out of control in Africa. Collier (1991: p.339) argues that these institutions can “protect public 
assets from depletion, prevent corruption, protect socially productive groups from exploitation and 
enforce contracts”. He further argues that at macroeconomic level domestic and external 
institutions play a major role in restraining public expenditure from outpacing revenues and deliver 
good fiscal performance. Until recently, standard macroeconomic theory had taken it for granted 
that governments had enough capacity to design and implement policies, yet several studies 
highlight the negative consequences of weak and poorly functioning domestic institutions on 
Africa’s underdevelopment (Sachs and Warner, 1997; Easterly and Levine, 1997; World Bank, 
1989; 2003). These issues have featured quite prominently in the development discourse (World 
Bank, 2003; Alence, 2004: p.164). On the domestic front, the political economy literature 
documents channels through which incentives to overspend, induced by factors such as the 
common pool resource problem and the political nature of fiscal policy as discussed above, can be 
mitigated. Institutional arrangements such as an independent central bank are examples of such 
institutions because of the preference for fiscal conservatism and discipline (due to the long  run 
connection between deficits and inflation) (Cukierman et al., 1992; Sturm, 1992; Sikken and de 
Haan, 1998; Bodea, 2013). Independent central banks can contribute to fiscal discipline through, 
inter alia, interest rate hikes and the refusal to lend to government. Most of the research on 
domestic institutions and fiscal policy has focussed on the role of fiscal rules, central bank 
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independence and the quality of budgetary institutions (IMF. 2012). Other domestic institutional 
arrangements which have also been credited in the theoretical literature for promoting fiscal 
rectitude are those that contribute towards government accountability and transparency, prevent 
leakage of public resources, increase the efficiency of public spending (as we found in Chapter 3) 
and improve the prospects of achieving and maintaining fiscal sustainability (Collier, 1991; Dabla-
Norris et al., 2010: p.3). These institutional mechanisms promote transparent and enforceable 
accountability systems making it politically costly for the incumbent to engage in opportunistic 
use of fiscal policy, while allow such institutions to act unconstrained on their aversion of fiscal 
deficits (Bodea, 2013). Much of the empirical literature on the link between domestic institutions 
and fiscal policies has focussed on the revenue side. For example, Gupta and others (2007) find 
that the weak ability to control corruption undermines tax effort. Besley and Persson (2010) and 
Knack (2008) show that in natural resource-dependent economies, natural resource rents create 
disincentives to invest in effective systems of taxation. Besley and Persson (2014) report that 
developing countries tax so little because corrupt systems of government face resistance to 
increasing taxes. More recently, Baum et al. (2017) find evidence that corruption undermines tax 
capacity due to its adverse impact on tax compliance. We have also already encountered in Chapter 
2 that weaknesses in bureaucratic institutions of government enable the copper companies, gold 
mines and other resource industries to escape payment of tax, hold the country to ransom and in 
innumerable ways create or push up significant budgetary gaps. Few studies that focus on public 
expenditure show that where domestic institutions are weak or poorly functioning, there is 
inefficient allocation of public spending (as we also encountered in Chapter 3), governments 
especially in resource-intensive countries deliberately underinvest in human capital accumulation, 
which has implications on growth, and spend more on corrupt and unproductive capital projects 
because of the ‘rents’ they generate in form of bribes and kickbacks. During the past few decades, 
several developing countries have made some steps towards institutional reforms which have 
essentially involved a shift towards improved domestic institutions of governance (Morrissey and 
Stewart (eds), 1995; World Bank, 2003). Based on its predicted positive contribution towards 
fiscal discipline, it is reasonable therefore to expect that the quality of domestic institutions will 
be an important determinant of the size of the fiscal deficit, and needs to be factored in any analysis 
of fiscal deficits in poor countries such as those in Africa. We focus on bureaucratic effectiveness, 
which encompasses the ability to design and implement sound and prudent fiscal policy, and the 
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ability to control corruption, a key factor affecting revenue mobilisation efforts and the quality of 
public spending, as measures of domestic institutions. The aim here is to update the literature using 
a more recent dataset than previous studies and focus on Africa so as to expand the evidence base 
on the connection between fiscal deficits and domestic institutions.  
 
External actors like the international financial institutions and bilateral aid donors have also 
played an influential role. For some time, developing countries that have experienced 
macroeconomic crises, and significant fiscal imbalances, have sought the assistance of external 
actors like the IMF, World Bank and other bilateral aid donors. Analysts have attributed the cause 
of much of the economic crises of the 1970s through the 1990s, to inappropriate domestic policies. 
For example, Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993) report that the debt crisis and the crippling 
stagflation experienced during the 1970s were mainly blamed on poor fiscal policies. The 
international development community had sought to tackle this problem by promoting policy and 
institutional reforms in exchange for financial aid, and until recently, the disbursement of much of 
this aid to developing countries was largely tied to policy reforms laid out in a series of structural 
adjustment loans (World Bank, 2000; Mosley et al. 2004). An aid package typically agreed with 
the IMF and World Bank, would comprise an element for the restoration or maintenance of fiscal 
discipline, with strong emphasis on the reduction of the fiscal deficit as a panacea for overcoming 
macroeconomic instability in poor countries. These aid packages were expected to have the effect 
of bringing public expenditure closer to revenues and help to maintain public debt with moderate 
bounds. The practice of tying aid to domestic policy reforms in developing countries, which has 
been perceived to be an important instrument for correcting domestic policy failures, was initially 
exclusive to IMF and the World Bank financing arrangement, but increasingly adopted by some 
bilateral aid donors in more recent times. Since the 2000s, aid donors have realised that the problem 
of Africa’s underdevelopment is not necessarily poor domestic policies alone, but also weak 
capacity to design and effectively implement policies. There has now been a huge shift from 
policy-based lending towards the increased role of governance (or attempts at it) in budgetary 
processes and practice of aid agencies. Aid donors have intervened in influential ministries like 
finance, as they are more enthusiastic about improving democracy, decentralisation, civil service 
reforms and also about promoting institutional reforms like establishment of effective anti-
corruption agencies, autonomous revenue authorities and public financial management systems. 
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Since the early 1980s, virtually every African country has received large amounts of aid aimed at 
stimulating policy reform. While there is broad consensus on the major role that external actors 
play, using foreign aid in stimulating policy and institutional reform the evidence has varied 
enormously including on its impact fiscal deficits.   
 
Most cross-country empirical studies of aid have identified its effectiveness on domestic 
revenue mobilisation effort as the main mechanism through which it influences fiscal discipline. 
The role of foreign aid in stimulating policy and institutional reforms and what impact this has had 
on fiscal deficits in Africa has received little attention. Studies, however, have shown that foreign 
aid leads to a reduction in government effort (substitution effect) to collect domestic tax revenues. 
Bräutigam  and Knack (2004), Moss et al. (2008) and Benedek and others (2013) report that aid is 
negatively correlated with tax collection. However, other studies report a positive impact (Clist 
and Morrissey, 2011; Carter, 2013; Clist, 2014). Ouattara (2006) finds an insignificant correlation. 
Further, our analysis in Chapter 2 of this thesis shows that foreign aid has not helped developing 
countries improve their capacities to generate tax revenues from domestic sources. In a recent IMF 
Working Paper, Combes et al. (2016) show that large aid inflows weaken tax capacity. On balance 
most of this literature implies that an increase in foreign aid can compromise fiscal discipline and 
lead to lower tax revenues thereby creating budgetary gaps. From this evidence, the potential 
indirect contribution of foreign aid towards fiscal discipline through fiscal, budgetary and public 
financial management reforms as discussed above has rarely been captured in quantitative 
analyses. It is therefore, unclear what the overall impact of the two effects – the positive impact of 
reforms (through both spending and/or tax reforms) and the negative effects of aid on tax effort – 
have been on fiscal deficits. In this chapter, we abstract from assessing the effect of aid on the 
revenue or expenditure only to consider the combined effect on overall fiscal balance, an area 
which has surprisingly attracted sparse empirical attention. Using the fiscal deficit rather than 
restricting the analysis of the impact of aid donors on fiscal discipline to either revenues or 
expenditure has the advantage of capturing the combined effect. We refrain from an a priori 
prediction of the direction of the effect and allow the data to show us as it depends on the direction 
and magnitude of the individual effects. We also wish to identify some of the causal factors that 
may underlie the lack of effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting fiscal reforms and discipline in 
Africa especially in the recent past, based on a country case study.   
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4.4 Empirical approach 
 
The ideas from the previous section which we wish to test empirically in this section are: 
the extent to which pre-election fiscal boosts are counterbalanced by post-election cutbacks to try 
and bring fiscal deficits down to avoid temporary fiscal deficits from getting out of control in 
Africa; how natural resource endowments can compromise fiscal discipline over the medium- to 
long-term effects, focussing on government weak ability to effectively tax and manage resource 
revenues, the damage that natural resources inflict on institutions of governance and the 
consequences of the ‘boom-bust’ cycles which complicate budgetary planning and debt 
management; and the role of domestic and external institutions in promoting fiscal discipline, and 
causal factors that may underlie their lack of impact. Apart from specifying a model that captures 
this story and enables us to empirically test these relationships, we also describe the data and its 
sources, and the estimation techniques used in this chapter. Finally, the quantitative findings and 
policy implications are reported and discussed in the last part of this section.  
 
Our starting point is to specify a Nordhaus-type opportunistic model, which will enable 
us to assess the existence of election-linked fiscal policy manipulation by the incumbent. This is 
captured by the inclusion of a dummy variable for each year a national election occurred. To 
address any potential problem caused by endogenously timed elections, we only consider national 
or parliamentary elections which are pre-determined according to national laws and excluded those 
which are called (by-elections). To capture the impact of post-election fiscal policy, in particular, 
whether the deflationary phase of the ‘political business cycle’ is implemented to bring election-
linked fiscal deficits down, we include two post-election variables: one for immediate year and the 
other in the second year after the election. these election variables enable us to assess fiscal 
behaviour during and after elections. According to the Nordhaus-type ‘political business cycle’ 
theory the election year dummy variable is expected to be negative while the post-election 
dummies are expected to emerge with a statistically significant positive coefficient.  
 
We then proceed to consider whether natural resource endowment has a negative 
medium-term impact as discussed earlier and through its negative impact on institutions. 
Following standard literature, this is captured by including both the current and lagged values of 
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the measure of natural resources. The lagged natural resource variable is assumed in our view to 
capture the impact of previous years’ resource booms or windfalls on the current fiscal deficit, and 
based on our predictions from the previous section, its coefficient is expected to be negative. 
Finally, to capture the effectiveness institutions in promoting fiscal discipline we incorporate 
bureaucratic effectiveness and ability to control corruption as indicators of domestic institutions, 
and the share of official development aid to represent the influence of aid donors. 
 
However, to convert our basic story at the core of this study into a formulation which will 
give us a better picture on the determination of fiscal deficits, we need to bring into the picture as 
controls, those structural influences which have long been recognised to potentially have a bearing 
on deficits. Although studies in this area control for several variables, we focus on those which are 
common across most studies such as: those which relate to the state of the macro-economy (real 
GDP growth rate and inflation) and the economy’s trade-orientation proxied the share of trade in 
GDP. These are not the only relevant structural factors, but they appear in most of the literature 
and are more relevant to the developing world context.  
 
Our story may now be graphically sketched out as shown in Figure 4.3, to illustrate the 
direction of possible correlations and causations. In this Figure we only illustrate possible linear 
linkages among the variables and all non-linear relationships will be addressed in subsequent 
empirical sections. Our key influences appear in shaded boxes, with arrows showing the direction 
of the association with the deficit.  
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Figure 4.3: The core model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Model specification  
 
To estimate empirically the association between the various explanatory variables and our 
dependent variable as hypothesised above and reflected in Figure 4.3, we now need to specify the 
estimating model. The mapping from the variables in Figure 4.3 to our proposed estimating model 
is as in Table 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political causes:  
• Election-year dummy variable 
• 2 post-election-year dummy 
variables 
 
 
Factor  Variable(s) Notation  Description 
Dependent 
variable 
Fiscal 
performance  
 
Fiscal deficit 
 
Government  
revenues  
Public 
expenditure 
 
𝐹𝐷 
 
𝑇 
𝐸𝑥𝑝 
 
Fiscal deficit, 
difference 
between 
government 
revenues and 
expenditure, (% 
of GDP) 
Total 
government 
revenues, 
excluding 
grants (% of 
GDP) 
Total 
government 
expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
Independent 
variables  
   
Political 
business 
cycle related 
factors 
Election and 
post-election 
year(s) dummy 
variables 
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡1 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡2 
Dummy 
variable for 
election year, 
equal to 1 in an 
election year 
and 0 otherwise;  
Dummy 
variable for one 
year after 
election, equal 
to 1 after 
election and 0 
otherwise; 
Dummy 
variable for two 
Fiscal deficit 
(tax minus spending) 
 
 
Fiscal deficit 
(tax minus spendi g) 
 
Role of natural resources in economy: 
• Current and lagged natural resources  
• ‘boom-bust’ cycles 
• Damage to institutions  
Governance factors: 
• domestic: bureaucratic effectiveness 
and control of corruption 
• external: official development 
assistance  
 
 
 
Governance factors: 
• domestic: bureaucratic effectiveness 
and control of corruption 
• external: official development 
assistance  
 
 
Other controls: 
• state of the macro-economy 
[Inflation and GDP per capita] 
• trade orientation  
 
 
 
Other controls: 
• state of the macro-economy 
[Inflation and GDP per capita] 
• trade orientation  
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Table 4.4: Notation 
Factor  Variable(s) Notation  Description 
Dependent 
variable 
Fiscal 
performance  
 
Fiscal balance  
 
Government  
revenues  
Public expenditure 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 
 
𝑇 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝 
 
Fiscal balance, difference between 
government revenues and expenditure, (% 
of GDP) 
Total government revenues, excluding 
grants (% of GDP) 
Total government expenditure (% of GDP) 
Independent 
variables  
   
Political business 
cycle related 
factors 
Election and post-
election year(s) 
dummy variables 
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡1 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡2 
Dummy variable for election year, equal to 
1 in an election year and 0 otherwise;  
Dummy variable for one year after 
election, equal to 1 and 0 otherwise; 
Dummy variable for two years after 
election, equal to 1 in year two after 
election and 0 otherwise 
Natural resource 
endowments 
Natural resource rents 
(% of GDP)  
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠 The proxy for the natural resource 
dependence is measured by total natural 
resources rents. It is the sum of oil rents, 
natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), 
mineral rents, and forest rents. 
Domestic 
institutions  
Bureaucratic 
effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
Control of corruption 
𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑢 
 
 
 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡 
 
 
 
 
State capacity measured by the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies 
Perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of 
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corruption, as well as "capture" of the state 
by elites and private interests 
External actors  Official development 
assistance (% of GNI) 
𝐴𝑖𝑑 a measure of external influences 
represented by aid and IMF/World Bank 
policies); 
Other controls  
 
State of the macro-
economy  
 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑓 
An indicator of the economy’s trade-
orientation is the sum of exports and 
imports (% of GDP).  
Real GDP per capita measuring the level of 
development  
Inflation rate, the average consumer price 
index measures changes in domestic prices 
(annual %) 
 
Drawing upon Nordhaus (1975), Rogoff (1990), Schuknecht (1996), Shi and Svensson 
(2000), Block (2002) and others, our baseline estimating equation derived from Figure 4.3 and 
Table 4.3, can be specified as a linear relationship, where all our key right-hand variables enter 
independently and can be expressed in a functional form as specified in equation (4.1): 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜃𝑃𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽2𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑡 +  𝛾𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                              (4.1) 
 
   where 𝑖 stands for country and 𝑡 for the year in which the variable was observed. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  represents variables relating to the state of the macroeconomy, in particular 
trade, real GDP per capita and inflation. GDP per capita is included to the 
positive capture the impact of economic development on the budget deficits, as 
the literature posits that an economy that is growing will tend to have smaller 
deficits. We also include the share of international trade in the economy to 
capture the effects of economic globalization. 
𝜇𝑖 =  captures unobservable country-specific fixed effects not captured by the other 
explanatory variables, thus helping in reducing omitted variable bias;  
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𝜆𝑡 =  captures unobservable time-specific fixed effects, and also contributes to 
reducing omitted variable biases; and  
𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  is an independent and identically distributed error term.  
 
As stated in our hypotheses, coefficients of interest in our baseline estimating regression 
model (equation 4.2) are those on variables PBC (𝜃), Bureau (𝜑), Corrupt (𝛿), Natres (𝜓) and 
Aid (𝛽3𝑡). Before estimating equation (4.1), we wish to clarify how the variable 𝑃𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 is measured. 
As mentioned earlier, this variable is measured by three dummy variables:  
 
𝑃𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡2𝑖𝑡 
where:  
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 
0,     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠)
 
and  
 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡1𝑖𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
0,          𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠)    
 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡2𝑖𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 𝑖𝑠 2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
0,          𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠)    
 
Specifying how the variable 𝑃𝐵𝐶 is measured allows for testing empirically the effects 
of opportunistic behaviour by re-election motivated political leaders and parties. This enables us 
to test for the existence of a ratchet which may underlie political business cycles in developing 
countries where expansionary fiscal policies allowed during the pre-election period are not 
compensated adequately by contractionary fiscal consolidation during the year after the election. 
The estimated coefficient on the variable 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 measures the impact of an election on fiscal 
deficits. The inclusion of the variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 will allow for testing empirically our key 
hypothesis developed in the previous section, namely that fiscal deficits can get out of control and 
become persistent because there is a ratchet underlying political business cycles in fiscal variables: 
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public expenditure increases during the pre-election periods but are not compensated by 
precautionary expenditure cuts or tax increases during the year after the election. To understand 
which component(s) of the fiscal deficit is frequently manipulated, requires testing the impact of 
PBCs on tax revenues and public expenditure. The empirical specification for testing this requires 
making each of these a dependent variable.  
 
Estimating our baseline linear dynamic model (equation 4.1) using standard OLS is likely to 
bias the estimated coefficients because the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as one of the 
regressors is endogenous with respect to the country-specific fixed effects. OLS estimates will be 
inconsistent because the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). OLS estimates with Huber–White standard errors are, therefore, reported for 
comparison only. Although the bias might diminish when the number of periods increases, our 
panel data is unbalanced and the average number of observations per country in most regressions 
is not large enough, thus it would seem reasonable to employ more robust estimators. Here our 
primary estimation technique is the robust Fixed Effects estimator (FE) with White standard errors 
which can address biases caused by unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables. We also 
employ an instrumental variable estimator, three-stage least squares to try and address any 
potential endogeneity due to reverse causality and simultaneities. The statistical software used is 
Stata/IC 14.2 
 
4.4.2 Data description and summary statistics 
 
This section provides a description of the dataset used in this study to test the hypotheses 
stated above. The data comprises an unbalanced panel of 42 African countries, spanning over three 
decades, from 1980 to 2017. It is unbalanced because some of the variables have missing data in 
certain years. All the variables used in this study are based on annual observations. Our sample 
includes most of the countries from sub-Saharan Africa (with the exception Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Liberia and South Sudan). These countries are relatively homogenous geographically, in 
economic structures (most of them heavily dependent on natural resources) and politically many 
of them recently democratised and now have more frequent and fairer elections, thereby making 
them suitable for such a study. The choice of countries has been informed by data availability. We 
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employ a dataset obtained primarily from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and 
the International Monetary Fund’s World Development Outlook database. Other sources of our 
data include: the African Election Database and the Centre for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV dataset. 
Table 4.4 below shows a summary of the variables in our study. 
 
Our primary dependent variable is the fiscal balance (𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙) from the World Economic 
Outlook Database published by the IMF. It measures a country’s fiscal balance in a given year and 
represents its net lending (surplus) or net borrowing (deficit) position. This is calculated as revenue 
minus total expenditure. According to the IMF the fiscal balance measures the extent to which 
general government is either putting financial resources at the disposal of other sectors in the 
economy (net lending) or utilizing the financial resources generated by other sectors and (net 
borrowing). This balance is calculated excluding grants from aid donors.  
 
To understand which components of the fiscal deficit are commonly manipulated during 
elections, we also use the shares of total government general revenues (𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡) and total 
government general expenditure (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡) in GDP as dependent variables. General government 
revenue (percent of GDP) is general government total revenue without grants as a share of GDP, 
including tax and other revenue (from property income, interest payments, sales of goods and 
services, and so forth) and general government total expenditure (percent of GDP) consists of total 
expense net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. These data series are from the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook database published in October 2018.  
 
The dummy variable 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 is coded as 1 if country 𝑖 held national elections at time 𝑡 and 
0 for all other years. The dummy variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 takes the value of 1 in country 𝑖 when 𝑡 is 
a year following an election and 0 otherwise. We use the dataset from the Database of Political 
Institutions (2018) and the African Elections Database and, drawing upon the practice in the 
literature, these variables only relate to highest national elections in a given country. We only focus 
on legislative, parliamentary and presidential elections (see for example Shi and Svensson, 2006; 
Brender and Drazen, 2008; Ebeke and Ölçer, 2013). The data shows that on average a country in 
Africa holds national elections every five years, and from 1980 to 2017, there were around 325 
national elections in the 42 countries in our sample. Some analysts argue that some of the elections 
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held in the 1980s, particularly in Africa, should not be included in the sample because they lacked 
competition and, therefore, are not likely to produce ‘political business cycles’ (Block et al., 2003). 
We make no such adjustment here because we would like our results to be comparable to previous 
findings where no such adjustments are made, and secondly because detailed data on political 
systems and electoral competition is not available for a number of the countries in our sample prior 
to the 1990s.  
 
Natural resource endowments (𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡), are defined as the sum of oil rents, natural gas 
rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents, expressed as a percent of GDP. 
The data for this variable is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators published in 
2018.  
 
The influence of domestic institutions is measured by two variables: Bureaucratic 
effectiveness (𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑖𝑡) measures the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies; and Control of 
Corruption, (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑡) captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state 
by elites and private interests. These data are from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
dataset.  
 
The influence of external actors is the measured by the share of net official development 
assistance in gross national income. The ODA consists of disbursements of loans made on 
concessional terms and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance 
Committee, by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic 
development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. It includes 
loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). 
The data is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators for 2018. The World Bank’s 
Development Policy Lending consists of loans or grants that are accompanied with conditions that 
take the form of prior actions, triggers and benchmarks. IMF loans are in theory provided to 
countries facing balance of payment problems. They are accompanied by conditions that take the 
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form of prior actions, quantitative performance criteria, indicative targets and structural 
benchmarks.  It is often difficult for recipient countries to refuse the implementation of IMF’s 
policy prescriptions in the context of an IMF loan. Bilateral and multilateral donors tend to favour 
countries with IMF programmes. IMF assessments are also used by donors to make aid allocation 
decisions, especially in low-income countries, where they often lack information on the country’s 
situation.  
 
Apart from our key variables of interest, we also include the lagged dependent variable as 
one of the control variables to capture the sluggish dynamics associated with government fiscal 
policy decisions, which are constrained by public budgets and bureaucracies (Beck and Katz, 1995; 
Bodea, 2013). It is also argued that current budgets are largely determined by previous 
appropriations (Schuknecht, 2000: 121). Based on the literature discussed in the literature survey 
section, we include the lagged dependent variable, inflation, GDP per capita and openness to 
international trade as independent variables. As stated earlier, the data on all our dependent 
variables is from the World Economic Outlook database published by the IMF (WEO, 2018). The 
data for GDP per capita and openness to international trade are from the World Development 
Indicators published in 2018. The data and variables discussed here are summarised and reported 
in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source  
Fiscal balance (deficit/surplus) -2.1 5.2 -25.7 40.3 World Economic outlook (IMF) 
Election year dummy 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Database of political institutions 
(World Bank)  
Post-election year dummy 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Database of political institutions 
(World Bank) 
Two years post-election dummy  0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Database of political institutions 
(World Bank) 
Natural resource rents 13.7 11.9 0.0 61.9 
World Development Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Bureaucratic effectiveness 1.3 0.8 0.0 3.5 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(World Bank) 
Control of corruption 2.2 0.9 0.0 5.0 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(World Bank 
Net Official development assistance (% 
of GNI) 
9.5 9.6 -0.2 78.7 
World Development Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Trade (% of GDP) 64.8 26.2 11.1 165.6 
World Development Indicators (World 
Bank) 
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GDP per capita, PPP (current 
international $) 
3,571.0 4,054.4 276.2 21,356.0 
World Development Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Total population size (million) 21.9 27.8 0.95 186.0 
World Development Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 157.9 313.2 0.3 3,234.8 
World Development Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Imports of goods and services (% of 
GDP) 
35.8 13.4 7.1 96.4 
World Development Indicators (World 
Bank) 
Exports of goods and services (% of 
GDP) 
29.0 18.1 2.5 108.0 
World Development Indicators (World 
Bank) 
   
4.5 Empirical findings – quantitative results 
 
In this section we present and discuss the findings which address the hypotheses stated 
above. The two important diagnostics which we conduct are the tests for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, both of which can bias the estimates and invalidate 
statistical tests of significance if not taken care of. To test for the presence of heteroscedasticity, 
we employ the Breusch–Pagan test. Our diagnostics confirms possible presence of 
heteroscedasticity as the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected at 1 percent significance 
level (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000). We also test for the presence of serial correlation. The null hypothesis 
for the absence of first order autocorrelation is also rejected as Prob > F = 0.0000. To deal with 
these problems, we estimate all our models with robust standard errors clustered by country so that 
the estimated coefficients are robust with respect to heteroscedasticity and arbitrary 
autocorrelations. Table 4.6 presents the results for the two estimators, a pooled OLS estimator with 
Huber-White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors and a more efficient Fixed Effects 
estimator, our main estimating strategy in this study. We also estimate a system of equations using 
an instrumental variable estimator 3SLS in later sections as a robustness test of our findings to 
reverse causality and simultaneities.  
 
4.5.1 Baseline regression results  
In this section, we present and discuss our baseline findings. Table 4.6 presents the results 
from the robust OLS and the fixed effects based on equation (4.1). In columns (1) and (2), we show 
the results on the impact of our explanatory variables on the overall fiscal balance. The results of 
the impact of the same variables on taxation are reported in columns (3) and (4) with the final two 
columns (5) and (6) showing the impact on public expenditure. We start our empirical tests and 
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analysis by first assessing the existence of ‘political business cycles’ in fiscal deficits in Africa. 
The  results from our two estimators indicate that the estimated coefficient on the variable 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡, 
our measure of the election-related fiscal manipulation, is negative and statistically different from 
zero at the standard 5 percent significance level. This implies that on average, fiscal deficits are 
larger in election years than in other years by between 0.9 and 1.1 percentage points of GDP. In 
our view, this confirms previous findings in the literature that governments in Africa engage in 
opportunistic manipulation of fiscal policy for re-election purposes, and as columns (3) to (6) 
show, the typical instrument utilised for this purpose is public expenditure. On average, public 
expenditure increases in election years by 0.7-0.8 percentage points of GDP relative to non-
election years. We find no evidence that tax policy is used for re-election purposes. Although its 
estimated coefficient is negative, it is insignificant across all specifications.  
 
The next issue we wish to examine is whether the pre-election fiscal boost is counterbalanced 
by adequate post-election cutbacks as claimed by the ‘political business cycle’ hypothesis. We 
observe the estimated coefficients on the two post-election dummies: 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡1 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡2. 
The results indicate that there is an effort to bring fiscal deficits down in the year following the 
election, but this does not have a statistically significant effect on the deficit. The effort to reduce 
fiscal deficits is confirmed by the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the variable 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡1 in the expenditure columns (5) and (6). However, the lack of a symmetrical effect on 
the E𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 and  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡1 in columns (1) and (2) suggests that election-linked fiscal deficits may 
last beyond the post-election year as efforts made by governments during the year after elections 
fall short of what is required to close the budgetary gaps entertained during the election.  
 
To understand whether, because austerity measures are politically sensitive and governments 
may tend to be cautious about the time within which to implemented cutbacks, we consider the 
conduct of fiscal policies two years after the election, which is a reasonable period within which 
to expect some government effort to deflate the deficit. The estimated coefficient on the variable 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡2 shows no sign of such effort, as it emerges negative but insignificant. Qualitatively, 
these results may be suggesting that the post-election contractionary measures that are 
implemented are not adequate and balanced enough to bring election year deficits down. We, 
therefore, conclude that the inability to implement painful fiscal austerity measures which can 
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adequately rebuild fiscal buffers eroded during elections, represents a possible reason why 
‘political business cycles’ contribute to the difficulties in controlling fiscal deficits in Africa. Our 
findings differ from those of Block (2002) and others. 
 
Table 4.6 Political business cycles, natural resources, domestic and external institutions 
Estimation method OLS 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
FE 
(6) 
Dependent variable: 
Explanatory variables: 
Fiscal Tax Expend 
Lagged dependent variable (𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡−1) 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.70*** 0.45*** 0.83*** 0.72***  
(6.03) (4.03) (11.11) (5.60) (19.68) (15.11) 
Election-year dummy (𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡) -1.05*** -0.91** -0.44 -0.10 0.71** 0.81**  
(2.67) (2.10) (1.08) (0.22) (2.30) (2.15) 
One-year post-election dummy (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡1𝑖𝑡) 0.41 0.47 -0.09 0.04 -0.72** -0.60***  
(1.03) (1.29) (0.23) (0.10) (2.25) (3.01) 
Two years post-election dummy (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡2𝑖𝑡) -0.25 -0.15 -0.10 0.13 0.31 0.37  
(0.52) (0.32) (0.22) (0.33) (1.01) (1.39) 
Natural resource rents, current value (𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) 0.16*** 0.19** 0.08*** 0.16*** -0.05 -0.02  
(4.12) (2.65) (2.60) (3.01) (1.46) (0.41) 
Natural resource rents lagged 2 years (𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−2) -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.06* 0.01 0.04 0.09***  
(3.20) (4.64) (1.84) (0.44) (1.38) (3.20) 
Bureaucratic effectiveness -0.46* -0.65 0.22 -0.33 0.25 -0.11  
(1.86) (1.44) (0.93) (1.10) (1.18) (0.26) 
Capacity to control corruption  -0.20 -0.57** 0.02 -0.36 0.10 0.00  
(0.97) (2.18) (0.08) (0.84) (0.51) (0.01) 
Donor aid (𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡) -0.01 0.004 0.04* 0.04 0.04 0.03  
(0.52) (0.11) (1.78) (1.46) (1.52) (1.04) 
Trade orientation of economy (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡) -0.01 0.005 0.04*** 0.03* 0.03*** 0.02  
(0.77) (0.42) (4.03) (1.96) (3.25) (1.59) 
Level of economic development (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) 0.0001** 0.0004 0.0002*** 0.00 0.00 0.00  
(2.34) (1.40) (3.11) (0.07) (1.31) (0.78) 
Time-specific fixed effects (𝛾𝑡) -0.03 -0.05* 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03  
(1.58) (1.87) (1.06) (0.92) (1.16) (0.83) 
Constant  63.86 109.17* -40.85 -58.54 -55.89 -55.42  
(1.56) (1.90) (1.02) (0.84) (1.14) (0.80) 
Observations  656 656 656 656 672 672 
R-squared 0.3092 0.2483 0.7421 0.3579 0.8393 0.6000 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Asterisks ***, ** and * denote level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Both the pooled OLS and Fixed 
Effects t-statistics, which are reported in the parentheses, are white-heteroscedastic-corrected. See data description and sources in 
Table 4.4. The joint F tests show that all the coefficients in our models are jointly different from zero. All estimations including 
the pooled OLS are done with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (White) robust standard errors with t-values 
reported in the parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
 
We now turn to the short- and medium-term effects of natural resource endowments. Our 
results show that natural resource endowments are consistently associated with fiscal deficits. An 
increase in resource rents helps to finance the deficits by boosting current revenue inflows, as the 
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estimated coefficients on the variable 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠 in columns (1)-(4) is positive and statistically 
significant. A one percentage point increase leads to a 0.08-0.16 percentage point increase in 
revenues and a 0.16-0.19 percentage point reduction in the fiscal deficit. This finding of a positive 
contemporaneous (or short-term) effect on revenues and fiscal balances, is consistent with recent 
findings by Morrissey et al. (2016). However, our interest is also to understand the medium-term 
impact, which in this case is captured by the lagged values of the natural resource variable, 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−2. The choice of 2 years, though short and somewhat arbitrary, is informed by the fact 
that resource revenues tend to be very volatile. The estimated coefficient on the variable 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−2, is negative for deficits indicating that a 1 percentage point increase in resource rents 
leads to an increase in the deficit of 0.09-0.12 percentage points 2 years later and this is driven by 
a fall in revenues (of 0.06 for OLS) and an increase in expenditure (of 0.09 for FE). One possible 
interpretation of this result is that, although natural resource booms may have a positive 
contemporaneous effect and help in driving fiscal deficits down at the beginning of a boom, over 
the medium-term they tend to complicate government control over fiscal policies in Africa due to 
poor management of resources and lack of investment capacity. We  attempt to address these issues 
by identifying some of the factors which may lead natural resource endowments to compromise 
government control over the budget, in the case study section. 
 
Finally, we consider the question of whether domestic and external institutions, in particular 
bureaucratic effectiveness, control of corruption and foreign aid have played any restraining role 
and promoted fiscal discipline in Africa. The estimated coefficients suggest that the inability to 
control corruption has a negative effect on fiscal deficits (though the impact is weak). We find no 
role of the direct impact of bureaucratic effectiveness as its estimated coefficient is but statistically 
significant. The evidence also suggests that although the coefficient on the coefficient on foreign 
aid emerges as positive, on balance it remains largely insignificant, possibly suggesting that the 
use of aid to influence domestic fiscal policies has not been successful fostering fiscal discipline 
in Africa. This evidence points to the possibility that in Africa fiscal discipline is being further 
compromised by the erosion of the restraining influence of aid donors and international financial 
institutions, as developing countries increasingly resort to alternative ways of financing fiscal 
deficits. We attempt to address this issue in the case study section.  
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Other results for our control variables show that the lagged dependent variable emerges with 
a strong positive and statistically significant coefficient across all specifications. The result is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Our proxy for the level of development, GDP per 
capita, emerges with the expected positive sign at 10 percent significant level (in other words, 
more developed countries run lower deficits), but the size of the impact on revenue is marginal, 
while the role of foreign trade is ambiguous here.  
 
4.5.2 Addressing possible endogeneity  
 
Our analysis so far does not take into account the interrelationships we have conjectured 
earlier, such as the link from natural resource intensity to the weakness institutions and the 
influence of aid on governance, which may have an impact on our findings. These 
interrelationships cannot be estimated using our baseline single model in equation 4.1. The other 
problem in our baseline model is that two of our independent variables may be endogenous, as 
they are possibly influenced by other variables outside the model: domestic institutions and foreign 
aid. To take these potential endogeneity issues into account, we propose to model the interlinkages 
between the independent variables as separate relationships as shown in equations 4.2 and 4.3, 
then re-estimate the three equations (4.1, 4.2 and 4.3) as a system of three simultaneous equations. 
Our first model in the proposed system of equations restates our baseline equation 4.1 as follows:  
 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜃𝑃𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽2𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑡 +  𝛾𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                             (4.1) 
 
The second equation, 4.2, estimates the impact of the natural resource curse on the capacity 
of the state, which in the political natural resource curse literature, and in this study, has been 
hypothesised to weaken the capacity of state institutions. Equation 4.2 is also intended to capture 
the increasing role of governance (or attempts at it) in the budgets and practice of aid agencies. As 
discussed earlier, aid donors have shifted their influence from policy to governance, as they seem 
to have realised that the problem of economic underdevelopment in Africa is not poor policies 
only, but also the lack of capacity to implement policies often due ill-trained or inadequately 
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trained and corrupt government officials. Thus, they have been enthusiastic in intervening in 
influential ministries such as finance. 
 
𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑡𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼3𝑡𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑡 +  𝛾𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (4.2) 
 
Finally, the level of aid is also, as documented by a large literature, endogenous to other 
factors such as the level of development (less goes to richer and faster-growing countries), the state 
of the macro-economy (less goes to profligate governments) and population size (Lenton et al., 
2016). Our final equation, 4.3, captures these important influences of foreign aid. 
 
 𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛿0 +  𝛿1𝑡𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿3𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑡 +  𝛾𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡   (4.3) 
 
In order to capture these simultaneities, we re-estimate our baseline equation and the other 
two new equations as a system of equations employing an instrumental variable estimator, three-
stage least squares (3SLS). The 3SLS estimator is a form of instrumental variable that has the 
advantage of being asymptotically more efficient than the 2SLS we have utilised in Chapter 3. The 
3SLS is ideal in this case because we are dealing with non-linear structural relationships.  The 
findings are summarised and reported in Table 4.7. Estimates of the three specifications show that 
the coefficients on the political business cycle factors, natural resource curse related factors, state 
capacity and external influences remain qualitatively similar to those established earlier in our 
analysis (i.e. the expected post-election expenditure cutback still does not happen,  and natural 
resource intensity and bureaucratic effectiveness are still negative influences reinforcing budget 
deficits even when these endogeneities are incorporated into the model45. Since the 
overidentification tests are failed, the 3SLS findings do not add much to our previous analysis.  
 
 
 
 
45 In our 3SLS regressions, the instruments are the lagged values of the endogenous variables (fiscal balance, 
bureaucratic capacity, and aid conditionality). Using lagged values of endogenous variables as instruments could 
potentially create a problem if those lagged values are also endogenous. However, the tests for overidentification 
restrictions carried out in Table 4.7 reject the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, suggesting that the 
systems of equations might be weak.   
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Table 4.7. Possible influences of fiscal deficits – estimating a system of equations [3SLS] 
Dependent variables: 
Independent variables 
Fiscal 
balance 
Bureaucratic 
capacity 
Aid  
Lagged dependent variable (𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1) 0.45**    
(13.07)   
Political business cycles    
Election-year dummy (𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡) -1.05***    
(2.56)   
One-year post-election dummy (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡1𝑖𝑡) 0.41    
(1.01)   
Two years post-election dummy (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡2𝑖𝑡) -0.25    
(0.59)   
Natural resource curse related factors    
Natural resource rents (𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) 0.16*** -0.02***   
(5.60) (6.53)  
Natural resource rents lagged 2 years (𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡−2) -0.12***    
(4.24)   
State capacity related factors    
Bureaucratic capacity  -0.46*    
(1.84)   
Capacity to control corruption  -0.20    
(0.91)   
Influence of external actors     
Donor aid (𝐴𝑖𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡) -0.01 -0.001   
(0.49) (0.24)  
Other controls    
Trade orientation of economy (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡) -0.01    
(0.83)   
Level of economic development (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.001***  
(2.58) (9.74) (7.21) 
Inflation rate   -0.003 
   (0.91) 
Time-specific fixed effects (𝛾𝑡) -0.03 -0.02***  
 (1.23) (6.01)  
Population size   -0.50*** 
   (3.90) 
Constant  63.63 45.29 38.44***  
(1.22) 6.18 (5.88) 
Observations  656 656 656 
R-squared 0.3092 0.2011 0.1967 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen-Sargan overidentification statistic    
(chi-square) 64.528 65.913 55.996 
(p-value) 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Asterisks ***, ** and * denote level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. See data description and sources in 
Table 4.4. The joint F tests show that all the coefficients in our models are jointly different from zero.  
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4.5.3 Robustness check – different estimation method 
 
In this section we use a different estimation method, the random effects estimator assess 
the sensitivity of the key findings, in particular the extent to which pre-election fiscal boosts are 
counterbalanced by post-election cutbacks to try and bring fiscal deficits down; the medium-term 
negative effects of how natural resource endowments; and the role of domestic and external 
institutions in promoting fiscal discipline. The random effects estimator has been applied in similar 
studies (Bove et al., 2016). Using the random effects estimator has the advantage of controlling 
for country-specific time trends. A Hausman test conducted in Table 4.8 indicates that the model 
with random effects is preferable to the fixed effects. We estimate the random effects specification 
and use heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors to calculate the 
corresponding test statistics. The results which are reported in Table 4.8 show that our variables 
are robust to a different estimation method.  
 
Table 4.8: Robustness check – Fixed Effects vs Random Effects estimators 
Estimation method 
Explanatory variables: 
FE RE 
Lagged dependent variable (𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1) 0.398*** 0.448*** 
 (11.000) (12.940) 
Election-year dummy (𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡) -0.914** -1.048** 
 (2.120) (2.540) 
Election-year dummy (𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡) 0.471 0.412 
 (1.100) (1.000) 
Two years post-election dummy (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡2𝑖𝑡) -0.152 -0.246 
 (0.350) (0.590) 
Natural resource rents, current value (𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡) 0.191*** 0.165*** 
 (5.410) (5.540) 
Natural resource rents lagged 2 years 
(𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−2) 
-0.087** -0.117*** 
 (2.510) (4.200) 
Bureaucratic effectiveness -0.651 -0.455* 
 (1.360) (1.820) 
Capacity to control corruption -0.569* -0.201 
 (1.740) (0.900) 
Donor aid (𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡) 0.004 -0.012 
 (0.140) (0.570) 
Trade orientation of economy (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡) -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.330) (0.820) 
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Level of economic development (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) 0.000 0.000** 
 (1.510) (2.520) 
Time-specific fixed effects (𝛾𝑡) -0.054 -0.032 
 (1.560) (1.220) 
Constant  9.171 6.861 
 (1.580) (1.210) 
Observations  656 656 
R-squared 0.2483 0.3092 
Hausman test of efficiency 
chi2 
Prob>chi2 
 
2603 
0.0106 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
 
4.6 Qualitative findings: Zambia case study 
 
The quantitative analysis conducted in the previous section suggests that ‘political business 
cycles’ are present in Africa (as suggested by the negative and statistically significant coefficient 
on the election year variable 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡), but that this has contributed to the difficulty of managing the 
deficit as pre-election surges are adequately counterbalanced by post-election cutbacks (in this 
case up to two years), presenting African governments with an unpleasant choice of surrendering 
to the cycle and thus causing a temporary deficit to persist. The results also show that natural 
resource intensity has imposed medium-term fiscal costs, and that domestic and external 
institutions have only had a very weak effect on fiscal deficits. Our aim in this section is to add a 
detailed country-specific context to try and gain some insights into the causal factors, focussing 
on these three ideas using the Zambian economy and its weak ability, even by African standards, 
to control the fiscal deficit in recent years (as illustrated in Table 4.2 above).  
 
As indicated earlier, the approach in this section is different as its mainly based on 
qualitative analysis using data from various sources, including ministries of finance (MoF) and 
mines and minerals development (MMMD) Zambia Revenue Authority, Central Statistical Office 
(CSO) and IMF Zambia office, during the periods 11-29 June 2018 and 7-21 January 2019. 
 
For various reasons, Zambia presents an ideal setting for exploring some of the causal factors 
underlying the correlations that have been developed and documented in the previous sections. 
First, the country’s democratic progression, like several of its peers on the continent, has been 
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considered by several commentators as fairly successful, practically transitioning from almost 
three decades of an autocratic one-party state in the 1970s to the early 1990s, to a dominant party 
system of the 1990s and early 2000s, and later to multi-party system of governance since the mid-
2000s. The chronology of the country’s democratic progression provided in Table 4.9, shows that 
there are competitive and cleaner elections, especially from the mid-2000s. With more frequent 
and competitive elections, the theories outlined above suggest the possibility that this may hurt 
fiscal performance due to  the incentive to the strong incentive to manipulate policies for re-
election purposes. Second, Zambia has historically been a natural resource-intensive country with 
copper mining accounting for the largest share of its foreign export earnings since the 1920s. 
Although the contribution of the mining sector to export earnings has declined over the years, from 
over 90 percent in the 1970s, it still remains the largest contributor estimated at about 70 percent  
in 2017 - indicating little diversification (IMF, 2017). With this level of natural resource-intensity, 
Zambia, like many African countries, has certainly been exposed to the vagaries of the ‘natural 
resource curse’, and its policy responses to the ‘boom-bust’ cycles and how it has managed 
resource revenues and rent-seeking behaviour and corruption will be crucial in our understanding 
of the impact, in practice, of natural resource endowments on fiscal management. Third, on the 
international scene, Zambia has historically had a weak relations with donors characterised by 
weak implementation and intermittent suspensions of donor-supported policy reforms in the 
1980s, a more favourable experience in the 1990s and 2000s during which donors had a relatively 
strong influence on the country’s economic policies and (liberalisation) reforms. In this period, the 
country experienced marked improvements in a number of economic, and assistance was almost 
always provided with conditionality attached. Since 2011, the country has been zigzagging 
backwards and forwards between aid donors, somewhat diluting the influence of traditional 
multilateral and bilateral donors. Finally, in terms of fiscal performance, Zambia’s fiscal deficits 
as indicated in Figure 4.3 had improved from the 1990s until the mid-2000s, but more recently 
appear to have become difficult to control, and the country is experiencing some of the worst 
deteriorations in fiscal deficits on the continent, as shown in the bottom part of Table 4.2 above. 
Most recently, the country was reclassified by the IMF in 2015 to be among those at the highest 
risk of debt distress and while all the reputable international rating agencies (Moody’s, Standards 
and Poor’s and Fitch) have downgraded the country’s credit rating primarily because of the 
deteriorating fiscal deficits. 
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This objective in this section is to understand the extent to which our quantitative findings 
explain fiscal developments in a typical African country such as Zambia, and to identify possible 
causal factors which may underlie the weak ability to manage fiscal deficits but do not show in the 
econometric results, focussing on the ‘political business cycles’, natural resource endowments, and 
the role of aid donors. We seek to assess the extent to which these three factors have contributed 
towards Zambia’s weak ability to manage fiscal deficits. 
 
4.6.1 Political business cycles  
 
Zambia presents an ideal setting for the study of opportunistic ‘Nordhaus-type’ rather 
partisanship ‘Hibbs-type’ models because most of the elections have been based more on 
opportunism and less on political party ideologies. For instance, van Donge (1995) describes the 
election campaigns of 1991 as having centred around the personality characteristics of the main 
players. Chikulo (1993: p.90) asserts that ‘although the campaigns leading to the 1991 elections 
were emotionally charged, what was less encouraging was the lack of any issue-based, issue-
oriented debate: there was no serious campaigning on the basis of tangible issues.’ Burnell (2002: 
p. 1111) claims that ‘by focusing on Chiluba personally the opposition were diverted from 
targeting the MMD government's poor socioeconomic performance’. The BBC observes that 
‘newspaper headlines and radio shows have been dominated by personality politics in the 2016 
election run-up … with little debate on real policies.’ (BBC: 10 August 2016).  
 
During the first four years of independence, Zambia functioned as a multi-party democracy 
and successfully held one presidential-and-national assembly election in 1968 contested by more 
than two political parties. This election was won by Kenneth Kaunda’s United National 
Independence Party (UNIP), who became increasingly authoritarian and intolerant to opposition, 
which led to the abolition of multi-partyism and the introduction of a one-party system of 
government on 8th December 1972. During the 20-year one-party state, a total of four elections 
were arranged and conducted with virtually no credible electoral competition. The return to the 
multi-party system in 1990 was led by powerful interest groups, predominantly from the labour 
movement, faith-based organisations and a consortium of non-governmental organisations who 
organised a mass-based popular movement against UNIP’s mismanagement of the country and 
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monopoly on power, in a classic episode that illustrates the political influence of interest groups 
and state weakness in Zambia. The mass-based popular protests of this time forced the UNIP 
government to abandon the one-party system of democracy and re-introduced multi-party 
democracy on 4th December 1990 (Times of Zambia, 1990), in the form of elections on 31st October 
1991.  
 
Between 1992 and 2005, the country functioned as a dominant-party democracy with 
Fredrick Chiluba’s Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), which had won the first 
elections after the return to multi-party democracy, enjoying majority seats in the national 
assembly. An attempt by Chiluba in early 2001 to amend the constitution so as to allow him to 
seek a third term (which he had imposed in 1996 aimed at eliminating Kaunda and other prominent 
opposition leaders) was met with widespread opposition by interest groups (opposition parties and 
civil society). Since then, as shown in Table 4.9, the country has enjoyed relatively stable 
democracy: having successfully held a total of eight presidential and/or national assembly 
elections and peacefully transferred power between different governments, UNIP-to-MMD (1991) 
and MMD-to Patriotic Front (2011). On this score, Zambia has been ranked as one of the most 
democratic countries in Africa (no. 9 out of 54) and just slightly above the world average (no. 86 
out of 167) (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018; Freedom House, 2018).  
 
Table 4.9 General elections in Zambia (1964-2016) 
Election dates Participating political parties System of 
government 
20-21 January 1964; Legislative Council Election UNIP (55), ANC (10), NPP, Independents Multi-party 
19th December 1968; Presidential and national 
assembly elections 
UNIP (81), ANC (23), Independents (1) Multi-party  
5th December 1973: Single party presidential and 
national assembly elections 
UNIP One-party  
12th December 1978: Single party presidential and 
national assembly elections 
UNIP One-party 
27th October 1983: Single party presidential and 
national assembly elections 
UNIP One-party 
26th October 1988: Single party presidential and 
national assembly elections 
UNIP One-party 
31st October 1991: Presidential and national assembly 
elections 
UNIP (25), MMD (125) Dominant  party 
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18th November 1996: Presidential and national 
assembly elections 
MMD (131), ZDC (5), NP (2), AZ (2), MDP (0), 
Independents (10) 
Dominant  party 
27th December 2001: Presidential and national 
assembly elections 
MMD (69), UPND (49), FDD (12), UNIP (13), 
HP (4), ZRP (1), PF (1), NCC, SDP, AZ, NLD, 
Independents (1) 
Multi-party 
28th September 2006: Presidential and national 
assembly elections 
MMD (72), PF (44), UDA (27), ULP (2), NDF 
(1), Independents (2) 
Multi-party 
30th October 2008: Presidential by-elections MMD, PF, UPND, HP Multi-party 
20th September 2011: Presidential and national 
assembly elections 
PF (60), MMD (55), UPND (28), ADD (1), FDD 
(1), UNIP, NMP, NAREP, ZED, NGP, NRP, HP, 
UPDD, NP, ZDDM, ZCP, APC, CDP, ULP, 
FEDEPA, Independents 
Multi-party 
20th January 2015: Presidential by-election PF, MMD, UPND, UNIP, HP, FDD, GPZ, CDP, 
NAREP, FDA, FRP 
Multi-party 
11th August 2016: Presidential and national assembly 
elections 
PF (80), UPND (58), MMD (3), FDD (1), RP, 
NAREP, ADD, UDF, UNIP, GPP, RRP, GPZ, 
UPP, Independents (14) 
Multi-party 
Notes: UNIP = United National Independence Party, ANC = African National Congress, NPP = National Progressive Party, MMD = Movement 
for Multi-Party Democracy, ZDC = Zambia Democratic Congress, NP = National Party, AZ = Agenda for Zambia, MDP = Movement for a 
Democratic Process, HP = Heritage Party, PF = Patriotic Front, NCC = National Citizens’ Coalition, NDF = National Democratic Focus, ULP = 
United Liberal Party, UPND = United Party for National Development, ZED = Zambians for Empowerment and Development, NAREP = National 
Restoration Party, ADD = Alliance for Development and Democracy, NMP = National Movement for Progress, UPDD = Unified Party for 
Democracy and Development, ZDDM = Zambia Direct Democracy Movement, ZCP = Zambian Conservative Party, APC = All People's Congress 
Party, FEDEPA = Federal Democratic Party, GPZ = Green Party of Zambia, CDP = Christian Democratic Party, FDA = Forum for Democratic 
Alternatives, FRP = Fourth Revolution Party, RP = Rainbow Party, GPP = Golden Progressive Party, RRP = Radical Revolution Party,  
 
The ‘political business cycle’ theoretical framework and the results from the quantitative 
analysis suggest broadly that national elections in Africa often have negative macro-economic 
effects, as opportunistic incumbent political leaders and/or parties engage in expansionary fiscal 
policies and drive up fiscal deficits during election years but fail to implement adequately the 
deflationary part of the cycle after elections. The evidence as shown in Figure 4.3, which has been 
produced using data from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (2018), African 
Election Database (2012) and the Electoral Commission of Zambia, clearly suggests that there has 
been electorally-timed fiscal manipulation in Zambia since the 1990s. General elections in Zambia 
are conducted every 5 years to choose the President, Members of Parliament and Councillors.  
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Figure 4.3: Fiscal performance and general elections in Zambia (1990-2018) 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook (2018), Database of Political Institutions (2018), African Election Database (2012), Electoral 
Commission of Zambia (various publications) 
 
There are some telling episodes that fit the pattern documented by our regression analysis, 
suggesting that there is evidence of election-motivated fiscal manipulation in Zambia as the 
country’s politics become increasingly more competitive. Figure 4.9 reveals clear patterns linking 
expansionary fiscal policies in five out of eight general elections conducted since the return of 
multi-partyism in 1990. These patterns also confirm our findings from the econometrics of Table 
4.7, suggesting that although government have made some effort to implement post-election 
cutbacks, these efforts have not been adequate to deflate the economy. During the elections 
conducted in 1996, 2001, 2008 and 2015, a clear pattern of fiscal manipulation appears but the 
post-election measures do not counterbalance the extravagances entertained during election, 
causing temporary deficits to persist. Deficits worsened in election years and did not fully subside 
after elections leading to even larger deficits in subsequent elections. As is shown in Figure 4.8 
cumulatively the resultant deficits from opportunistic fiscal manipulation in Zambia have been 
growing after 1991. For instance, the deficit of the election year 1996 is lower by 2.7 percentage 
points to the one in the election year 2001, and the one in 2015 is higher than in 2001 by 4 
percentage points. The weak ability to implement post-election cutback have particularly been 
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severe after 2006 (reflecting the impact of more competitive elections). In the other three elections 
in 2006, 2011 and 2016 appear not to show any such patterns. On this evidence we conclude that 
‘political business cycles’ have contributed towards Zambia’s increasing weak ability to manage 
and control fiscal deficits, and this has partly contributed to the massive deterioration of the deficit 
since the beginning of more competitive elections. 
 
4.6.2 Natural resource endowments 
 
As mentioned earlier, Zambia is a natural resource-dependent country with copper currently 
accounting for about 70 percent of export earnings. It is clearly documented that copper mining in 
Zambia has been central to the country’s economic fortunes as well as its ills (Kalinda and Floro, 
1992; Lundstøl and Isaksen, 2018). To assess what impact this has had on fiscal performance we 
focus on ‘boom-bust’ cycles and the management of resource revenues. damage to institutions. 
The context is that for much of the decade after independence in 1964, Zambia was seen as one of 
the prosperous countries on the African continent, thanks to the huge mineral deposits and the 
booming copper prices. However, a decade of macroeconomic shocks which started in the mid-
1970s and closely associated with natural resource dependence such as a slump in copper prices, 
and massive increases in oil prices, conspired and sent the economy into severe macroeconomic 
downturn. These factors weakened government finances, significantly increased public 
indebtedness, the result of which was balance of payments crisis and economic decline. The 
continued fall in copper prices resulted in the dramatic erosion of national income and brought the 
country’s real per capita GDP to its knees, as it plummeted by almost one-third, an experience 
some analysts assert has never occurred anywhere else in Africa during peacetimes. The past 
decade also witnessed a significant surge in commodity prices on the international market, 
including copper since 2004. Although the structure of the economy has changed slightly, the 
country still has a strong dependence on mining (IMF, 2015). 
 
We argue that understanding the extent to which the country’s fiscal position is linked to 
natural resource dependence, we need to examine fiscal responses during resource ‘boom-bust’ 
cycles and government management of resource revenues. Our econometric findings in this 
chapter suggest that during resource booms, governments in developing countries tend to come 
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under huge political pressure to engage in extravagant public expenditure;  and because of state 
weakness, these spending extravagances tend to be difficult to completely reverse during resource 
busts, thereby causing fiscal deficits to emerge. Also, as we discovered in chapter 2, natural-
resource intensive economies such as Zambia have not just failed to successfully introduce new 
taxes which can recoup a fairer share of revenues from the resource sector, because mining 
companies are so powerful to compel government not to force heavier taxes for them to pay, but 
have also tended to be slack in their imposition of the corporate taxation that is due, making it 
difficult to restrain the public sector deficit and, of course, setting a bad example to other taxpayers 
by transparently failing to encourage timely payment of taxes. 
 
We argue that Zambia’s experience fits a pattern where resource ‘boom-bust’ cycles fuelled 
unproductive public spending resulting in massive budgetary imbalances and high public debt. We 
attempt to trace these trends to the periods of copper booms of the early 1960s and early 1970s, 
and busts of 1980s, and the most recent ‘boom-bust’ and resource management of the 2000s. 
Particular attention is also given to government fiscal responses and resource management during 
these periods. As a mineral intensive country and following the nationalisation of the mines after 
independence, natural resource revenues have been a major source of revenues for the government 
of Zambia. The country boasted of a strong fiscal position during the decade after independence 
(1964-1974) with many of the government programmes funded from government revenues, 
bolstered by mineral revenues (Kalinda and Floro, 1992). Although copper revenues presented an 
opportunity to investments in economic development, development policy as espoused in 
successive National Development Plans was anchored on an expensive and inefficient strategy of 
nationalisation of key economic sectors and a strong preference for heavy government 
participation in the economy. Throughout the 1970s, resources were wasted on promoting ‘import 
substitution’ and protection of ‘infant industries’ as the panacea for achieving industrialisation. 
Additional resource revenues were directed at public consumption mainly subsidies in the 
agricultural sector mainly covering the production of the staple food, maize but also towards other 
consumer items such as ‘cooking oil, salt, matchers and soap’ (Kalinda and Floro, 1992: p. 7) and 
sustaining inefficient state-owned companies, on the expectation that the fairly favourable copper 
prices on the international market will remain for some while (Adam et al., 2014). Substantial 
amounts were also allocated towards social sector spending, education, health and social service 
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delivery: in particular there was a massive expansion of social infrastructure in form of public 
schools and hospitals (Ibid). Because of the booming copper sector which brought into national 
coffers additional revenues there was at that time no real concern over the country’s public 
finances, or pressure to keep them under control. The natural resource booms were able to pay for 
most public expenditure. In the final analysis, Zambia was able to expand its total final expenditure 
on consumption and investment by some 70 percent of GNI in the years immediately following 
independence. However, with weak bureaucratic capacity, there was neither proper planning with 
respect to the sustainability of these policies other than its reliance on booming copper revenues, 
nor the capacity to effectively administer these measures (Colclough, 1989; Kalinda and Floro, 
1992). The expansionary period bequeathed to later years a high level of running costs and the 
burden of servicing debt.   
 
When world copper prices collapsed during the 1980s, the country plunged into a profound 
and lasting macroeconomic crisis as public spending, driven by policies of urban bias, became 
unsustainable. Copper prices plummeted by about 51 percent creating a gaping hole in export 
earnings of almost 43 percent. Two factors were at the centre of the fiscal response to this 
macroeconomic crisis: firstly, the pressures from domestic political constituents to continue with 
the urban bias agenda in order not to alienate the interest groups on whom political stability 
depended and secondly, the shock was wrongly treated as a temporary phenomenon and was not 
expected to take long. According to a former of minister of finance “copper prices had once 
collapsed in 1970 only to rebound in 1974, and when we consulted the World Bank the advice was 
that the shock was temporary with prices expected to recover within five years”. Under pressure 
from the political influence of urban dwellers and faced with what was perceived as a temporary 
fiscal deficit, the government’s initial policy response was to borrow to cover the deficit. However, 
as copper prices continued to fall, mineral revenues which had financed most of public 
expenditure, including the extravagant social services aimed at maintaining consumption and 
living standards in urban areas, had dried up by 1977. At this point it was clear that the temporary 
deficit had become persistent and was now a major concern. “[T]here was a real concern and a 
sense of desperation in the UNIP government over public finances from the early 1980s – national 
coffers had dried up” as one of our interviewee, a former deputy minister in the UNIP government 
responded to our question on how the political leadership took the crisis. The rapid expansion of 
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social service spending during the time when copper prices were fairly favourable, could no longer 
by supported by the dwindling copper revenues. Government revenues declined with the fall in 
copper export earnings from the average of about 30 percent of GDP during the first decade of 
independence (1965-75) to less than 20 percent from the mid-1980s onwards. The World Bank 
estimates the deficit to have averaged around 13 percent of GDP during the period 1975-85 (World 
Bank, 1987). Attempts were made to close the fiscal gap by cutting spending, but these efforts 
were not sufficient to eliminate deficits or address the fiscal crisis.  
 
We argue that even when it was certainly evident that the government needed to cut spending 
further, as deficits persisted, the government sought additional borrowing with significant fiscal 
risks over spending cuts because it was too scared to cut ‘politically sensitive’ areas like public 
sector employment, food subsidies and social service provision. The case of state weakness was 
clearly illustrated by the events of December 1986, when at a time of severe economic crisis with 
fiscal deficits averaging about 13 percent of GDP, following an IMF recommendation, the Kaunda 
government announced measures to restrict government spending including reduction of subsidies 
on food and fertilizer, and a wage freeze so as to curb the deficit that had clearly become difficult 
to control. The removal of subsidies, which caused massive increases in prices of basic foodstuffs 
including the staple food (corn meal) but was crucial to bringing deficits down, had to be 
abandoned after four days of a violent revolt by the urban population in which eleven people died. 
Fearing the danger of alienating powerful interest groups – the urban population, labour unions 
and civil servants – on whom political stability and continued stay in office depended, President 
Kaunda announced on 12th December 1986 the cancellation of price rises and reinstated the 
subsidies, thus allowing the deficits to persist. Subsequent economic development and 
democratisation have not reduced Zambia’s natural resource dependence: mineral exports as a 
proportion of total exports remain high at about 70 percent which is lower than 89 percent about 
the level in the 1970s and 1980s (World Bank, 2018). What is surprising in Zambia is that attempts 
through liberalisation and privatisation as in the 1990s or through an extension of capitalism since 
2010, have alike been unsuccessful in reducing mineral dependence and its various harmful 
impacts, some of which have been illustrated – such as rigidity of tax revenue in Chapter 2, limited 
bureaucratic quality in Chapter 3 and increasing lack of control over budget deficits as illustrated 
in Figure 4.3 above. 
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During the boom of 2010, government accelerated spending by embarking on large-scale 
infrastructure projects and expansionary fiscal policies. As well as constructing new and 
rehabilitating old road networks, building of new hospitals and housing units, and expanding 
airport infrastructure to cater for an estimated ten-fold increase in traffic, the government more 
than doubled the size of the public sector wage bill in 2013 and introduced a new (higher) 
minimum threshold of taxable personal income. The government also increased administrative 
expenditure, expanding the number of provinces by one (to 10), and the number of districts from 
72 in 2011 to 115 by 2017. When the copper boom began to recede after 2011, declining from 
US$6,800 to US$4,900 per tonne between 2011 and 2014, government revenues especially the 
mineral royalty and corporate income tax  were hit, and this combined with the increases in public 
expenditure referred to above caused the public sector deficit to increase sharply as can be 
observed in Figure 4.3. Left with this gap combined with a slowing economy, the government 
turned to borrowing to maintain spending and stimulate the economy. Although Zambia had a 
slightly above average level of public sector budget deficit in the past, it has been deteriorating 
faster than anywhere else on the continent since 2010, worsening by 7.2 percentage points between 
2010 and 2017 (see Table 4.2 above). Public debt has increased rapidly, from 21 percent of GDP 
in 2011 to about 60 percent by 2016 (MoF, 2018; 2017), and now a larger proportion of the budget 
is being spent on servicing past debt, thereby diverting resources from social spending. For 
example, debt service was less than 15 percent of the budget prior to 2009, but now at 31 percent 
it is more than spending on education (at 9 percent), and over half of combined spending on health 
and education. The fall in commodity prices exacerbated the difficulty of controlling public sector 
deficits because it weakened the local currency and consequently made foreign currency- 
denominated public debt more expensive. The estimated impact of the depreciation of the local 
currency on debt service was estimated at K1.3 billion (US$118 million). Other problems that have 
cropped up are delays in making payments to government contractors (suppliers of goods and 
services) resulting in a build of public debt and delays in paying civil servants’ salaries (for 
example, salaries for January and February 2019 were delayed by a month). 
 
The second issue documented by our econometric analysis, is that natural resource 
dependence can affect fiscal performance via its negative impact on institutions, in particular rent-
seeking behaviour and corruption. Some scholars have argued that this is probably the biggest 
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challenge facing natural resource-intensive countries (Tornell and Lane, 1999; Arezki and 
Brükner, 2012). We wish to examine the extent to which the idea that because natural resources 
generate significant rents, powerful interest groups compete for fiscal windfalls thereby 
exacerbating the difficulty of building fiscal discipline, fits the Zambian experience. Zambia has 
certainly experienced some of the political consequences of natural resource dependence as 
predicted by theory, mainly through weak institutions and rent seeking and corruption. As in many 
natural resource rich countries in Africa, there is a considerable history linking rent-seeking and 
corruption to poor policies and management of natural resources, in this case copper, in Zambia. 
The privatisation of the mines in Zambia provides some of the patterns that have been linked to 
these problems. The privatisation of the mines which started in 2000 and ended in 2007, saw a 
total of eleven private mining companies buying off assets previously owned by the parastatal 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) Limited while others developed green field assets. 
Under the agenda of encouraging private sector investment in the country’s largest industry, the 
government discreetly granted what appears to be extremely generous tax concessions, informally 
exempting all mines except for the more profitable deep mines in the northwest (Lumwana and 
Kansanshi) from payment of corporate income tax. This tendency towards overlooking the tax 
obligations of established clients of the government extended beyond the mining industry to other 
parastatals such as the Zambia Sugar Corporation (Action Aid, 2013: Sweet nothings ‘The human 
cost of a British sugar giant avoiding taxes in southern Africa’) Action Aid, a charity organisation 
working in developing countries, found that the Zambian subsidiary of Associated British Foods 
had during the early 2000s been using an array of tax planning schemes to avoid paying  US$13.8 
million in due taxes on its Zambian activities, and this constituted one of major constraints on the 
ability of the Zambia Revenue Authority to sustain the tax ratio and control the public sector 
deficit. In particular, of course, it was very hard to persuade small- and medium-income corporate 
taxpayers to pay their income tax obligations when much larger-scale operators were so obviously 
being exempted. Indeed, as shown in chapter 2, the tax ratio in Zambia actually fell over time 
during the period 2001-2018, and played a major part in the tendency for the budget deficit to 
deteriorate as reported in Figure 4.3 above. 
 
It is the awarding of these ‘under the table’ tax concessions which has been linked to bribery 
and corruption (Curtis and Lissen, 2008), and thence to the persistence of budgetary deficits on a 
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larger scale in Zambia than in otherwise similar developing countries (such as Ghana as discussed 
in Chapter 2 above). A related area to this which has come under intense scrutiny is the 
management of tax exemptions. Fiscal powers to grant tax exemptions are vested in the Minister 
of Finance, and reports and our experience in the Ministry of Finance, show that decisions are 
often related to individual mining companies and people, rather than being based on any strategic 
sector-wide argument. This is well illustrated by how the granting of tax concessions was done 
during the privatisation of the mines. In 2000, the minister first granted tax exemptions to two 
mining companies, Konkola Copper Mines and Mopani Copper Mines. This policy decision 
infuriated other mining companies which petitioned the government so that they could also benefit. 
What followed was a highly guided confidential process of negotiations with individual mining 
companies with virtually no input from key stakeholders except politicians from the ruling party, 
with no public explanation of the foundational basis of the expansive tax concessions. These series 
of negotiations culminated into the signing of eleven individual Development Agreements with 
what many commentators, including the international development community regard as some of 
the most generous tax exemptions observed in Africa. Specifically, the mineral royalty rate was 
reduced from 2 percent to 0.6 percent; the corporate income tax rate was reduced from 35 percent 
to 25 percent; the period for carrying business losses forward was increased from 5 to 20 years; 
the withholding tax rate was reduced from 15 to 0 percent; excise duty on electricity was abolished 
for a period of 5 years; and tariffs on consumables scrapped.  
 
Several people interviewed by ourselves believe that the negotiations that led to 
Development Agreements provided fertile grounds for corruption, and also placed the government 
in a persistently weak bargaining position in relation to the mining companies. This view was also 
strong even as early as 2008, when it became publicly apparent that the unprecedented increase in 
copper prices had not translated into more revenue benefits for the country because of the tax 
concessions and the long stability periods offered to the companies through the Development 
Agreements. Under public pressure and with the help of the Norwegian government, the 
Mwanawasa regime government abolished the Development Agreements and introduced a new 
fiscal and regulatory regime in 2008, which included among others, a copper windfall. However, 
fearing to alienate the mines which had threatened to suspend operations and take legal action 
against the Government, the new government of Rupiah Banda which took office after 
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Mwanawasa’s death abandoned the windfall tax in 2009. Political interference and rent seeking 
have continued: in 2014 when the government doubled the mineral royalty tax rate on mining to 
raise revenues to close budgetary gaps that had gone out of control, mining companies threatened 
to scale back substantially their operations and layoff more than 20,000 workers. Fearing the 
political fallout that would result from estranging the mining companies, the President directed the 
ministers of Finance and Mines to renegotiate the new tax arrangements, which were subsequently 
substantially reduced leaving the country still grappling with large budgetary gaps and rapidly 
increasing public debts. These episodes appear to confirm our finding that natural resource 
dependence can negatively affect fiscal performance through political interference, rent-seeking 
and corruption alongside other tax-related issues discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 above, as 
one of the major causes of poor revenue performance and thence the fiscal deficit. Unhappily, this 
problem has persisted into the current decade, as shown by Table 4.10, but has also been 
accompanied by worsening control of public expenditure. 
 
Table 4.10: Tax regimes for the mining sector in Zambia (1964 – 2017) 
 
 Kenneth Kaunda Fredrick 
Chiluba 
Levy Mwanawasa Rupiah 
Banda 
Michael 
Sata 
Edgar 
Lungu 
 1964-
1966 
1970 1983 1986 2000 2007 2008 2009 2012/14 2015 2016 
Mineral 
royalty 
13.5%a    0.6%b  3% of 
gross 
sales 
value 
3% of 
norm 
value  
3% of 
norm 
value 
6% 6-
9% 
4-
6% 
Corporate 
income tax  
37.5-
45% 
45% 45% 45% 25% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 
Mineral tax   51% 51% 51%        
Export tax    4-8% 13%        
Windfall tax       25-75% Abolished     
Variable 
income tax 
      15% 
when 
taxable 
income 
is above 
8% of 
gross 
value 
15% 15%  15% 
Withholding 
tax 
   15% 0% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
Capital 
allowances 
5% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 25% 100% 25% 25% 25% 
Reference 
price  
Yes  No No No No No Yes 
(LME) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Ring fencing  No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
Carry 
forward of 
losses 
Yes Yes Yes 5 years 10-20 
years 
10-20 
years 
10-20 
years 
10 years 10 years 10 
years 
10 
years 
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State 
ownership  
No 51% 100% 100% 10-20% 10-20% 10-20% 10-20% 10-20% 10-
20% 
10-
20% 
Fiscal 
stability  
No Yes  No No Yes No  No  No  No  No  No  
Exemptions 
from tariffs 
No No   Yes  Yee Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Development 
agreements 
    6 11 0 0 0 0 0 
Tax haven 
owner 
Yes  Yea  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
aThis rate was applied on gross output multiplied by the prevailing London Metal Exchange price at the time of 
production, less the estimated cost of production of K16 per ton 
bof gross sales value less transport, insurance and refining costs 
cthe monthly average cash price per metric ton 
 
 
4.6.3 Effectiveness of IMF (and other) conditionality  
 
When a country is hit by a severe macroeconomic crisis and fiscal imbalances, international 
mechanisms are available to help steer the economy out of such crises, in particular IMF standby 
agreements, typically made conditional on policy and structural reforms such as public expenditure 
cuts and liberalisation of the exchange rate. Faced with increasingly unmanageable levels of public 
debt as described above, the Zambian government approached the IMF in 2013 for such a standby. 
The Fund agreed to help - but attached conditionality in the form of a strong and sustained fiscal 
consolidation path starting in 2015 to significantly lower the deficits, including specific measures 
to increase domestic revenues and scaling back public spending (IMF, 2015). However, the 
commitment to engage with the Fund began to fade following the death of the country’s president, 
Michael Sata, in October 2014 as the new administration did not seem eager to conclude the 
negotiations. One respondent who worked in the Ministry of Finance at that time, indicated that 
although the ministry of finance was enthusiastic about an IMF bailout, the incumbent political 
leadership was ‘uncomfortable’ accepting and implementing the aid package in the form proposed 
by the IMF, namely withdrawal of fuel and electricity subsidies and scaling down significantly the 
infrastructure budget (roads, housing units, hospitals, airports, etc). It has been reported that when 
the team from the IMF Headquarters met the President in 2015 in Zambia for a possible bailout 
package, the proposed aid package was turned down because it was feared that it would have 
significantly constrained critical spending (required to boost re-election chances) during the 
heavily contested 2016 presidential election. He is reported to have told the IMF that withdrawing 
subsidies would stoke up “price increases” while slowing down infrastructure projects would be a 
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“sign of failure”, both of which could cost him the next election (Quoting Lusaka Times, 21 
November 2015). A deadlock was ‘informally’ declared as the IMF could not accept the borrowing 
plans proposed by the government in exchange for financial help. Therefore, the IMF returned to 
Washington without an agreement.  
 
Further efforts by the IMF to reach an agreement on an economic programme for Zambia 
failed even after its Deputy Director in charge of African Affairs met the government in January 
2016, on account of lack of specific measures and reforms to achieve fiscal consolidation, and 
more fundamentally existing policies threatened macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability 
(IMF, 2017).  In November 2016, the IMF warned that Zambia had now crossed over from the 
category of ‘moderate risk’  into the territory of ‘high risk’ of debt distress  (IMF, 2016) after an 
attempt by the ministry of finance to engage the IMF into negotiations failed. With the fiscal 
situation deteriorating faster than anywhere on the continent in the recent past (see Table 4.2), and 
the cost of adjustment escalating exponentially, the Zambian Cabinet in February 2018 approved 
several measures envisioned to start curing the now out-of-control public sector budget deficit and 
convince the IMF, but again these were rejected on similar grounds. Discussions on a possible 
Enhanced Credit Facility (ECF) IMF arrangement had remained on hold in 2019.  
 
One of the big puzzles in the period 2011-18 is how the Zambian government had somehow 
avoided reaching an agreement on an aid package with the IMF, but managed to finance its deficits 
despite its public finances being under severe stress. We argue that this puzzle may be explained 
by the declining restraining influence of traditional aid donors due to the increased ability of poor 
LDCs, particularly in Africa, to turn to alternative sources of sovereign finance, namely China and 
Eurobond markets. In Zambia since 2011 the government has increasingly turned to China and 
commercial lenders for loans to fund its deficits given the welcome absence of a requirement to 
implement IMF-type austerity measures, which the incumbent political leaders are certainly not 
comfortable to implement (The Economist: 15 September 2018; Africa Confidential: 25 January 
2019). Between 2015 and 2018, the IMF repeatedly tried to dissuade the Zambian government 
from expanding its borrowing from China, but to no avail. Our respondent in the ministry of 
finance, who was involved in some of the negotiations stated that the government has been 
sceptical about the adequacy and predictability of the IMF bailout package, as well as the potential 
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negative impact of the austerity measures. The government seems resolved not to accept any 
conditionality which, like the IMF’s, would have halted borrowing and thereby reduced the public 
sector budget deficit. When the most recent negotiations failed in August 2018, the government 
formalised the deadlock by declaring it was going ahead with its earlier plans of sourcing financing 
from other sources – predominantly from Chinese sources. In a media brief on 17 February 2018 
on the conclusion of the failed discussions, a presidential spokesperson stated that “there is no 
worry in government whatsoever about the status of the IMF program because the stalling IMF 
arrangement has no effect on Zambia’s growth strategy… we will not go to the end of the earth to 
pursue an IMF programme. If it comes, well and good, if it doesn’t.., we are proceeding with the 
credible programme which is already delivering results” (quoting: Lusaka Times Reuters, 20 April 
2018). This was an apparent reference to the borrowing plans approved by the Zambian Cabinet 
and rejected by the IMF, because no other plans had been developed. The government also put 
pressure on the IMF to recall its envoy, a year prior to the expiry of his tenure in Zambia, for his 
open criticism of the rising foreign debt, which remarkably the IMF openly endorsed (The Mast: 
28 August 2018; Africa Confidential: 14 September 2018; The Economist: 25 September 2018). 
Although the ministry of finance had confirmed his premature departure and that the IMF had 
committed to send his replacement (MoF Press Statement: 24 August 2018), no new envoy had 
been sent after 8 months.   
 
The declining influence of advice from the DAC donors can also be seen in the withdrawal 
of bilateral aid to Zambia government by the Norwegian government, which had been supporting 
the country to improve the effectiveness of tax collection, particularly in the mining sector. The 
Norwegian government, with the backing of the IMF, had supported Zambia in improving the 
taxation of the mining sector in a number of areas since 2006, focusing on knowledge sharing, 
provision of technical expertise and legal advice on possible routes out of the infamous 
development agreements, support towards specialised auditing of mining companies, development 
of a mining tax model and training of staff in the country’s revenue collection statutory body, 
Zambia Revenue Authority (Fjeldstad and Heggstad, 2011). Support was also provided towards 
the country’s Mineral Value Chain Project, aimed at developing and strengthening information 
coordination systems. Although there had been some success, particularly in the area of audit 
capacity, the Norwegians were unhappy with the ‘political forces’ in the ministry of finance that 
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ignored more prudent advice from international partners on the importance of providing a 
predictable and equitable tax regime for mining companies. Against donor advice, the government  
had embarked on an unpredictable and reactionary approach to tax policy, amending the fiscal 
regime for the mining sector about 9 times between 2000 and 2014, a situation which contributed 
not only to a hostile relationship between government and mining companies, but also adversely 
affected the tax ratio (lower revenues from the mines). For example, the IMF (2015: p. 10) argues 
that an unexpected change in the mining fiscal regime and documentation requirements for 
purposes of value added tax in 2015 “impacted the outlook for the mining sector.” Norway pulled 
out its support to the Zambian government in 2014, primary for these and other governance-related 
reasons. Other aid donors like DFID, who had been providing aid to government to help increase 
tax revenues so as to reduce the country’s reliance on the UK and other donors, suspended its 
support due to reports of corruption in the handling of social cash transfer.  
 
Although the country has in this way managed to dodge the imposition of conditionality, it 
has not completely escaped the cost of delayed adjustment: fiscal deficits have been deteriorating 
faster than anywhere else on the continent since 2010, concerns on public debt have increased as 
it has increased rapidly, from 21 percent of GDP in 2011 to about 60 percent by 2016. According 
to the most recent debt sustainability analyses conducted by the IMF in low income countries, 
Zambia is now one of the 17 countries in Africa considered to be at highest risk of debt distress.     
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we sought to understand why fiscal deficits have become difficult to manage 
and control, especially in Africa. Large and persistent fiscal deficits profoundly concern 
policymakers and development agencies because of the economic costs such as macroeconomic 
instability, unsustainable public debt, loss of flexibility to conduct effective countercyclical fiscal 
policy and loss of investor confidence in the economy which has implications a country’s 
competitiveness. A large literature has identified several economic, political and institutional 
factors identified as determinants of fiscal deficits.  
 
227 
 
Our study focuses opportunistic ‘political business cycles’ to understand whether 
governments in Africa have been able to implement the deflationary phase of the cycle to bring 
down fiscal deficits after the election as claimed by the political economy literature. We also 
considered the short- and medium-term effects of natural resource endowments on the ability to 
manage and control fiscal deficits, focussing on the ‘boom-bust’ cycles, management of natural 
resource revenues, and the effects of natural resources on institutions. Finally, we analysed the 
effectiveness of external and internal institutions, through their restraining influence through 
various instruments, in promoting fiscal discipline and heling African countries in managing fiscal 
balances.  
 
We use a ‘qual-quant’ approach. In our quantitative analytical framework, we follow the 
literature to specify a standard dynamic model that captures the essence of the Nordhaus-type 
opportunistic behaviour to which we add all our key variables in this study. These models are then 
estimated on a sample of 42 African countries for the period 1980-2017, using robust OLS and 
fixed effects. An instrumental variable estimator three-stage least squares (3SLS) is also utilised to 
estimate a system of equations to address a potential problem of endogeneity of some of our 
explanatory variables.   
 
We find some evidence that in most African countries the pre-election fiscal boost is not 
counterbalanced by a post-election cutback (as shown by a statistically significant negative 
coefficient on the election-year dummy and an insignificant positive coefficient on the post-
election year dummy). There is consistently strong evidence of a negative medium-term effect of 
natural resource endowments, but both domestic and external institutions restraint emerge with a 
very weak restraining influence. In the qualitative part of the analysis, we also discover three 
additional factors which appear to play a part in that dynamic. First, Zambia’s increasing 
democratisation has expressed itself in increasingly weak government resistance towards demands 
for higher public expenditure around elections, especially after the mid-2000s. Second, the 
country’s natural resource intensity has weakened government ability to manage and control 
deficits, mainly through weak tax effort especially an extraordinarily generous (and secretive) 
treatment of the tax liabilities of most of the mineral corporations and wasteful and unproductive 
use of natural resource revenues. Finally, the advent of the Chinese as aid donors, which has 
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relieved Zambia, as it has relieved many African administrations, of the need to go to the IMF 
when faced by debt escalation which would otherwise not have been controllable. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis focusses on some of the most urgent and consequential issues in fiscal policy and 
development in Africa. Although it concerns Africa in general, we also make special reference to 
Zambia because fiscal policy has become a major economic topic in the country, and the sponsors 
of my PhD had expressed interest in its findings. Recent trends have shown that, as in many other 
African countries, tax revenues have stagnated or declined, economic growth rates have slowed 
down, public debt have significantly increased, and fiscal deficits are getting out of control. One 
of the consequential implications of these developments for Zambia is that the country was 
reclassified by the IMF in 2016 as being at the highest risk of debt distress, and in 2019 
international rating agencies downgraded its credit rating from Caa1 to Caa2 on account of the 
huge public debt and fiscal deficits. Therefore, thesis has been designed as three core chapters, 
specifically focussing on the developmental role of taxation, public expenditure and fiscal deficits. 
Across the three core chapters, we employ a ‘qual-quant’ (quantitative – qualitative) empirical, a 
key contribution of our work, using panel data regression analysis as main analytical framework 
and a case study approach in the final section pf each chapter to identify causal factors which don’t 
typically emerge regression analysis. 
 
In chapter 2, the main research objective is about how to get developing countries out of 
the low tax-low public expenditure-low development spiral. This is on one of the most urgent and 
intractable problems in development because the capacity to generate sufficient tax revenues is at 
the core of building effective states and, therefore, development (Bräutigam et al.,2008; Besley 
and Persson, 2013). First, we explored the effectiveness of reforms implemented to remedy the 
poor quality of tax structures which are recognised to play a major role in the growth of tax 
revenues in developing countries. Reforms to improve tax structures have involved replacing taxes 
which depend on low-yielding, unstable and narrow bases, with the VAT, which has spread to 
most developing and emergent countries. Second, the tax literature has identified political factors 
as the root of poor tax revenue performance, as governments especially of weak states are 
frightened to raise taxes for fear of loss of office. Efforts to mitigate against political risks 
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associated with tax increases, have included ring-fencing the process of revenue collection and 
transferring it from the direct control of the ministry of finance and other political authorities to 
ARAs. Third, the theoretical literature has also proposed framing the process of revenue collection 
as part of a ‘fiscal contract’ in which the government encourages taxpayers to pay their taxes in 
return for better public services, as part of mitigating against political risks associated with tax 
increases. Existing evidence on the effectiveness of the effectiveness of the VAT and ARA is 
surprisingly limited, and inconclusive, as can be observed in Table 2.2, with the most recent and 
comprehensive studies being sceptical about the revenue effects (Ahlerup et al., 2015; Dom, 2019). 
We do not have systematic evidence concerning processes by which ‘fiscal contracts’ can be 
formed and what impact they have had on revenue generation.  
 
A standard tax equation is specified and estimated by OLS, fixed effects and random effects 
on a sample of 42 African countries covering the period 1980-2013, to test these ideas. Possible 
endogeneity problems such as selection bias and omitted variable and time lag effects are also 
accounted for in our empirical approach. Taken together, our quantitative results show that VAT 
has had no effect, neither in the short- nor in the long-run. The ARA may at best lead to higher tax 
revenues in the immediate term, but the effect dissipates over the medium to long term. ARAs 
have also been found to have a positive effect in countries with better institutions of governance. 
Our results also show a consistently strong positive impact of the two factors that are crucial in the 
emergence of a stable ‘fiscal contract’ – democratic accountability and the quality of public 
expenditure – on tax ratios.  
 
The qualitative section the case studies of Ghana and Zambia provide some insights into 
the factors underlying the development of tax capacities in Africa. Our analysis revealed that the 
ability of the Ghanaian government to secure support of taxpayers and the public by offering a 
bona-fide through ear-marking the additional revenues from the three increases in the VAT rate 
towards the Ghana Education Trust Fund and the National Health Insurance Scheme played an 
important role in building effective ‘fiscal contracts’ and increasing the VAT revenues. By 
contrast, in Zambia VAT revenues had remained stubbornly lower than when the tax was first 
introduced, partly because of the increasing weak resistance towards demands from the urban 
populations for the reduction of taxes to lower prices of basic commodities, which resulted in the 
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reduction of the rates from 20 percent when the tax was first introduced in 1995 to 17.5 percent in 
2003 and 16 percent in 2008. Our case studies have also revealed that the VAT may actually be 
more complex and difficult to administer in low-income countries, due to its heavy reliance on 
robust information and systems requirements especially for large and complex business 
transactions, which have created enforcement problems and undermined its effectiveness 
(Jantscher, 1987: p.3). In Zambia, the key problem with the VAT appeared to emanate from the 
steady increase in input tax refunds relative to the growth in tax collections, which as shown in 
Figure 2.8 had doubled between 2013 and 2015 while the VAT revenues had remained static.  
 
We also discover that another factors which appear to play a part in the difference between 
the two countries is an extraordinarily generous (and secretive) treatment of the tax liabilities of 
most of the mineral corporations and the increasing lack of resistance to demands by the powerful 
mining companies to be exempt from higher taxation in Zambia, where only two out of eleven 
mining companies pay corporation tax, an issue that had become widely known and debated, 
unlike Ghana where all except two larger mining companies pay rates. The two case studies also 
enabled us to observe other processes by which effective ‘fiscal contracts’ were built: in particular 
the offer by government of a bona-fide, or incentive to take part in a contract – either a tax cut 
designed to buy bigger tax increases in future (as in Ghana in 1992), or evidence of effective public 
expenditure, or a formal or informal link between a particular tax base and a particular form of 
favoured public expenditure (as in the windfall taxes levied in the 1990s and 2000s in both 
countries). Finally, our analysis illustrated that if there is widely disseminated evidence that big 
players (in particular multi-national corporations) are not paying what they owe, that will act as a 
disincentive to all the other players seeing their tax liability as contractual. Other issues, however, 
remain unresolved, in particular the ability of ARAs to reduce corruption and increase tax 
revenues. 
 
Although there is now abundant evidence of several low-income countries (not only Ghana 
as illustrated by our case-study, but also Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda; see Figure 2.6 above) have 
been able to break out of the low tax capacity, and that the formation of a fiscal contract, often 
with the assistance of the IMF and aid donors, it remains the case that low-income countries still, 
on average, have worse tax performance than lower-middle and middle- income countries, and this 
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holds their entire development back. The particular aspect of this that we would like to raise in 
conclusion is that the formation of ‘fiscal contracts’ is not a one-shot action, but a process, often 
long-drawn out in time and often requiring experimentation and policy reversal (the case of 
Ghana’s botched and excessive initial VAT introduction in 1995 at 17.5 percent is relevant here). 
Moreover, it is a process requiring the slow building of trust, and this requires in turn the making 
of down payments or bona-fides which require risk-taking and financial sacrifices exceeding the 
capacity of the poorest developing- country administrations, -especially if they are also fragile, 
conflict-vulnerable states. To take a specific example, the crucial move made by Ghana in 1992, 
of liberalising its cocoa industry, was important in presenting the Ghana government as a credible 
partner in a ‘fiscal contract’ and politically enabling the raising of taxes elsewhere in the economy; 
but it was a move with considerable short-term financial costs (note the dip in Ghanaian public 
revenue after 1992 on Figure 2.7a) and this implies costs, and political risks, not necessarily 
affordable by a state with a weaker bureaucracy and less access to aid donors: for example, a 
Burundi, a Southern Sudan, a Central African Republic or a DRC46. The question what kind of 
‘down payments’ towards a fiscal contract can feasibly be made by governments in this 
predicament represents, in our opinion, an important frontier for future research. 
 
In chapter 3, the objective is to understand whether investment in human capital, including 
public expenditure on education, is effective towards promoting long-run economic growth, since 
it has been given a pride of place in the theoretical literature by the 2018 Nobel Prize winner Paul 
Romer and other ‘endogenous growth theory’ advocates. The focus on education rather than on all 
human capital is because it is education which has been credited in the literature to generate 
technological change and thence growth. We examine the possibility that although aggregate 
measures of education spending may not emerge as significant correlates with growth, some of the 
categories of education spending may differentially affect growth as suggested by the World Bank 
and others. We also draw attention to an issue which has recently attracted international attention 
and debate – and has led to an apparent shift in World Bank policy on human capital from more 
enrolments to more learning – that the quality of education human capital, which has been 
 
46 The question of how to best target expenditure (and, by our argument, increase tax yield) in ‘fragile states’ is 
addressed by the recent OECD report on those states (OECD 2014). This draws particular attention (OECD 2014: 
p.45, Box 5.1) to the ‘One Cow per Poor Family’ programme in Rwanda, which being targeted, asset-based and 
decentralised, satisfies several of the conditions for a positive bona-fide towards the making of a ‘fiscal contract’. 
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underexplored in the literature, is crucial for development. Our indicator of human capital quality 
(repeat rates) – being used as second best option due to data limitations on other more ideal 
measures such as test results. 
 
A simple ‘endogenous growth’ framework is estimated on a sample of 42 African countries 
between 1980-2016, using the OLS, FGLS (a variant of the GLS estimator) and the instrumental 
variable 2SLS, guided by the need to make our results comparable to previous studies. Our 
quantitative results show no evidence that increasing government spending on education and 
expanding school enrolments are associated with economic growth. The analysis of disaggregated 
data on education spending levels fail to support the World Bank’s conventional wisdom that 
allocating more resources towards primary is associated with higher growth. However, there is 
strong evidence that improving the quality of education provides a clear boost to economic 
development, much more than by school enrolments. Our preliminary findings show similar results 
as observed by van der Berg (2007) for South Africa and the 2018 World Development Report in 
several poor countries, that the quality of educational human capital, which has been 
underexplored in a majority of growth studies, matters more than the quantity and that policies 
which have strongly focussed on expansion of school enrolments may have compromised quality, 
confirming the scepticism about education quantity expressed by the World Bank’s 2018 World 
Development Report. Focus on universal primary education is important, but not sufficient and 
must be complemented with the goal of improving quality. Appropriate policy to raise the quality 
of education should focus on improving schooling conditions and the quality of institutions as 
these can propel the growth effects of the quality of education. One possibility for the weak impact 
of education expenditure, which we considered here was variations in the quality of institutions of 
governance. Although the quality of institutions has been associated with better outcomes, we 
found no evidence that it provided a boost to the development impact of educational spending in 
Africa. Estimates of the growth effects of educational human capital quantity, measured by gross 
enrolment rates at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, emerged with no statistical significance.  
 
Government expenditure on education, as a share of the national budget, rose from around 
7.7 percent in the late 1990s and over the next two decades reached more than 20 percent. By 2015, 
education expenditure had become the single largest share of the budget. Total enrolment rates 
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expanded from less than 70 percent at primary during the 1970s, to almost all school-age children 
primary being accommodated at more than 102 percent enrolments. Secondary enrolments also 
expanded from around 14 percent in the 1980s to about 40 percent after 2010. However, as can be 
observed from Figure 3.3, the country’s economic growth was relatively poor, with an estimated 
average growth rate of -1.6 percent per year, during the first three decades of independence when 
there was massive growth in spending and expansion of schooling. The GDP growth rate 
temporarily improved between 2001 and 2010 recording the country’s highest performance of 
above 7 percent in 2010 since the 1970s, but in recent years the trend has been declining reaching 
-0.1 percent in the year when education spending and enrolments were at their highest – 2015. 
This apparent lack of linkage between education spending, schooling and economic growth was 
in line with the findings from our regression results, where the insignificant coefficients on these 
explanatory variables suggests no association.   
 
In the qualitative section of the analysis, we apply the same analytic framework to investigate 
why massive investments in education in Zambia since independence have not been correlated 
with improvements in economic performance. The evidence shows that explanations for low 
educational impact and quality can be linked to inefficiencies in managing public resources, 
including disproportionate allocation of scarce resources to wages/salaries versus other 
educational inputs leading to widespread lack of the necessary teaching and learning materials and 
the failure to send resources designated for specific areas to those areas. Educational quality has 
been compromised by a failure to recognise that growth in enrolment cannot effectively deliver 
better learning unless complementary inputs such as teaching materials, additional teaching staff 
and maintenance of school buildings are delivered at the same time: a problem which in Zambia 
has been compounded by weak budgetary discipline and switching of such resources away from 
the areas to which they had been destined. 
 
First, in Zambia, like many other developing countries, education expenditure is 
predominantly allocated and spent on teacher salaries. The World Bank (2018) has documented 
that teachers’ salaries constituted the largest single budget item in education expenditure in low-
income countries, accounting for more than three-quarters of the budget. The evidence based on 
data from the ministry of finance showed that in Zambia, this budget item (salaries) averaged about 
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89 percent of total educational spending in Zambia between 2009 and 2015, leaving 7.5 percent 
for construction and upgrading of schools and 3.5 percent for other educational inputs. We have 
argued that spending more on teacher salaries is not necessarily in and of itself a major problem, 
but it had made it difficult for the provision of other learning and teaching complementary inputs 
needed such as textbooks and in-service training which are crucial in significantly aiding learning. 
We argue that such factors could explain the weak association between education spending and 
learning.  
 
Second, despite the presence of policies to ensure the quality of learning, such as school 
grants for primary and secondary education, weak implementation undermines the effectiveness 
of these programmes. This situation is exacerbated by the problem of schools not often unaware 
of how much they are supposed to receive. For instance, primary schools are supposed to receive 
school grants (funding) from government to support the free education policy, but 30 percent of 
schools do not receive any government grants. In 2013-14, almost a third of school capitation 
grants failed to reach Zambian primary schools, thus public funds sometimes fail to reach schools 
or are not used as intended. In Zambia funds were diverted for other uses, including to fund district 
level operational costs. 
 
Third, substantial improvements in educational spending and enrolment rates had on our 
analysis, not improved the quality of education as measured by learning outcomes: the significant 
coefficient on the variable Repeat in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 suggests that the problem is one of 
declining educational quality. This problem is paralleled elsewhere: for instance, across Africa as 
a whole there had been no improvement in student learning at grade 5 between 1999 and 2014, as 
national learning assessment scores averaged 34.5 percent in maths and 33.2 percent English in 
1999, compared to 35.3 percent and 31.4 percent respectively in 2014 (World Bank, 2018: p.59). 
Although the government has invested in improving schooling conditions by recruiting more 
teachers and thus, making some improvements in the pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) to around 40 (the 
mid-range for region), this has not fully translated into improvements in the quality of education 
in Zambia because of other factors such the high levels of teacher absenteeism, there has been no 
improvements in the provision of textbooks and shortages are widespread (World Bank, 2018: 
p.59). The World Bank reports that the number of primary school students sharing a text book 
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textbook for each subject is around 5 (1 for mathematics, 0.9 for English, and 0.9 for science) and 
almost the same number of secondary school students share between 1 and 1.5 textbooks (for 
example, 1 for math, 1.7 for English, and 1 for science). At the primary level, there seems to be no 
urban and rural difference in the availability of textbooks; however, rural secondary schools face 
more problems with textbook shortage compared to urban secondary schools (World Bank, 2018; 
Figure 3.18). In secondary, shortages in science and math textbooks are more serious than those 
in English textbooks. Eighty-two percent of primary schools and 63 percent of secondary schools 
reported the shortage (Ibid: p. 61). School enrolment rates have rapidly improved since the 1970s, 
reaching 75 percent for primary, 96 percent for lower secondary, 59 percent for upper secondary. 
However, learning achievements have been low – below the 40 percent mark in all subjects 
(English, math, local language). Scores for English and mathematics for grade 5 remain as low as 
32 percent and 35 percent, respectively (Examination Council of Zambia 2015). Scores in grade 
9, too, show low scores of 29 percent for mathematics and 36 percent for English and science, 
respectively. Finally, the Zambia case study also highlights the existence of a weak direct link 
between the democratic accountability measure of institutional performance and growth, as the 
attainment of multi-party rule has not delivered since 2006. 
 
In chapter 4, the main research objective is to understand why fiscal deficits are becoming 
difficult to manage and control, especially in Africa, because large and chronic fiscal deficits 
profoundly concern policymakers and development agencies due to their macroeconomic 
implications, they can lead to a debt crisis, undermine a country’s ability to conduct prudent 
countercyclical fiscal policy, affect invest confidence in the economy, and  undermine a country’s 
competitiveness. Using the opportunistic ‘political business cycles’ approach, we seek to 
understand whether governments in Africa have been able to implement the deflationary phase of 
the cycle to bring down fiscal deficits after the election as claimed by the political economy 
literature. We also consider the medium-term effects of natural resource endowments, focussing 
on the role of ‘boom-bust’ cycles and management of natural resource revenues in this process. 
Finally, we consider the effectiveness of external and internal institutions, through foreign aid and 
policy reforms in promoting fiscal discipline.  
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Our empirical approach employees ‘qual-quant’ methodology. In the quantitative part of the 
analysis, a standard dynamic model that captures the essence of the Nordhaus-type opportunistic 
approach is augmented by measures of the natural resource endowments and domestic and external 
institutions and estimated on a sample of 42 African countries for the period 1980-2017. Our main 
estimating techniques are the robust OLS, fixed effects and the instrumental variable estimator 
3SLS. The random effects estimator is utilised to test the robustness of our findings. Regardless of 
the estimation methods, our results confirm the existence of strong fiscal policy manipulation 
during elections (as suggested by the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the 
election variable 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡). We have found evidence that in most African ‘political business cycles’ 
the pre-election boost is not counterbalanced by the post-election cutback, as governments are 
typically afraid to enforce one because of the weak political base. The coefficients on the two 
variables created to measure capture the conduct of fiscal policy after elections, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡1 and 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡2, emerge positive and negative, respectively, but both are statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that on average pre-election surges in fiscal deficits have been hard to reverse, thereby 
presenting African governments with an unpleasant choice of surrendering to the cycle and thus 
causing a temporary deficit to persist. The results also show that natural resource intensity can 
impose on fiscal costs in the medium term mainly through weak tax effort and poor management 
of resource revenues.  
 
The qualitative evidence indicates that the sharp increase in the Zambia’s budget deficit since 
the mid-2000s, and this is linked to three factors: Zambia’s increasing democratisation has 
expressed itself in increasingly weak government resistance towards demands for higher public 
expenditure around elections as noticed during the elections in 2001, 2008 and 2015; an 
extraordinarily generous (and secretive) treatment of the tax liabilities of most of the mining 
corporation and poor management of resource revenues as during years of higher resource 
revenues, spending expanded substantially, due to political pressure from urban populations. For 
example, much of the copper booms of the late 1960s and early 1970s were spent on the 
extraordinary expansion of the role of the state, rapid expansion of basic services and an attempt 
at industrialisation, but during the slump government was unable to rollback spending, and instead 
financed the gaps by borrowing. The inability of the government to control the fiscal deficit and 
the extensive borrowing that followed resulted in one of the worst economic declines seen in 
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Africa, as the country dropped from being one of the most prosperous at independence to one the 
highest indebted on the continent by the late 1980s. During the boom between 2005 and 2008 
proceeds were channelled towards a large scale but uneconomical roads project, expansion of 
poorly designed and targeted agricultural subsidies and public sector wages, which again were 
difficult to rollback when the boom was over. As we discovered in chapter 2, natural-resource 
intensive economies such as Zambia have not just failed to successfully introduce new taxes which 
can recoup a fairer share of revenues from the resource sector, because mining companies are so 
powerful to compel government not to force heavier taxes for them to pay, but have also tended to 
be slack in their imposition of corporate taxation, making it difficult to restrain the public sector 
deficit and, of course, setting a bad example to other taxpayers by failing to encourage timely 
payment of taxes. 
 
Finally, we find that because of the poor relationship Zambia has historically had with 
donors, and more recently the increased availability of diversified sources of financing such as 
Chinese loans and commercial borrowing which do not impose strict fiscal responsibilities, its 
ability to finance pre-election boosts has not depended on the relationship with traditional aid 
donors. The reclassification of the country to lower middle-income status in 2011 caused some 
traditional aid donors to reduce development assistance and forced the country into diversifying 
its sources of development finance, thereby reducing its ability to capture aid finance. As recently 
as 2015, the government postponed an IMF bailout package in an election year but still succeeded 
in financing a pre-election boost, which produced one of the largest fiscal deficits in the country’s 
recent history. This evidently suggests that traditional donors have had influence on the conduct 
of fiscal policy, including around election time, in small open economies such as Zambia, and 
thence some ability to restrain budget deficits; but such influence may not be effective where a 
recipient country has access to diversified sources of financing.  
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